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ABSTRACT 
This work draws from history, theology, and political philosophy to address the 
question of whether it is possible to democratize the polity of the RC Church. Its 
historical part investigates two hypotheses. First, neither exegesis nor history warrants 
the absolute necessity for church unity of the political function of ἐpiισκοpiή: and much 
less do they provide sufficient evidence for upholding that such a function should be 
fulfilled exclusively or even only primarily by means of a top-down monarchical 
hierarchy. Second, in structuring their own faith community, Christians throughout 
history have adopted and at times critically adapted insights as well as structures from 
political philosophy and the human polity respectively. 
Next, it examines the few central insights political philosophy has advanced 
concerning the socio-ethical conditions for the individual’s cooperation in the common 
action of a group to be responsible. Particular attention is paid to the principle of 
subsidiarity which, it is argued, entails a precise understanding of ‘delegation’, as 
something justified only and exclusively with regard to decisions which the individual 
or lower levels deem beyond their capacity to make responsibly, because they lack 
either the relevant knowledge or the resources to implement them. The important 
implication is that the division between what can be decided autonomously and what 
should be decided by delegation must be determined by the delegating individual or 
group and not by the higher levels: it is only the former, in effect, who has the 
responsibility to decide on the appropriateness and extent of the delegation. The result is 
an original understanding of democracy’s distinctiveness as consisting in its enabling 
and fostering the rationality and responsibility of the delegation of authority, rather than 
exclusively or even primarily in the number of people to whom ultimate decisional 
power has been freely, intelligently, and responsibly delegated. 
The final section assesses the compatibility of those political insights with the 
ecclesial constitution on the basis of the scriptural and traditional evidence concerning 
the structural aspect of the Christian community. It highlights the potential hospitality of 
Christian ecclesiology to key insights of democratic political philosophy. 
This work improves on the current state of ecclesiological research in two main 
ways. The first contribution is to supply a broad historical mapping of the symbiosis 
between the Christian and the human polities, as well as ecclesiology and political 
philosophy, complementary to the many already existing specific case-studies. At the 
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theoretical level the work blends a variety of arguments developed in different domains, 
and thus also bridges several bodies of literature. To analyse the distinctiveness of the 
Christian community, it builds on traditional theological insights concerning the 
distinctiveness of the Christian individual qua Christian, as well as on political insights 
into the formation and development of community and of the cooperation it serves. In 
so doing the work links two related but—currently at least, although not in the past—
largely disconnected literatures: that on ecclesiology, and that on political philosophy. 
The genuine insights the latter has developed throughout history retain a lasting 
significance which Christians in general and ecclesiologists in particular ignore at their 
own risk. This work is an initial attempt to suggest concretely why the traditional 
symbiosis between those two disciplines is still valid and can bear fruit toward the 
solution of their shared problems. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem of Church Democratization 
One of the most intriguing and well-known characteristics of the contemporary Roman 
Catholic Church is the non-democratic character of its monarchical polity. Time and 
again some of the highest officials of that church have maintained that the church 
cannot be a democracy, and have forcefully operated to maintain the institutional status 
quo against proposals for its democratization.1 
The issue of the democratization of the church is, of course, quite momentous, and 
this for evident reasons. One, and arguably the most pragmatic, concerns the correlation 
which exists between the public perception of any organisation, and the willingness of 
                                                 
1
 On the general anti-democratic trend carried on with particular vigour since the papacy of John 
Paul II the relevant literature, both anecdotal and theoretical, is quite vast. A concise survey of the 
authoritarian elements of that period can be found in several essays of the recent collection by Gerard 
Mannion (ed.), The Vision of John Paul II: Assessing His Thought and Influence (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press, 2008), in particular: James Voiss, ‘Understanding John Paul II’s Vision of the Church’, 62–77 (esp. 
69–71); G. Mannion, ‘“Defending the Faith”: The Changing Landscape of Church Teaching Authority 
and Catholic Theology’, 78–106; Paul Lakeland, ‘John Paul II and Collegiality’, 184–99. Further 
information can be have from the biographical accounts of some of the protagonists of the RC internal 
policy during that period: e.g. John Allen, Cardinal Ratzinger: The Vatican’s Enforcer of the Faith 
(London: Continuum, 2000); Juan Arias, Giovanni Paolo II: assolutismo e misericordia, trans. C. M. 
Valentinetti (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 1996); David Gibson, The Rule of Benedict: Pope Benedict XVI 
and His Battle with the Modern World (San Francisco: Harper, 2006); Peter Hebblethwaite, Pope John 
Paul II and the Church (Kansas City MO: Sheed & Ward, 1995); Giovanni Miccoli, In difesa della fede. 
La Chiesa di Giovanni Paolo II e Benedetto XVI (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007). Particularly relevant are also the 
proceedings of trials opened against well-known theologians, inasmuch as they represent an invaluable 
source for understanding the Vatican mentality on a variety of important theological topics including, 
most to the point, exquisitely ecclesiological questions, e.g. the non-democratic, unaccountable character 
of episcopal and specifically papal power; the impossibility of public dissent (even on non-infallible 
teachings of the episcopal magisterium); the impossibility of a ‘democratic’ church from below; and so 
on. Consult in particular Paul Collins (ed.), From Inquisition to Freedom: Seven Prominent Catholics and 
their Struggle with the Vatican (London: Continuum, 2010), bringing together in a concise form the most 
important elements of the investigations and trials of Tissa Balasuriya, Lavinia Byrne, Paul Collins, 
Charles Curran, Jeannine Gramick with Robert Nugent, and Hans Küng. Among those, the trials which 
focused the most on ecclesiological topics, and whose documents are therefore most relevant for present 
purposes, are those of Charles Curran and Hans Küng, to which one should add those of Leonardo Boff 
and Edward Schillebeeckx. They have been documented in Ted Schoof (ed.), The Schillebeeckx Case: 
Official Exchange of Letters and Documents in the Investigation of Fr. Edward Schillebeeckx by the 
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1976–1980 (New York: Paulist, 1984); Peter 
Hebblethwaite, The New Inquisition? The Case of Edward Schillebeeckx and Hans Küng (London: 
Collins, 1980); Harvey Cox, The Silencing of Leonardo Boff: The Vatican and the Future of World 
Christianity (Oak Park IL: Meyer-Stone, 1988), as well as in two recent first-person accounts by Curran 
and Küng: respectively Loyal Dissent: Memoir of a Catholic Theologian (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University, 2006), 107–59, and Disputed Truths: Memoirs II (London: Continuum, 2008), esp. 428–74. 
Further examples of and reflections on the recent anti-democratic RC trend can be found in Hans Küng 
(ed.), Reforming the Church Today: Keeping Hope Alive, trans. Peter Heinegg with Francis McDonagh 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), and Küng and Leonard J. Swidler (eds.), The Church in Anguish: Has the 
Vatican betrayed Vatican II? (London: Harper & Row, 1987). For additional works consult section a) of 
the bibliography, entitled ‘Works Envisaging a Democratisation of the Church’. 
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the wider society to accept it first, and then to cooperate with it. The way authority and 
cooperation are exercised within any institution is quite an important element of its 
public image. It is well known that the unambiguously negative answer the RC 
establishment gave to the possibility of democratising the RC Church—which has been 
especially visible at least ever since Pope Gregory XVI’s Mirari vos2 and until now—
has been a cause of strong criticisms against Roman Catholicism (and often, by an 
unfortunate generalization, of Christianity in general). ‘Popery’ has long been a 
derogatory term to indicate what was perceived as the Catholics’ de-humanizing 
subjection to the absolute authority of the pope.3 Nor have similar sentiments been 
completely overcome today.4 Again, the view that the Christian polity cannot be 
democratic, while being advanced most famously by the RC ecclesiastical 
establishment, is far from being uncontroversial even within Christianity itself: rather, it 
leaves perplexed at best, and openly contrary at worst, a great number of Christians, 
many of whom are indeed Catholics.5 The perceived scandal to a variety of people 
caused by the anti-democratic character of the Roman Catholic Church has been a 
notable factor in (1) the ongoing silent schism of Roman Catholics themselves from 
their church; (2) the overt schism between that church and all other Christian churches; 
(3) the ongoing alienation of many non-Christians, agnostics, and atheists whose 
indifference, antipathy, or even repulsion for Catholicism has long been fuelled, among 
other things, by their perception of the Catholic Church as an illiberal society contrary 
to, and dangerous for, freedom and self-development at all levels: the individual, social, 
political, and cultural. 
Related to this is the link between the quality of a community’s political 
organization and its efficiency in fulfilling its mission. By determining the way 
                                                 
2
 ‘Mirari vos. Encyclical Letter on Liberalism and Religious Indifferentism’ (15th August 1832), 
available at http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Greg16/g16mirar.htm. 
3
 E.g. William Craig Brownlee, Popery: An Enemy to Civil and Religious Liberty, and Dangerous to 
Our Republic (New York: Charles K. Moore, 4th ed. 1839), available online at 
http://www.archive.org/details/poperyanenemyto00browgoog. 
4
 E.g. Paul Blanshard, American Freedom and Catholic Power (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949); 
Communism, Democracy, and Catholic Power (London: J. Cape, 1952). Significantly, Blanshard did not 
attack primarily Catholic doctrine, much less the Catholic laity—for which instead he expressed 
sympathy—but rather the authoritarian power structure to which they were ‘subjects’ (his emphasis), see 
American Freedom and Catholic Power, 5 and passim. Also noteworthy is the fact that, notwithstanding 
his strong criticism of the Roman Catholic Church as a dangerous authoritarian and anti-democratic 
institution, Blanshard was later to be invited by Pope John XXIII to come to Vatican II as a witness and 
reporter. 
5
 A recent and concise example of considerations by a RC theologian in favour of church 
democratization is Josep M. Margenat, S.J., ‘Hacia una reforma de la Iglesia’, in Joaquim Gomis (ed.), El 
Concilio Vaticano III cómo lo imaginan 17 cristianos (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 2001), 155–76 (esp. 
169–71). 
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cooperation is to be structured and, more specifically, the process for reaching decisions 
concerning collective courses of action, a community’s political layout influences the 
greater or lesser efficiency in achieving the goal towards which such common action is 
oriented. As it will be argued, among the distinguishing characteristics of a democratic 
polity is the maximisation of the knowledge brought to bear on the issues and decisions 
facing a community—while, conversely, an authoritarian political structure does not 
sufficiently exploit the common fund of experiences, insights, judgments of fact and of 
value of the community.6 Hence innumerable RC theologians have stressed, in one way 
or another—whether by emphasising the need for freedom of debate (including 
criticism and dissent), or by insisting on the episcopal hierarchy’s duty to consult both 
the relevant expertise and the wisdom of the sensus fidelium—that a thorough 
information- gathering and assessing must precede ecclesial decision-making.7 The 
much-decried poor implementation of those freedoms and of consultation in the RC 
Church, coupled with the slow haemorrhage of educated people (especially since the 
eighteenth century, and on a much greater scale since Vatican II), has stunted the 
capacity of Roman Catholicism for answering the fresh questions and challenges arising 
anew in every time and place about the mission of informing with the gospel 
individuals, societies, and cultures. In contrast, the democratization of the church has a 
considerable potential for a greater efficaciousness of the Christian community in 
creatively addressing the countless specific problems encountered in carrying out its 
                                                 
6
 As already John Stuart Mill had argued at some length, one of the elements of the merit of a 
government is the degree in which its political system is adapted to bring ‘whatever moral and intellectual 
worth exists in the community to bear upon the administration’ of public affairs, in the second chapter 
(entitled ‘The Criterion of a Good Form of Government’) of his essay Considerations on Representative 
Government, in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XIX—Essays on Politics and Society 
Part 2, ed. John M. Robson, introduction by Alexander Brady (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1977), 383–98, available also at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=234&chapter=16574&layo
ut=html&Itemid=27. For analogous considerations with regard to the church, see e.g. Leonard Swidler, 
‘Demo-kratia, the Rule of the People of God, or Consensus Fidelium’, in Swidler and Piet F. Fransen 
(eds.), Authority in the Church and the Schillebeeckx Case (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 226–43 (227–
8). 
7
 One of the RC theologians who insisted the most on this point has been Richard McCormick: see 
for instance the first eleven essays by in his collection Critical Calling. Reflections on Moral Dilemmas 
Since Vatican II (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1989), 3–208. Other theologians who have 
made similar points include: Richard Gaillardetz, Teaching with Authority. A Theology of the 
Magisterium in the Church (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1997), 144–6, 292–3; Paul Lakeland, Church: 
Living Communion (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2009), 170–2; Gerard Mannion, Ecclesiology and 
Postmodernity: Questions for the Church in our Time (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2007), 94-102; 
David J. Stagaman, Authority in the Church (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999), 126; Leonard Swidler, 
Making the Church Our Own: How We Can Reform the Catholic Church from the Ground Up (Lanham 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 127–31. 
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general mission: namely, to spread the Good News, and to concretely (co)operate for 
the advancement of God’s kingdom at the individual, social, and cultural levels.8 
We reach here what is perhaps the most serious ethical reason for considering of 
critical import the question concerning the possibility of organising the Christian 
communities democratically. It is the classic problem of reconciling individual 
autonomy and (political) authority by making real as much as possible the ultimate goal 
of collective responsibility. Such goal is to render individuals truly responsible not only 
for the lives they lead and the personal decisions they take, but also for the resultant 
situation—especially as it affects the social, political, economic, cultural and religious 
domains of life and activity in a society.9 ‘No doubt’, Bernard Lonergan observed in this 
regard, 
single elements in the resulting situation are identical with the actions or 
the effects for which individuals are responsible. But the resulting 
situation as a whole commonly was neither foreseen nor intended or, 
when it does happen that it was, still such foresight and intention are apt 
to reside not in the many but in the few and rather in secret schemes and 
machinations than in public avowal.10 
More recently, Amartya Sen developed his basic thesis that ‘the freedom of 
agency that we individually have is inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, 
political, and economic opportunities that are available to us’.11 For this reason, he 
proposed that ‘Societal arrangements [...] (the state, the market, the legal system, 
political parties, the media, public interest groups, and public discussion forums, among 
others)’ be evaluated ‘in terms of their contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing the 
substantive freedoms of individuals, seen as active agents of change, rather than passive 
recipients of dispensed benefits’.12 The guiding assumption of this work is that to the 
extent that the political structure of a community—whether the latter be political or 
religious is irrelevant—hinders rather than fosters the individual’s exercise of his/her 
                                                 
8
 Again, it was John Stuart Mill among the first to formulate most clearly the contention that the 
regime that in practice best takes advantage of and promotes the intellectual and moral riches of a 
community is a democratically representative government, see the chapter entitled ‘That the Ideally Best 
Form of Government is Representative Government’, in Considerations on Representative Government, 
op. cit., ch. III, 399–412, available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=234&chapter=16576&layo
ut=html&Itemid=27. 
9
 Lonergan, ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’, A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. 
Lonergan, ed. F. E. Crowe (Mahwah NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 169-73 (169). 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Development as Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 1999), xi. 
12
 Ibid., xii–xiii. 
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responsibility human possibility for the individual’s cooperation in determining and 
implementing common courses of action, such polity is dysfunctional and ultimately 
immoral. 
Sen has been correctly interpreted as maintaining that ‘Public deliberation and 
democratic decision making are arguably defensible ways in which citizens and their 
representatives both exercise their agency and forge good policy’.13 One of the goals of 
this work, then, is to contribute to illustrate ‘how democracy, including public 
discussion, provides procedures for collective agency’ and collective responsibility.14 As 
it will be argued, a democratic system allows each decisional level, from the individual 
upwards, to determine both what it can decide by itself, and what instead needs the 
cooperation in knowledge and/or action of the higher level. For this reason, democracy 
is today widely seen as that political arrangement which best preserves the possibility of 
a free and responsible cooperation while, by contrast, non-democratic, authoritarian 
systems of government are ordinarily deemed to a greater or lesser degree immoral—i.e. 
robbing lower decisional levels, from the individual upwards, of their responsibility and 
freedom of self-determination. Such, at least, was the point Pope Pius XI made in his 
definition of the principle of subsidiarity.15 
This ethical aspect of democracy is also highlighted, from a different angle, by the 
traditional contentions that a paternalist authority micromanaging what lies within the 
decisional and operational range of lower decisional levels, down to the individual is, 
first and most fundamentally, incompatible with autonomous (i.e. self-legislating or 
self-determining) human beings endowed with both free will as well as reason, and, 
secondly and as a consequence, it can stunt the intellectual, moral, and spiritual growth 
of its subjects. One of the best descriptions of the last point remains that of John Stuart 
Mill, according to whom—as he has been paraphrased—the decisive argument against 
despotism 
is not that most despots are tyrannical, or that absolute power corrupts 
even wise and benevolent despots, or, again, that despotism inherently 
violates individual rights. Rather, [...] Mill argues that even the most wise 
and benevolent despotism, one where the virtue of his subjects is the 
                                                 
13
 David A. Crocker and Ingrid Robeyns, ‘Capability and Agency’, in Christopher W. Morris (ed.), 
Amartya Sen (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 60–90 (84). 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 See Pope Piux XI, ‘Quadragesimo anno. Encyclical Letter on the Reconstruction of the Social 
Order’ (15th May 1931), §79 available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-
anno_en.html, and the literature in 5.4. 
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despot’s chief concern, stultifies the moral and intellectual development 
of the people by depriving subjects of the discipline of mind and 
refinement of the powers that come from the practice of self-
government.16 
The general problem had already been perceived much earlier, and indeed with 
specific reference to the case of the church: thus, already Calvin had condemned—
although without much elaboration—the ‘kind of Christianity there is under the Papacy, 
when the pastors labor to the utmost of their power to keep the people in absolute 
infancy.’17 A patriarchal and theocratic caste system where all decision-making 
authority resides only and exclusively on a percentually negligible as well as largely 
unelected, unaccountable, and self-perpetuating sacerdotal class, condemns the vast 
majority of its members to a position of relative irresponsibility, powerlessness and 
tutorage analogous to that of a minor child.18 ‘Infantilization’ of the laity is in effect one 
way in which the current ecclesiological literature describes the moral aspect of the 
dysfunctional exclusion of the laity from exercising their responsibility in determining 
the common courses of action to be implemented as a church.19 
The above are the main reasons for regarding the issue of whether the Christian 
community can be structured democratically as an urgent one: namely, that its answer 
will considerably influence the twofold essential goal of Christianity of informing with 
the gospel both Christians individually and the societies and cultures they live in. For, 
as we will see, the same can be said of democracy that has been said of one of its 
                                                 
16
 Peter Berkowitz, ‘Mill: Liberty, Virtue, and the Discipline of Individuality’, in Eldon J. Eisenach 
(ed.), Mill and the Moral Character of Liberalism (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 
1998), 13–48 (41). Mill’s original argument is expounded in ‘The Criterion of a Good Form of 
Government’, in Considerations on Representative Government, referenced in no. 6 above; also quite 
relevant are his considerations on the psychological influences of despotism in his essay The Subjection of 
Women (1869), whose best edition is in On Liberty and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 117–218 (the full text is also available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=255&chapter=21684&layo
ut=html&Itemid=27). Nadia Urbinati has rightly noted how, for Mill, infantilization is a form of 
subjection: see her Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Goverment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 172–4. 
17
 John Calvin, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians and 
Colossians, ed. David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance, trans. T. H. L. Parker, Calvin’s New 
Testament Commentaries vol. 11 (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 183 (on Ephesians 4.14). 
18
 ‘[A]s long as I can contribute advice and work but am excluded from decision-making, I remain, 
no matter how many fine things are said about my status, a second-class member of this community: I am 
more an object that is utilized than a subject who is actively responsible.’ Hans Küng, ‘Participation of 
the Laity in Church Leadership and in Church Elections’, in Eugene Bianchi and Rosemary Radford 
Ruether (eds.), A Democratic Catholic Church. The Reconstruction of Roman Catholicism (New York: 
Crossroad, 1992), 80-93 (80). 
19
 Paul Lakeland, Liberation of the Laity. In Search of an Accountable Church (New York/London: 
Continuum, 2003), 19, also 186–7, and 211. For further see Quentin de la Bédoyère, Autonomy and 
Obedience in the Catholic Church: The Future of Catholic Moral Leadership (London: T.&T. Clark, 
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constitutive principles, subsidiarity: namely, that it influences ‘the possibilities for the 
development of personal, social, and cultural life as a whole’.20 
There are, however, several arguments advanced against a democratic reform of 
the church, which need to be addressed. One is that the essential political structures of 
the church are of divine right and, as such, necessary for the existence of the church.21 
Several ecclesial institutions have been officially and explicitly affirmed by Roman 
Catholicism as having been either directly established by Christ, or indirectly 
willed/ordained by God: the twofold division between ordained priesthood and non-
ordained laity (see e.g. LG §18; cf. §10); the threefold division of the priestly order, 
and/or its descending hierarchy from bishops to priests and deacons (e.g. CD §15); the 
sacra potestas of diocesan bishops (e.g. LG §§20–1; CD §§2, 6); the primatial authority 
of the pope (e.g. Pastor aeternus, ch. 1; also CD §2). 
The disagreement concerning which ecclesial institutions, if any, are necessary for 
the existence of a Christian church is a trans-denominational issue, dividing not only 
Christians belonging to different confessions, but also those belonging to the same 
church.22 Some theologians—among whom many, but by no means all, are Roman 
Catholic and Orthodox—believe that at least some of the above ecclesial institutions 
have been established by Christ or indirectly ordained by God, and are accordingly 
essential for church existence.23 Others—especially some Anglicans—suggest a 
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distinction between different degrees of necessity: whether for the esse (being), plene 
esse (full being), or bene esse (well-being) of the church.24 Still others—many of whom 
are trained in the Lutheran theological tradition—further point to the need to distinguish 
between the external embodiment of ecclesial offices and institutions, which are 
historically relative, and the functions they fulfil—e.g. preaching the Good News, and 
ἐpiισκοpiή (oversight)—whose relative necessity is assessed against the greater or lesser 
role in carrying out the church’s mission.25 Finally, there are Christians—among whom 
a majority of the vast and varied universe of Baptist and Pentecostal churches—who 
maintain that no detailed church polity or particular ecclesial structure, and certainly 
none of the traditional ones mentioned above, is mandated as necessary either in the NT 
or in the ecclesial tradition.26 
A second objection to the democratization of the church maintains that, as a 
mystery, the ecclesial polity is radically discontinuous from the human one, so that what 
is valid for the latter is not necessarily valid for the former.27 This too is still a point of 
disagreement, with much of the recent ecclesiological literature taking exception to 
what has been dubbed the ‘theological reductionism’ or even ‘mystification’ of the 
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church, and insisting instead that relevant sociological and political insights be 
integrated in ecclesiology.28 
Finally, a third set of reasons is based simply on a negative judgment concerning 
some central features of democracy itself. Majority rule, in particular, is perceived as 
intrinsically relativistic and thus, because only truth should inform one’s beliefs and 
guide one’s actions, not to be adopted as a decisional procedure.29 This objection is the 
only one strictly philosophical in nature, and it is accordingly mostly debated in the 
literature of democratic political philosophy.30 
In contrast, both the objection stressing the existence of irreversible divinely-
willed structures, and that emphasising the uniqueness of the church as a mystery and 
the creature of God’s inscrutable will, are primarily theological. In effect, they assume a 
real discontinuity (as distinct from difference) between the church and civil society, and 
thus between ecclesiology and political philosophy. (That such assumption also 
underlies the contention concerning the existence of divinely-willed ecclesial structures 
follows from the fact that—as it will be shown—the appeal to God’s will has most often 
been used to justify [absolutist] ecclesial structures which were regarded even by their 
apologists as apparently ‘unnatural’, viz. contrary to the insights of natural law 
commonly recognized as valid and normative for the other human societies [see 3.1–
3.2]). But such can only be the case on the theological belief that a real discontinuity 
does indeed exist, at the social level at least, between the (‘merely’) human and the 
Christian, grace and nature, creation and redemption, on two basic aspects: the 
relationship between divine action and human cooperation; and the ethical norms for the 
individual’s cooperation in the common action of a group to be responsible. 
1.2 Argument and Findings of this Work 
According to the theological method outlined by Bernard Lonergan,31 such theological 
beliefs or doctrines should be assessed against the scriptural and historical data 
concerning the relationship between the Christian and the human communities with 
regard specifically to their strictly structural/institutional elements. 
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Hence, the next chapter will survey the history of the church and of ecclesiology 
to see whether or not the contention that they are discontinuous with the human 
community and political philosophy respectively is warranted. Generalising from 
numerous specific historical studies, it will suggest that, from the very beginning right 
to the present day, Christian communities have ordinarily modelled their own 
organizational outlooks by borrowing both practical structures and theoretical insights 
from the civil community (2.1–2.4).32 With regard to the practical level, a pattern will be 
uncovered of adoption and when necessary adaptation of concrete procedures from the 
civil polity, whether those concerning the selection of officials, or various kinds of 
majority voting used during representative gatherings. This is particularly noteworthy to 
the extent that we have there the importation of practices which are central to and 
defining of the nature of a polity. Yet such finding easily takes second place in light of 
the even more fascinating discovery that the symbiosis between ecclesiology and 
political philosophy went deeper than the visible level of concrete practices and 
institutions. In fact, it extended to the very theoretical explanations adduced to justify 
the latter: the most fundamental element of that theoretical identity concerns the 
consensual understanding of authority, envisaging the necessity for the free and 
responsible consent of all people concerned by and involved in any given decision or 
action, so that cooperation may be responsible; a secondary but still important element 
is the high epistemic value bestowed on the common judgment (whether unanimous or 
majoritarian) following a free public discussion. 
Last but not least, the continuity between ecclesiology and political philosophy 
will be revealed to be further adumbrated by the identity of the arguments advanced to 
vindicate a monarchical as well as absolutist form of government both in the church and 
in civil society: the Pseudo-Dionysian appeal to the top-down, hierarchical order of the 
universe; the scriptural passages witnessing to a monarchical authority as proof of 
God’s will in that regard; and, last but not least, the ‘regress’ argument in favour of a 
unique, supreme, and indivisible authority being ultimately necessary for the common 
action, peace and possibly even continued existence of a community (2.5). 
Next, a chapter each will be devoted to answering the above mentioned three sets 
of theological and philosophical objections to the democratization of the church. 
Chapter three will examine the scriptural, historical, and philosophico-theological bases 
for the claim that certain ecclesial structures or functions are willed by God and are 
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accordingly both necessary and irreformable. On the basis of the exegetical and 
historical consensus, it will argue against the possibility of regarding the external form 
of any ecclesial structure as permanent, and thus a fortiori necessary—the two 
characteristics implied in claims of divine-right (3.3). 
Such a conclusion, which is widely accepted today, has triggered a twofold shift 
in the post-Vatican II debate on ius divinum (3.4). The first one is the move away from 
understanding ius divinum as entailing an explicit scriptural institution, towards 
conceiving it as a post-apostolic, Spirit-inspired development. The problem with this, it 
will be argued, is that in the absence of a positive scriptural mandate or a miraculous 
intervention immediately revealing God’s will, the only alternative for affirming the 
divinely-willed status of any given church structure would be to acknowledge its being 
a historical development in agreement with God’s will, i.e. resulting from God’s 
indirect action through secondary causes. In the specific case at hand, that would entail 
demonstrating that supposedly ius divinum church structures have developed by means 
of divine inspiration working though the social, political, and cultural processes of 
ecclesial institutionalization, without subverting them. Yet such a solution is insufficient 
for upholding a distinct set of supposedly divinely willed ecclesial structures. When 
everything humanly achieved through cooperation with God’s grace can be said to be 
divinely-willed, the latter adjective becomes much too undefined and ultimately 
unhelpful for discerning which ecclesial institutions have evolved under the guidance of 
the Spirit and thus in accordance with God’s will, and which instead have not. The 
requirement for a clear and unmistakable divine command remains unavoidable. 
The other noteworthy post-Vatican II change in the conception of ius divinum 
consists in predicating it not anymore of the external institutional embodiment of church 
structures, but exclusively of their function, i.e. ἐpiισκοpiή (3.5). The conviction here is 
that although the external institutional embodiments of church structures varied 
substantially throughout history, such diversity should not mask their common essential 
and constitutive function, namely ἐpiισκοpiή or oversight. The permanency ab initio of 
such function would indicate its necessity, even in the absence of explicit scriptural 
evidence of its divine warrant or institution. 
In assessing this contention I will concentrate first on the most clear-cut case, by 
focusing on whether ἐpiισκοpiή can be construed scripturally or historically as necessary 
at the supra-regional or universal level (3.6). The conclusion will be that the function of 
supra-regional ἐpiισκοpiή only evolved gradually as a modification—and an arguably 
positive development—of the original network of self-governing house churches. If 
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ἐpiισκοpiή at the universal level cannot be shown to have been necessary for the church 
to exist and develop—if, in other words, it is correct that the early church has lived for 
several centuries without the ordinary exercise of such ἐpiισκοpiή at the universal level—
it cannot be affirmed to be such also at all other levels, viz. the regional and local. From 
a logical viewpoint, the burden of proof is on those who argue otherwise. Finally, the 
above conclusion will be further strengthened by consideration from political 
philosophy and political anthropology. The point of attention here is that what is both 
necessary and sufficient for a group of people to become a ‘community’ is not a central 
political authority but, more fundamentally, shared experiences, insights, judgments of 
fact, values, and goals. The constitution, preservation, and development of such a 
common fund of meanings and values is what establishes a community in the first place, 
as well as what nurtures and sustains it in time. It will be concluded, however, that an 
authority of ἐpiισκοpiή—whose exact contours will be defined later—can be quite useful 
in increasing the efficaciousness in attaining the goals of a community. 
Chapter four will focus on the distinctively post-Vatican II argument that, as a 
mystery, the church, in its organizational pattern, is not simply different but 
discontinuous with any other human polity. The chapter will outline the historical 
genealogies both of this objection and of its rejoinder, which reaffirms the essential 
continuity between the Christian and the human societies on the basis of the distinctive 
belief of Christian theology that grace perfects nature without destroying it (4.2–4.6). 
It will then expand such a traditional rebuttal by contending that the continuity 
between political philosophy and ecclesiology is real because of the real continuity 
existing between the Christian and the non-Christian person with regard to the 
cognitional and moral operations required of both to come to know intelligently and 
decide responsibly. It will be argued (4.7) that as Christian anthropology and ethics 
were based on the best available philosophical or ‘natural’ understanding of human 
beings in general, as knowing and acting agents, so the natural explanatory/systematic 
analogate for ecclesiology was and should be based on a focus on the best philosophical 
explanation of how human beings use their attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, 
and responsibility when cooperating with others towards a common goal. Whether with 
regard to evaluating the intelligence and moral worth of solitary courses of actions, or 
with regard to evaluating the intelligence and moral worth of cooperation with others, 
theological reflection is always and necessarily grounded on what has already been 
understood of human coming to know the true and the good: on the one hand, 
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(individual) cognitional and moral theory, and on the other, political philosophy and 
political ethics. 
Chapter five will turn to addressing the specifically philosophical objections 
which the official RC ecclesiology has advanced against democracy. It is the pivotal 
chapter which bridges the primarily negative, ‘destructive’ task of this work—
concerned with dismantling the chief deeply ingrained yet admittedly mistaken 
arguments precluding an open-minded critical examination of the RC ecclesial polity—
with the second and more demanding positive duty of engaging political philosophy to 
outline a coherent philosophical account of authority which can prove compatible with, 
and indeed even be demanded by some basic insights of, Christianity. 
Following Bernard Lonergan, the point of departure will be an analysis of the 
universal intentional procedure generally known as ‘belief’, by which both cognitional 
and evaluative contents discovered by separate individuals can be appropriated by 
others, and thus eventually become common (5.2.1). Historical development, it will be 
noted, is assured by the creation through belief of a common fund of knowledge, to 
which it is possible to draw as well as to contribute. Community arises precisely out of 
the cooperation in knowledge and action that emerges through the belief people grant 
each others. Individuated materially by a group of persons, a community has its own 
formal component in common meanings, values, and goals. Cooperation in knowledge 
can foster specialisation, while cooperation in action can nurture a division of labour 
integrating the sundry activities of the community members. 
Now, the power of a given community is the product of cooperation (both in 
knowledge and in action); hence belief, by enabling cooperation, is also at the basis of 
power of a given community (5.2.2). Because it is the community which collectively 
possesses and passes on the achievements of the past through a common tradition, and 
because it is the community which organises itself to make possible cooperation in the 
present, the community is the original and primary carrier of power. Cooperation 
develops as a web of responses to the actions of others. There are two most relevant 
kinds of response and ways of cooperating. First, individuals or groups may adjust their 
decisions and actions to the actions of others, so that each focuses on what s/he can do 
best while leaving to others the fulfilment of tasks s/he either cannot or has not the time 
to discharge. This develops into that socio-economic phenomenon known as ‘division 
of labour’. 
But there is a second type of cooperation which originates from the individual’s 
free decision to accept as a directive for action the choice of someone else. Such 
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decision is what is meant by ‘delegation’, and the resulting relationship is what is 
expressed by the word ‘authority’ (5.3). The relationship of authority can thus occur 
both in the field of knowledge and in that of action; and because knowledge and action 
are interrelated, the relationship of authority ordinarily involves a mix of the two. In any 
case, the central point is that, both in the cognitive and in the practical domains, the 
decision to believe/delegate should be responsible, following a judgment on the greater 
accuracy of someone else’s capacity for evaluation in comparison with one’s own. It is 
precisely such a judgment and subsequent assent—however one may want to call them: 
belief, consent, or delegation—which is the common constitutive basis of any authority. 
Hence, legitimate authority does not derive automatically from competence—and much 
less from office—but rather from the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and 
free consent given to the perceived competence of some person or group (5.3, compare 
5.5). 
It is quite significant that such description of a responsible delegation yields the 
principle of subsidiarity (5.4). For to the extent that one is only justified in delegating 
what one deems to be beyond their capacity to make a responsible decision, it is 
irresponsible to delegate to others a decision that one could make by oneself, in an 
equally or even more responsible way. In agreement with this, the principle of 
subsidiarity suggests that, on the one hand, each decisional level (from the individual 
upward) has an inalienable responsibility to decide and act within its own operational 
range and, on the other hand, that only those actions which cannot be achieved by the 
individual or the smaller group alone, can be appropriately achieved through recourse to 
the higher level of a structured community. Moreover, attention will be drawn to a 
further unavoidable postulate of subsidiarity, namely that the division between what can 
be decided autonomously and what should be decided by delegation must be determined 
by the delegating individual or group and not by the higher levels. For it is only the 
former who has the responsibility to decide on the appropriateness and extent of the 
delegation. 
The central part of the chapter will therefore address one of the key contemporary 
challenges facing democracy in differentiated societies, namely, that of integrating 
expert knowledge into the decision-making process without falling into the danger of a 
rule by experts (5.6). The problem is to make possible the determination by the 
delegants of the area, scope, and limits of an authority which, being specialised, cannot 
be evaluated by those who are not expert in the relevant field(s). Several ways can be 
employed in making it possible for the community to evaluate and hold accountable 
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specialised or expert authorities. One consists in an a posteriori assessment of their 
effectiveness in solving the issues for which their help has been sought. Another is more 
pro-active and is accomplished by setting standards of peer-review with regard to expert 
education, training, and research findings. The point of attention here is that the 
recognition and legitimation of specialised authority—just as for any other authority—
must be dependent on agreed standards of expertise and so, ultimately, on the consent of 
its audience, and that makes it democratic, in principle at least. But the most important 
factor tempering the danger of rule by experts is arguably the fact that the (admittedly 
necessary) use of expert knowledge and findings is always shaped by and subject to the 
shared values and priorities of the (majority of) the community (see below, the outline 
of 5.8). 
The argument will then contend (5.7) that because the decision to delegate 
authority to someone else on a (generally limited) issue is only justified against a 
previous judgment concerning the greater knowledge or expertise of the delegate with 
regard to the specific area being delegated, ordinarily delegation is never omni-
comprehensive, but rather always specific: limited both to what the delegant does not 
yet needs to know in order to decide responsibly, and to what the delegate is being 
recognized as competent in. Differently put, authorities are such exclusively in the 
specific domain in which they are recognized as being competent, and an 
omnicompetent authority is only possible to the extent that a single person or body can 
be recognized as omnicompetent. In effect, none of the innumerable specialised 
authorities present in a differentiated community can be hierarchically subject to any 
authority outside its field of expertise because such authority, whether primarily 
specialised or coordinative, would not have by definition any competence outside the 
limited domain determined by its competence. 
Such an understanding of contemporary differentiated societies as encompassing 
countless mutually dependent yet autonomous authorities in every field of human 
knowledge and activity does not exclude—rather it calls for—the possibility of an 
authority coordinating those specialised authorities for the purposes of societal 
cooperation (5.8). While it does not admit that such political authority might exercise 
such cooperation through hierarchical subordination, it does allow what might be called 
a ‘functional’ coordination of their expertise on the basis of the wishes, desires, needs, 
values, and goals of the community. Put differently, the primary and distinctive function 
of a political authority is not that of micro-managing those specialised authorities, but 
rather that of making decisions that determine the general direction of common action. 
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Such function it accomplishes by (1) seeking the relevant (expert) competence 
whenever needed by the complex issues to be addressed, and thus accepting their purely 
technical findings as correct; (2) subjecting their import for policy-making to the scale 
of values, priorities, and goals of the (majority of the) community, which it represents. 
Finally (5.9–5.11), the two main objections against majority rule as potentially 
tyrannical and relativistic will be met by a double clarification. First (5.10), delegation 
to the majority is not motivated by a belief that majority decisions will be invariably 
correct, but merely that, on an assumption of roughly equal competence of the body 
deliberating by majority, there is a greater probability that the truth is approached by the 
majority than the minority. In this sense, delegation to the majority is a mere prudential 
decision, which can be responsible either when one is unsure about which of the 
alternative courses of action proposed is the best, or when one of the them is indeed 
deemed morally misguided (although not completely unacceptable), and yet the 
consequences of its implementation are considered to be a lesser evil than what would 
follow inaction. Secondly (5.11), in a democratic system, the conditions for delegation 
to be responsible, and specifically the principle of subsidiarity, do not permit majority 
decisions to trample on the minority’s most strongly held, absolutely non-negotiable 
principles and values, and thus degenerate into a dictatorship of the majority. 
Chapter six will inquire about whether the requirements for a responsible 
cooperation outlined in the previous chapter are compatible with some relevant 
scriptural and traditional data on the church, as well as with the current polity of the RC 
Church (6.1). The first issue addressed will be whether ecclesiastical authority is 
essentially different from civil authority (6.2). The answer will point out that the real 
antithesis is not between ecclesiastical and civil authority, but between divine-right and 
consensual conceptions of authority. Their crucial difference lies in their opposite 
understandings of the relationship between divine action and human cooperation. In 
one, such relationship is conflictual: the king or pope by divine right is a monarch 
imposed (and potentially forced) by God on (or over against) the intelligence and 
responsibility of free people. In the other, God leaves that human beings exercise the 
intelligence, responsibility and freedom He endowed them with to discern His will for 
them and carry it out. According to this latter understanding, God ordinarily governs 
everything in the universe through secondary causes: so that, with regard to the specific 
case of human beings, God’s sovereignty over them occurs by a gracious and ongoing 
offer of communion in love, which however compelling leaves intact their intelligence, 
responsibility, and freedom. In the language of the Scholastics, God is indeed the causa 
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prima of authority, but it is human consent which, ordinarily, is its causa secunda, in 
the church just as in the civil society. Nor is it possible to defend a divine-origin 
understanding of authority on the grounds that the consent to ecclesial authority—
differently from the consent constitutive of civil authority—is ultimately based on the 
assent of faith. In effect, the assent of faith, while supernatural (to the extent that, 
according to the traditional Scholastic explanation, a gracious prevenient action by God 
is necessary for it), retains its supremely human substratum. In it, human intelligence, 
responsibility, and freedom cooperate with and are actively raised by divine grace: yet 
they are by no means superseded or destroyed, and so the assent of faith is based on and 
presupposes all the human characteristics essentially constitutive of the consent to a 
human (including political) authority. 
Moreover, the assent of faith is only the remote cause for ecclesiastical authority, 
whether sacramental or jurisdictional. Its most proximate cause is an (attentive, 
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible) judgment focusing on the perceived 
(intellectual and moral) competence/charism of someone, and the consequent decision, 
if need be, to appoint/ordain him/her. This is analogous to the distinction between the 
legitimacy and legitimation of authority: one must distinguish the legitimacy (i.e. 
authenticity) of the ‘empowerment from above’, of the divinely bestowed ‘sacramental 
power to mediate grace’—or, more scripturally, of those charisms supernatural in 
origins—per se, from the legitimation to exercise it, which requires discernment 
followed by consent. 
To understand authority as based on consent translates concretely in envisaging 
church officials as being selected by the community, whether directly or 
representatively, through a properly devised electoral procedure (6.3). However 
structured, such procedure should respect subsidiarity, that is the inalienable 
responsibility of each level, from the individual upwards, to determine both what is 
within and what is beyond the possibilities of one’s competences and charisms. 
Subsequently, the chapter will address two dysfunctional centralizations affecting 
the current RC Church. The first is a centralization of competences: the monarchical 
authority exercised by the hierarchy is conceived as including each and all domains of 
church life (6.4). The obvious problem with this is that for an authority (of ἐpiισκοpiή) to 
have decision-making power over all the many specialised areas of church life it would 
have to possess all the innumerable specialised competences involved. Because that 
cannot be the case, the solution ordinarily advanced is to insist and even require that 
bishops inform themselves through consultation. The contribution of political 
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philosophy to this problem can, once again, prove illuminating. The authority of 
ἐpiισκοpiή in the Christian church would have two main functions analogous to those 
fulfilled by the political authority in civil society. One would be that of overseeing—as 
distinct from micromanaging—the performance of those who are recognized to be the 
community’s specialised authorities. The other would be that of deciding and guiding 
the common action of the community in agreement with the latter’s distinctive scale of 
values and goals. For the authority of ἐpiισκοpiή, just as the political authority in civil 
society, is distinctive with regard to the other authorities in the community in that it is 
selected not on the basis of specialised or technical expertise, but on the basis of its 
representativeness of the values, priorities and goals of the (majority of the) community. 
Most often such policy-making necessitates the findings of the specialised 
authorities within the Christian community. For this reason, and analogously to political 
authority in civil community, the authority of ἐpiισκοpiή (which cannot normally possess 
all the expertise needed to plan and decide common policies) must defer to the relevant 
specialized authorities as a matter of moral duty, by means of the legal 
institutionalization of binding forms of collaboration (either by consultation or by 
delegation) with the Christian community’s specialised authorities—including its 
structures of knowledge and evaluation such as universities, think tanks, and so on. 
Once it has gathered the relevant specialised findings, the authority of ἐpiισκοpiή can 
proceed to make informed decisions on their basis but informed by and subject to the 
Christian community’s values, priorities and goals, which it represents. 
The second is the centralization resulting from the disregard of the normative limit 
subsidiarity imposes on authority, namely that of only acting on those issues which are 
judged by the lower level as beyond its range (6.5). There are scriptural grounds for the 
oft-repeated dominical mandate to exercise authority not by ‘lording it over’ (which I 
interpret as micro-managing in disregard of subsidiarity) but as a ‘service’ whose goal, 
as the apostle Paul elaborated, would be to help people help themselves and develop 
their own competences/charisms (Eph 4.12). This section will also highlight the chief 
elements in the RC canon law currently in force which are in open contrast to 
subsidiarity. 
Finally (6.7), attention will be given to the necessity of free and public discussion 
within the church—a discussion which includes the possibility of public dissent on 
everything but the few essential, scripturally unambiguous beliefs of Christianity. Free 
and public discussion is necessary because it is what enables both the emergence of a 
community of meanings, values, and goals, and its subsequent development and 
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evolution. Criticism towards such tradition is necessary because all cultural or religious 
traditions—including Christianity—can come at one time or another to incorporate 
inauthentic, unjust, indeed un-Christian meanings and values. The impossibility of 
public criticism is the death-sentence of any society, as well as any cultural or religious 
tradition: for just as self-critique is an absolutely necessary premise for individual 
conversion—conversion always stems from the realization of the sinfulness of one’s 
own current ways—so public debate and critique is an absolutely necessary premise for 
social and cultural conversion, and this applies within the church as well. Hence the 
critical assessment of tradition necessary for its ongoing renewal and development 
largely depends, as far as human means are concerned, on the existence of the freedoms 
of information, thought, communication, and public debate. 
Chapter seven will close the work by suggesting promising directions for 
expanding the conclusions reached. 
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2 ECCLESIOLOGY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: 
HISTORICAL SURVEY 
2.1 Introduction 
It has been maintained in the introductory chapter that the section of ecclesiology 
studying the structures of the church should make more use than at present of the results 
of political philosophy. The symbiotic relationship between those two disciplines 
depends on their having an analogous object, which can be briefly described as the 
study of cooperation and common action towards a common goal in the human and the 
Christian communities respectively. Such study includes, most significantly, the 
examination of the moral conditions for the individual’s cooperation in the common 
(i.e. political) action of a group to be responsible. Among such general moral 
conditions, particularly relevant are the specific ones to be fulfilled for delegation to be 
responsible and not, instead, a desertion of responsibility. It is precisely the fact that 
both ecclesiology and political philosophy share their object of study that has made it 
possible for ecclesiology to integrate and develop the insights of political philosophy on 
that subject, as well as the political structures implementing them. Such an approach to 
ecclesiological method has been traditional since the very beginning. 
The scrutiny of such a claim will be done, first, against history. No comprehensive 
historical survey exists which analyses the entire history of the development of ecclesial 
structures from the vantage point of its relationship with the socio-cultural structures at 
each epoch in church life. What we have, instead, are many specialist studies witnessing 
to that practice, especially at key stages in history. Building on their basis, this chapter 
will offer a brief and necessarily very selective survey of some of the most important 
historical instances of the Christian community borrowing from the civil one both 
practical structures and theoretical insights. 
2.2 The First Millennium 
A most evident instance of the Christian borrowing from the natural understanding of 
the human polity occurred with regard to the very term ‘ἐκκλησία’ to designate the 
assemblies of the disciples of Jesus. In order to understand its meaning it is certainly 
necessary to investigate its older Jewish connotation in the Septuagint, where it 
generally refers to the people of Israel gathered before God to listen to Him, within a 
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strong eschatological perspective.1 Yet it would be hazardous and hardly justifiable to 
rule out or ignore that the term was also chosen by the newly formed Christian 
community in preference over other possible ones because of the meaning it had in the 
surrounding pagan Roman society, to which the Gospel was to be preached, of a 
democratic assembly of free citizens.2 It might indeed be surmised that the early 
Christians’ choice of terms possessing such an ambivalent connotation was made 
precisely in order to convey the self-understanding of their own community not only to 
the Jews (ἐκκλησία as the continuation of the Old Testament ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ spoken 
of in the Septuagint) but also to their predominantly pagan neighbours (ἐκκλησία as the 
community of equals, as brothers and sisters in Christ).3 Their choice also suggests that 
often the appropriation of secular terms was not without critical distancing and indeed 
even positive development. So, in the very act of ‘receiving’ the basic, fundamental 
secular political meaning of ἐκκλησία, Christians purified it, and transcended its most 
outstanding limitations by including the categories of women, children, and slaves 
which had been excluded in the secular use of the term.4 Again, primitive Christianity 
was essentially constituted of independent cooperating house churches, that is, it took 
‘the οἶκος, the Greco-Roman city family house, as the pastoral basis for the whole of the 
Christian movement, since as well as gathering in houses in this way, the first Christians 
remained faithful to the temple or synagogue.’5 Indeed, it appears that ‘the first 
Christians saw themselves within Judaism as a “free organization” (collegium) that 
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gathered “at the house of”, in the Greco-Roman usage of the time, collegium quod est in 
domu Sergiae Paulinae, the free community or the free association which meets at the 
house of X.’6 
Also notable is the fact that the NT and early Christian writings do not resort to 
cultic or priestly language to describe those members of the community fulfilling an 
official ministry, but rather preferred to borrow entirely from the ‘secular’ political 
domain. Both Judaism and the Greco-Roman culture used priestly, cultic language to 
designate its religious and political hierarchies, to underscore their mediatorial and even 
representative function of the divine to the people. The significance of the rejection of 
what was a traditional, widely accepted use in the two main cultural systems which had 
nurtured and shaped all primitive Christians cannot be overestimated. Ἐpiίσκοpiοι and 
διάκονοι ‘were simple, widely known titles, yet not precisely defined and therefore in 
their very breadth of meaning capable of a new and specific use. It is worth noting that 
the Christians chose modest words which did not of themselves raise any spiritual 
claims.’7 Paul’s letters in particular witness to the feature—most striking to 
contemporary Roman Catholic ecclesiology—that ‘there is […] no theological 
legitimation of these positions. [They] are assumed to be in existence and are regarded 
in purely functional terms.’8 
Again, Hermann Josef Sieben has individuated three major procedural styles for 
the common discernment and decision-making which emerged during the second, third 
and fourth centuries, and all of them are of secular origins. The first involved the public 
debate and judgment on controversial issues ‘conducted as occasions of inquiry leading 
to the determination of error, the demonstration of corresponding truth, its acceptance 
by the perpetrators of error, and its endorsement by the Christian congregation within 
which the dialogue took place.’9 There is evidence that the style of such public debates 
was ‘the critical analysis of specific issues in the form of question and answer common 
to the philosophical schools of the time’.10 In addition, inasmuch as it was a method 
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suitable not only for learning (growing in understanding of the Good News) and 
deciding but also for teaching, it was also commonly adopted by the teachers 
(διδάσκαλοι) in the Christian communities during the second and third centuries in the 
East. 
Initially, the practice of public debate/deliberation was confined to matters 
internal to the local house-churches; it was the decision-making pattern of relatively 
isolated Christian οἶκοι and ἐκκλησίαι which were self-governing with regard to the 
preservation, discernment, and development of the Good News they had welcomed.11 
But with the increase in supra-regional interconnectedness and communications such 
method was extended to the discernment of controversial issues between different local 
churches, thus giving life to important public discussions. It was the result of ‘the need 
for congregational clarifications in matters of teaching and practice, and this was part 
and parcel with the process leading to the emergence of the Catholic mainstream’.12 
Indeed, 
[T]he mainstream emergence has come to be recognized as having been a 
process, at least in some important cases, of the recognition of 
commonalities in doctrine and practice among specific groups which bore 
the Christian name, and by their own self-definition or differentiation 
from other groups which had significantly different orientations or 
doctrinal stands. It seems evident also that the struggles for identity and 
mutual recognition among the groups were increasingly the occasion of 
both intra- and inter-congregational discussion and that the discussions 
and decisions regarding acceptable teachings resulting from these 
attempts towards the resolution of issues were, in fact, the beginnings of 
conciliar action.13 
The second style of ecclesial decision-making was precisely the properly conciliar 
and synodical one, in both disciplinary and doctrinal matters, essentially mutuated from 
Roman parliamentary procedures.14 And, in this case again, it seems that valuable 
political insights and practices were not simply imported but were rather also improved 
upon.15 When supra-local meetings began to be held, they partook of the very same 
parliamentary procedure which, first used by the Roman senate, had become widespread 
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in the civil administration of the entire Roman Empire. It was a four-staged process 
involving: 1. the relatio setting forth the matter to be discussed; 2. statement of opinions 
by individual bishops/senators; 3. voting; and 4. preparation of the written decree 
resulting therefrom, to be sent as a letter to the interested parties. The emulation 
extended to the smallest details of the style of the formulae and protocols.16 In short: ‘If 
the Greco-Roman “domus” was a model for the organization of early Christian 
churches, Greco-Roman public assemblies most likely provided procedural and 
institutional models for early Christian assemblies’.17 
What is most significant for present purposes is that the conciliar system and the 
practice of electing ἐpiίσκοpiοι were based on and justified by the principle of consent—
the same normative rationale developed for the analogous practices exercised in the 
Greco-Roman world.18 Its original value, as espoused by Plato, Aristotle, and other early 
Greek philosophers, was primarily epistemological, as ‘a basis for the discovery of truth 
and ethical values and that the principle later became applied to Roman and Christian 
institutional life’.19 Its application to the social and political sphere, with regard to the 
discernment of the common good, was soon to follow, and is already to be found in 
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Cicero’s translation of the expression ὁµολογία (or κοινωνία) τῶν ἀνθρώpiων as 
consensus omnium.20 
The two chief manifestations of such theoretical framework, in both the Christian 
and the non-Christian polities, were the understanding of the election of officials, and 
the method for political (i.e. common) decision-making. So we find that 
Under Augustus and his successors during the period of the Principate 
and beyond, the head of state, in fictionalized theory, was called to 
sovereignty by the consensus of gods and men (deorum hominumque 
consensus ad imperium vocatus), and the senate and other deliberative 
bodies sought decisions by consensus. The Christian Church, growing to 
maturity in this society quite naturally (and certainly in a congenial 
relation with its own practice as a self-governing community) applied the 
consensus principle and adapted Roman governmental practice to its own 
institutional life. The appointment of bishops by God and men and the 
conciliar system with its consensual protocol are major applications.21 
Such practices by the Christian community, then, originate from and were analogous to 
their secular model in both their practical procedures and their theoretical foundations. 
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the understanding of the relationship of 
authority operative in any given community is the discernment and appointment of its 
officials. That includes observing, on the one hand, who or which body is understood 
should discern/appoint those most apt to be in positions of authority, and, on the other 
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hand, the procedure(s) utilized toward that goal. If there is continuity between the 
ecclesial and the human communities, then we should expect that the solutions to those 
issues reached in the political domain be mirrored in the ecclesial one. The above 
reveals that the early Christians mutuated from the surrounding Greco-Roman world not 
only the qualifications and the procedures for their discernment and appointment of 
office holders, but also the theory behind them. 
According to Sieben, the last political pattern of decision-making which some 
important Christian churches were to adopt from the Roman society concerns the 
judicial procedure. At about the time when Christians started enjoying more freedom of 
self-government, Roman judicial procedure underwent an important change from the 
formulary system, in force from around 150 BCE until around 342 CE, to the cognitio 
procedure, 
in which a state-appointed professional judge presided over the whole 
case, deciding questions both of law and of fact, and giving judgements 
which, unlike those of the earlier iudex, could be the subject of appeal 
through the judicial hierarchy up to the emperor himself.22 
It appears that this new procedure ‘was taken over by the courts of the Church and was 
the basis of the medieval Romano-canonical procedure’23 with the papacy at the top. 
Specifically, it seems to have been the procedure adopted at the council of Aquileia in 
381, ‘at which Ambrose of Milan sat as “public prosecutor and principal judge” by 
commission of the Emperor Gratian in the heresy trial of the Illyrian bishops Palladius 
and Secundianus’.24 Thus, in addition to 
the ecclesiastical adaptation of the parliamentary style, which clearly 
dominated the procedural pattern of the synods and councils both regional 
and ecumenical during the fourth and fifth centuries and beyond, Sieben’s 
demonstration of the adaptation of the other two modes further illustrates 
the willingness of, and indeed necessity for, the churchmen of our period 
[i.e. third and fourth centuries] to adapt the modes and procedures of civil 
society to ecclesial use.25 
Another quite important such adaptation is also worth noting, concerning the 
principle of apostolic succession (διαδοκή, as distinct from piαράδοσις, tradition), 
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probably drawn from the practice, common among philosophical schools in the Greco-
Roman world, of drawing up lists of succession.26 Finally, the process of adaptation of 
the secular political insights and institutions became both more widespread and more 
public with the greater freedom to develop and organize itself following the legalization 
of Christianity by Constantine. It extended to the very names used for the territorial 
divisions in ‘dioceses’, their geographical delimitations, and, most to the point, their 
ranking.27 
Likewise noteworthy is the use by the famous third canon of the First Council of 
Constantinople (381) of the expression ‘prerogative of honour’ (piρεσβεία τῆς τιµῆς). 
Following the place ‘honour’ had in the Greco-Roman world, that expression arguably 
indicates not a merely formal, ‘honorific’ dignity but rather a jurisdictional authority—
and in fact can. 28 gave the patriarchate of Constantinople a jurisdictional power of 
oversight and as an appeal court over a large part of the East. If this interpretation is 
correct, it supplies another relevant instance of the borrowing of structures and concepts 
of Roman law by the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the time.28 
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and the Primacy of Constantinople’, in Catholicity and the Church (Crestwood NY: SVS Press, 1983), 
121–42 (esp. 131–3). For a bibliography on the extent to which the hierarchical order of the various local 
church and patriarchates followed Roman Imperial organization, see Randall Lee, Jeffrey Gros (eds.), The 
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directly from Roman law. Again, a recent survey of the importation of the notion of privilegium from 
Roman law to ecclesiology and canon law can be found in Alan McCormack, The Term ‘Privilege’. A 
Textual Study of Its Meaning and Use in the 1983 Code of Canon Law, Ph.D. thesis (Rome: Pontificia 
Università Gregoriana, 1997), esp. 6–14. 
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A further illustration of the fact that the import from secular sources extended to 
the level of theory since an early date in the church’s life is provided by the emergence 
of a distinctive, quite original, and hugely influential (down to the present day) way of 
conceiving the Petrine primacy by pope Leo I (440-61), as Walter Ullmann among 
others has argued.29 Leo I succeeded, for the first time ever, in providing a lasting—if, I 
shall argue, anachronistic—answer to the remarkably difficult task of justifying the 
crucial link between the person of the pope and Peter. The issue was justifying those 
prerogatives which the pope was thought to have, by explaining how they passed from 
Peter—who was supposed to have exercised them—to the bishops of Rome after Peter’s 
death. Leo I justified that passage by employing the Roman law on inheritance. He 
claimed that the pope was to be understood as the heir and successor of Peter. Now, 
according to classical Roman law, there existed complete juristic identity between 
successor, or heir, and the deceased person: the latter is literally continued in the former, 
and takes her place by receiving all the assets, liabilities, and, most to the point, the 
office, which were of the deceased person (‘Haereditas est successio in universum 
ius’).30 The claims for papal prerogatives were thus justified by the fact that each pope 
was the successor to Peter, in the legal sense of the word and with the consequences 
spelled out by Roman law, and thus enjoyed the latter’s powers for the fulfilment of the 
Petrine office. It enabled the elaboration of ‘a full-fledged’ theory ‘culminating in the 
juristic succession of the pope to St. Peter’31 which is still in place at present.32 
Some comments by Ullmann on this development are worth reporting. The move 
towards understanding papal primacy and its prerogatives entirely in terms of Roman 
law at the time of Leo I was not only ‘understandable’—for the Petrine commission was 
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 Walter Ullmann, ‘Leo I and the Theme of Papal Primacy’ [1966], in Ferguson (ed.), Church, 
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 ‘Leo I and the Theme of Papal Primacy’, 367. 
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 ‘The readiness with which the following pontificates operated with this [juristic] form of 
governmental action and instruction would indeed prove how fertile the soil was for juristic 
argumentation’, 365; and he clarified: ‘From the purely intellectual standpoint it can be said without fear 
of gainsaying that the medieval papacy was built on the juristic foundations laid by Leo’, ibid., 380 (cf. 
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understood as a (primarily) judicial power—but in a sense necessary and inevitable, as 
Roman law contributed the only available theoretical tools in order to promote a deeper 
understanding. Not only could the plenitudo potestatis not have been conceived 
otherwise than in juridical terms;33 but also, and even more importantly, ‘[o]nly through 
the juristic element of succession […] could the theme of Petrine powers continuing in 
the pope be established. And as long as this juristic link was not forged, the primatial 
claim of the papacy rested upon somewhat insecure and brittle foundations’.34 Hence its 
importance: 
Leo’s conclusion made a permanent contribution to the ecclesiological 
thought of the papacy, establishing as he did satisfactorily, that is, on a 
purely juristic basis, the continuity of the Petrine office in the pope, not 
because the latter occupied the same chair or because Peter’s tomb was in 
Rome, but because he was the heir of St. Peter. […] Within the precincts 
of the theme of papal primacy Leo’s theology appeared in the garb of 
Roman jurisprudence: it is nothing more and nothing less that juristic 
theology, as the originator of which he may well be claimed.35 
Hence, also, Ullmann’s warning: 
Now that—thanks to the Leonine argumentation—the juristic tissues are 
laid bare, it is no longer possible to air such sloppy and spongy views as 
that of a ‘mystical union between St. Peter and the pope’ or of a 
‘persönliche Erbheiligkeit’. What did exist was a juristically operative 
succession to a status or an office, and there is nothing mystical about 
this…36 
As well as his quite notable conclusion: 
It is of no less moment to observe that it could only be by bringing juristic 
considerations to bear upon this crucial and vital problem of the Petrinity 
of the pope that all the potentialities inherent in papal Petrinity could be 
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envisaged and stated with a clarity for which it is difficult to find an 
adequate parallel.37 
Arguably, Leo was not interested in contending that the popes really were the 
historical legal successors of Peter according to Roman law: but what he did want to do 
was to point to the institution of the Roman law of inheritance and maintain that the 
way in which the heir inherits the content of the office of the deceased person can 
explain analogously how the pope should be understood as inheriting the function and 
powers which Peter had. 
Such theory, which will strongly contribute to shaping the future of the RC 
Church, is based on an analogical construction with civil society, and represents a good 
instance of the exploitation of juridical concepts for clarifying ecclesiological issues. 
With this, Ullmann’s final assessment has arguably a broader application than to the 
issue of the primacy alone; it hints at the role that cultural development plays in the 
development of doctrine—in our case, the role the development of political philosophy 
plays in the development of ecclesiology. 
These are but a few instances of the ‘“environmental influences” of Roman law 
and the Roman constitution on the organizational complexion of the Roman Church’.38 
The influence of Roman law on both the civil and the ecclesial societies was to be 
somewhat diminished in the West for several centuries after the fall of the Western 
Roman empire, before its rediscovery in the twelfth century. Still, the intervening period 
continued to witness to parallels being routinely drawn between the secular and the 
ecclesiastical hierarchies. Specifically, when dealing with the different ordines within 
the holistic conception of Christendom, 
Some authors conceived of two parallel ordines, clerical and lay, the 
official of the ecclesiastical hierarchy having exact counterparts in the 
secular hierarchy. Pope and emperor were equivalent ranks, as were 
patriarchs and patricii, archbishops and kings, metropolitans and dukes, 
bishops and counts, down to the lowest levels of the two hierarchies. The 
symmetry of this vision of Christian society appealed in the twelfth 
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century to Honorius Augustodunensis and Hugh of St Victor, as well as to 
anonymous illuminators of manuscripts.39 
We thus arrive to the period which best evidences the importations into 
ecclesiology of insights and practices from political philosophy. 
2.3 From the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Century 
The period beginning from the twelfth century is significant for an examination of the 
method to be used in ecclesiology for it is then that attention to the church as an 
institution assumed the contours of a distinct and important discipline of its own. 
Previously, the church did not get separate treatment, only passing considerations within 
broader arguments on the various homiletic or more theoretical patristic texts. The 
language used was not technical but mostly metaphorical, made up of images from the 
bible and the Fathers. Ecclesiology as a subject in its own right and with its own proper 
techniques only emerged in the Middle Ages. It is conventional for histories of 
ecclesiology to see in James of Viterbo’s De regimine christiano (1301–2) the first 
treatise wholly dedicated to the institutional Church.40 
In the period from the mid-twelfth century to the mid-thirteenth the Roman curia 
developed considerably, enabling the papacy to greatly extend its operational range and 
thus the possibilities of centralization. As Oakley put it, 
Only in the second half of the eleventh century, indeed, with their 
vigorous leadership first of the Gregorian reform and, later, of the 
crusading movement, did the popes begin to undertake a more than 
intermittent exercise of judicial authority and of truly governmental 
power over the entire universal Church. Only in the thirteenth century, 
with the rapid expansion of that governmental role, did they come to be 
viewed as credible claimants to the plenitudo potestatis, the fullness of 
jurisdictional authority over that Church. And only with that development 
did they begin to emerge in no small measure as sacral monarchs, true 
medieval successors of the erstwhile Roman emperors, claiming many of 
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the attributes of those emperors and using some of their titles, surrounded 
by their ceremonies, wearing their regalia, exploiting their laws, and 
eventually showing little hesitation about invoking the most secular of 
sanctions against those powers that seemed seriously to threaten their 
imperial position.41 
The papacy’s ecclesial domain of action included legislating through decretals, 
acting as a court of appeal or through delegate judges, collecting taxes, especially by 
means of ‘papal preferment to vacant benefices all over Europe of candidates selected at 
Rome, as well as the papal creation on behalf of other selected candidates of 
‘expectancies’ for benefices not yet vacant’.42 It seems that in the eight years of his 
pontificate, Pope Benedict XII’s (1334–42) issued ‘a total of 4,002 provisions and 
expectancies (i.e. provisions to benefices not yet vacant) [...]—by any standards a 
massive intervention in the realm of collation to benefices, and one that was to be 
intensified under his papal successor’.43 All the above was the unprecedented, concrete 
factual basis both resulting from and justifying the papal claim to a plenitude of 
jurisdictional power over the universal church; indeed, it ‘represented an immense and 
systematic intensification in the exercise of that power’.44 
Another significant area of the symbiosis between ecclesiology and political 
philosophy during the Middle Ages has been the voting procedures, especially for 
appointing officials. ‘All of the ancient and medieval choice theorists worked in the 
context of practical elections and electoral systems in the Roman Senate or the medieval 
Church.’45 Ancient and medieval authors, such as e.g. Pliny the Younger, Ramon Lull, 
and Nicholas Cusanus, were confronted with the very same disadvantages intrinsic to 
any voting procedure, whether within or without the church, and devised several voting 
methods to overcome them. Their ‘precocious insights into strategic voting and agenda 
manipulation—issues that are still current—push back the invention dates of such 
procedures as rank-order count, exhaustive pairwise voting, and approval voting by 
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several centuries.’46 The very concrete advantages and disadvantages of such different 
voting procedures as unanimity, majority, qualified majority and two-thirds majority, 
exclusion vote (where a two-thirds majority votes to exclude one of the candidates), 
approval balloting (where voters can vote for more than one candidate in order of 
preference), were all studied and implemented within the church for the appointment of 
its office-holders (pope included). Indeed, 
The history of Church decisions about electoral rules seems to have been 
driven by successive reactions to unintended, undesirable effects of 
previous decisions. The change from unanimity rule to two-thirds 
qualified-majority rule was fortunate, from the perspective of modern 
social choice literature, since the two-thirds rule makes cycles and 
unstable decisions for a limited number of candidates impossible. The 
trade-off, however, was the time needed to reach a final decision. […] 
[T]he delays provoked by the requirements of qualified-majority rule 
were curbed somewhat by the physical and material restraints on the 
cardinals while locked up in conclave, as well as by the cardinals’ 
prerogative to approve more than one candidate [i.e. ‘approval 
voting’]…47 
The successive reforms of the rules for electing popes during the Middle Ages can 
be explained as a series of rational responses to some recurring drawbacks and 
problematic outcomes of electoral procedures, adopted in reaction to unintended 
consequences of the previous electoral reforms. In all this, canonists’ and theologians’ 
belief that the outcomes of the elections—especially papal elections—ought to 
correspond to God’s will did not stop them to investigate the insights from political 
philosophy concerning how best to implement the human means for discovering the 
truth. Concretely, a theoretical development can be traced which culminated in the 
eventual vindication of majority rule: thus the problems deriving from attempts at 
weighing the votes on the basis of the ‘soundness’ (sanioritas) or quality of voters were 
eventually solved at the theoretical level by the affirmation that sanioritas should 
ordinarily be presumed to reside with the majoritas, especially if the latter is a large 
(e.g. two-third) majority—an evaluation of majority rule which contrasts somewhat 
with that of the recent RC magisterium.48 In summary, ‘theories of election, office, and 
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jurisdiction belonged to the canonist’s stock in trade’,49 as did theories of representation 
and delegation. 
Most interestingly for present purposes, the foundational problems regarding the 
locus and origins of authority—jurisdictional as well as ecclesiastical, according to a 
division which was to have considerable fortune in later history—were investigated and 
made to bear upon the issues of the day, mainly touching the right relationship and 
extent of the jurisdiction of the pope with that of—in the chronological order in which 
the disputes arose—temporal rulers (the struggle for the investitures of [lord-]bishops); 
the bishops (the quarrels on the mendicant orders: are the travelling friars subject to the 
local ordinary or do they enjoy exemption from it in virtue of their being immediately 
under papal jurisdiction?);50 the council (especially the central issue at the councils of 
Basel and Constance: where does the supreme [judicial] authority in the church reside?). 
The structural difficulties emerging in that period fostered ecclesiological development 
by raising new questions. An increasingly systematic reflection on the polity of the 
church—its structure of authority—had become necessary to answer concrete power-
struggles: systematic ecclesiology was born and developed under pressure for solving 
distinctively institutional difficulties concerning the papal polity. 
The need to cope with issues concerning the respective competences and domains 
of action of the papacy and local authorities, whether secular or ecclesiastical, fostered a 
systematization and development of canon law, especially during the great century 
stretching from Gratian’s Decretum to Gregory IX’s Decretales. The practical quandary 
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of deciding who (or which body) should appoint bishops raised the deeper issue 
regarding the locus of authority in the community—thus entering the reserve of what is 
today political philosophy. The ecclesial problems facing canonists were those about 
justice (ius) in the organization of the social and political relationships which are shared 
by any structured polity: hence, because of the very nature of the subject, the 
systematization and development of the ius canonicum could and in fact did incorporate 
the solutions to the question of (societal) justice already established in the secular 
sphere by that highly systematic body of Roman ius civilis. So it is that canon law 
experienced its most sustained development because Roman law became increasingly 
available.51 Canon lawyers found that the rules of both legal systems, the Roman and the 
ecclesial, 
sometimes conflicted and sometimes agreed, but most often they found 
that the rules of one legal system could be used to illuminate, qualify, or 
refine the rules of the other system. […] Eventually, the two systems 
would become inextricably entangled with each other, in effect forming a 
new legal system. This is the ius commune, the European Common Law, 
which dominated European law for the rest of the middle ages and 
beyond.52 
Thus, ‘[b]y the end of the twelfth century the study and knowledge of canon law 
demanded training in Roman doctrine and principles’.53 Roman law first, and 
Aristotelian political philosophy a few decades later, supplied essential elements of the 
theoretical justification of the medieval ecclesiastical polity. Roman law, for instance, 
was the legislative framework used to classify ‘the accumulated body of rules 
concerning the disposition of ecclesiastical benefices’.54 
More fundamentally, however, two insights from the Roman law of corporations 
have been used by canonists: the first is the plenitudo potestatis, used to explain papal 
sovereignty: such expression defined in classical Roman law ‘a kind of mandate of “full 
power” that could be granted by a corporate body to an agent acting on its behalf’.55 
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Interestingly, it seems that imperial ideology appropriated that expression for its own 
purposes from (papal) ideology, rather than directly from Roman law.56 
Again, medieval canonists and theologians adopted corporation theory, whose 
general principle was that ‘authority resided with all the members of the Church, who 
conferred upon the head only a limited and conditional right to act on their behalf’.57 
Consistent with that theory was another famous principle of Roman law which was seen 
as valid in the church just as in civil society, namely ‘quod omnes tangit debet ab 
omnibus approbari’ (what touches all should be approved by all—Corpus iuris civilis, 
Codex Iustinianus, 5.59.5). Such principle ‘was [later] to play a large part in struggles 
against absolutism’,58 and the insight it conveys is construed as foundational by much of 
contemporary political philosophy. 
Tierney summarized: ‘Such phrases [i.e. plena potestas and quod omnes tangit] 
were taken out of Roman private law by the canonists, turned into principles of 
constitutional government in their [ecclesiological] works, and then reflected back so to 
speak to the temporal sphere where they influenced the theory and practice of secular 
government’.59 Roman law first (from the eleventh century) and then Aristotelian 
political philosophy (from the second half of the thirteenth) supplied the intellectual 
tools for unravelling many ecclesiological issues. 
The fact that the same philosophical arguments were used to justify the general 
organizational pattern of both the ecclesial and the temporal societies, and that 
foundational insights from legal and political philosophy were naturally considered 
valid with regard to the ecclesial polity means that the latter was considered 
fundamentally analogous with the civil polity. Such was, for example, Aquinas’ 
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understanding of the matter, to the extent at least that for him ‘Arguments from political 
thought (such as the principles of representation or consent) have—and this claim has 
obvious subversive consequences—equal relevance to Church as to State’.60 This crucial 
methodological and theological contention, implicit yet evident in Aquinas’ thought, 
was to become dominant among the best and brightest subsequent theologians and 
canonists: a cursory survey could mention John of Paris (1255–1306), Marsilius of 
Padua (c. 1275–c. 1342), Pierre d’Ailly (1350–1420), Francesco Zabarella (1360–
1417),61 Jean Gerson (1363–1429), Nicolò de Tudeschi (‘Panormitanus’, 1386–1445), 
Nicolas Cusanus (1401–1464), Francisco de Vitoria O.P. (1492–1546), Domingo de 
Soto, O.P. (1494–1560), the ‘divines of Paris’ John Mair (1467–1550), Jacques Almain 
(c. 1480–1515), and later Edmund Richer early in the seventeenth century (1559–1631). 
The same methodological approach, and thus the theology undergirding it, was adopted 
also by the top theologians of the papalist camp: Juan de Torquemada O.P. (also known 
as Johannes De Turrecremata, 1388–1468), Tommaso da Vio, O.P. (also known as 
Cajetan, 1469–1534), and Roberto Bellarmino, S.J. (1542–1621). It is noteworthy the 
presence of six Cardinals among the theologians mentioned: Zabarella, d’Ailly, 
Torquemada, Cusanus, Cajetan, and Bellarmine. The dependence of ecclesiology on 
political philosophy continued unabated through the centuries. It was self-evident that if 
something belonged to what they considered the natural law (i.e. the right understanding 
and ordering of reality and specifically human political life), then it could not be 
dismissed as no longer applicable within the Church. Thus ecclesiology and political 
philosophy were inextricably linked: theories about the origins of authority in civil 
society had implications for understanding the locus of authority in the ecclesial 
community.62 
2.4 From the Reformation to Vatican II 
With the Reformation, the heated debates on institutional and structural problems 
pressed a greater systematization of ecclesiology, for they required to define the terms 
under discussion with precision and to determine their relation to other ecclesiological 
concepts. At the same time, they resulted in quite a greater variety of different and even 
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opposed ecclesiologies than the already varied panorama existing in the discipline 
before the Reformation. 
A feature of post-Reformation ecclesiological thought most interesting for present 
purposes is that parallels between the forms of ecclesial and political government 
continued to be advanced not only by Protestant and Catholic theologians alike, but also 
by political philosophers. Specifically, papalists in the ecclesiological sphere were to 
appeal to some arguments of royalists and divine-right theorists (and vice-versa), while 
constitutionalists in the political sphere were to refer to the arguments of conciliarists 
(and vice-versa).63 This methodological approach, based on the assumption that the 
ecclesial and civil polities were analogous, was thus common to both political 
philosophers and theologians, as Oakley has argued with a wealth of documentary 
evidence.64 
And its acceptance or rejection was generally—with a few exceptions—to be at 
the heart of the arguments of, respectively, conciliarists and papalists (or 
constitutionalists and royalists). Thus, among political philosophers, royalists and divine 
right theorists rejected the constitutionalists’ use of the ‘democratic’ arguments which 
conciliarists developed for the church by insisting that the ecclesiastical analogy was 
invalid65—the very same tactic, as we will see (4.4), that had already been adopted in 
reverse by papalist writers such as Cajetan, once they had to acknowledge as correct the 
democratic understanding of political authority. 
On the other hand, Spanish and French monarchomacs in the late sixteenth 
century and, during the next couple of centuries, French, English, and Scottish 
resistance theorists and constitutionalists often stressed the natural superiority of the 
civil community, gathered in its representatives in the parliament, over its head, the 
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king, by drawing a comparison with the whole ecclesial community which, gathered in 
a general council, could exercise its power to defend itself from a harmful or heretic 
pope.66 As notable a political philosopher as John Locke understood the essential 
likeness between the ecclesial and the human polity: ‘A church […] I take to be a 
voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord…’, whose 
laws, he added, are agreed on by the members: ‘the right of making its laws can belong 
to none but the society itself; or, at least (which is the same thing), to those whom the 
society by common consent has authorised thereunto’.67 Of course, the reverse also 
happened of arguing from the structure of the civil to that of the ecclesial polity, with 
many theologians—especially of Reformed confession—regarding the democratic form 
of the state as the most adequate for the community of Christian brothers and sisters, all 
redeemed by Christ and thus all children of the same Father. 
In general, then, it can be said that quite regularly, ‘from John of Paris at the start 
of the fourteenth century to Henri Maret, dean of the Sorbonne theology faculty in 1869 
on the very eve of the First Vatican Council’, passing through the classical formulations 
of similar methodology as found in ‘the so-called “divines of Paris”, from Pierre d’Ailly 
and Jean Gerson in the fifteenth century, via Jacques Almain and John Mair in the 
sixteenth, to Edmond Richer in the seventeenth’,68 the analogy with political society was 
taken for granted, with all its momentous consequences concerning the use of political 
philosophy for diagnosing as well as offering prognoses to the problems of church 
organization: ‘All of these men, as John Neville Figgis pointed out long ago, simply 
assumed that “arguments applicable to government in general could not be inapplicable 
to the Church”.’69 It is worth reflecting on the universality of such a view: as the list of 
names suggests, each century from the thirteenth forward can boast a handful of most 
distinguished theologians who worked on ecclesiological problems from the perspective 
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of secular law and political philosophy. As they were the pace-setters, it is likely that 
minor theologians too simply followed this method. 
As recently as the nineteenth century, ultramontanists regularly linked 
ecclesiology and political philosophy by drawing parallels between the absolute 
monarchies of the Ancient Regime and the monarchical constitution of the Catholic 
Church.70 In the restorationist climate following the turmoil of the French Revolution 
the normal trend which saw theologians borrow from the development of society for 
understanding the Church also admitted of the reverse movement, whereby important 
components of Catholic culture, especially those of ultramontanist leanings, 
turned to the Church as a model of society […]. It was seen as the 
foundation of authority; exalted as the model for social organization […]. 
An ongoing parallelism was established between ecclesiastical and 
political forms. The problem of infallibility became identified with that of 
sovereignty (“L’infallibilité dans l’ordre spiritual, et la souveraineté dans 
l’ordre temporal, sont deux mots parfaitement synonymes”, said de 
Maistre [Du pape, bk. 1, ch.1, J. Lovie and J. Chetail (eds.) (Geneva: 
Libraire Droz, 1966), 27]); the problem of authority was confused with 
that of tradition, considered superior to individual reason and the 
foundation of every rule, not only ethical-religious, but also cognitive (‘A 
l’autorité de l’évidence, il faut substituer l’évidence de l’autorité’, de 
Bonald was saying in polemics with Descartes) […].71 
There were also, of course, those of a different opinion. In particular, one of the most 
accomplished nineteenth century proposals for church reform, Antonio Rosmini’s The 
Five Wounds of the Church, owes a good deal of its novelty and originality to the 
author’s deep knowledge of ancient and contemporary political thought.72 
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Perhaps the most evident instance of the lasting influence of political philosophy 
on ecclesiology lies in the papal dogma promulgated by Vatican I. Following the 
method of exploiting political philosophy in order to reach a greater understanding of 
ecclesiological problems, it defined the Petrine primacy in terms of the category of 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, such jurisdictional primacy was conceived on the analogy 
with political absolutism, insofar as it was de facto, although not de iure, unaccountable 
not only to any one single person within it but also to the community of Christians as a 
whole. I say de facto but not de iure because while all the traditional limits of papal 
jurisdictional authority were recognized—the ordinary jurisdiction of diocesan bishops; 
the fact that it had to be exercised only ad aedificationem and for the common good of 
the church; the fact that it had to employ all the relevant human means for discerning 
the truth before making a decision; and so on—have not been incorporated in the final 
text of the dogmatic decree, nor in the subsequent canonical legislation up to the 1983 
CIC currently in force.73 In the absence of legally defined checks and balances capable 
of controlling the fulfilment of those conditions, the exercise of papal jurisdictional 
primacy continues to be de facto absolutist. 
From Vatican I to Vatican II little changed: the Petrine primacy continued to be 
understood in juridical terms, and the church as essentially a (perfect) polity. However, 
particularly noteworthy during that period is the elaboration of the first code of canon 
law (1917), which bears eloquent witness to the continuing validity of Roman law 
concepts, principles, and precepts within the ecclesial and not only the civil 
community.74 
Significantly, the above sketchy historical outline suggests that the creative 
interaction between ecclesiology and political philosophy—and between ecclesial and 
civil structures—gradually diminished in the post-Tridentine period, in favour of an ad 
hoc apologetic exploitation of the most authoritarian theories concerning the human 
polity. 
And yet—as the milestones of Vatican I and of the 1917 Code of Canon Law 
suggest—it is not that ecclesiology did not anymore use the language of political theory; 
but it no more kept up to date with the developing political thought—and, consequently, 
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with the developing organizational form of civil society. So far, this appears to be 
largely true also of the post-Vatican II period. Suffice here to mention two of that 
period’s most significant ecclesiological imports from the legal and political domain: 
the first is the division of ecclesial power into the threefold pattern of legislative, 
executive, and judicial (CIC 1983, can. 135), almost two centuries and a half after its 
original introduction into political theory; and the second is the principle of subsidiarity. 
Both such imports have been accepted in theory but contradicted in practice. In 
effect, the transposition into the RC Church of the threefold distinction of governmental 
authority has completely ignored the motivations behind its original introduction in the 
political sphere.75 There it served primarily to separate the wielders of the three powers, 
so that each body could act as a balance of the other two. But in the RC Church it has 
become a purely verbal 
distinction among three kinds of authority, not a division into three 
branches of government. At the papal and episcopal levels of church 
authority, these three kinds of power are joined in one office; the three are 
united—there is no real separation of powers, except when it comes to 
those who assist the pope or diocesan bishops, e.g., the vicar general in 
executive matters, the judicial vicar in judicial matters.76 
The result is that such import has been unfortunate: a purely formal and theoretical 
distinction, with no structural consequences, besides being useless, also adds confusion 
by giving the dangerous illusion that playing with words can be sufficient to solve the 
still unsolved question of the division of powers and competencies within the Christian 
community. 
An analogous situation applies to the principle of subsidiarity: mandated as an 
ordering principle for the legal and political organization of the church, it is largely 
ignored in both the theory and practice of the RC Church (see esp. 5.4, but also 5.2–
5.3). 
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It appears, then, that the concrete application of the method of borrowing from the 
insights of political philosophy was never completely abandoned, albeit it did grow to a 
standstill in the crucial post-Tridentine period.77 That period is crucial for many reasons. 
First, because it was a period of particular attention to the visible institutional structure 
as well as to the defence of its status quo, which discouraged as ‘innovations’ 
developments and creativity in that area. Second, because the cautious application of the 
ecclesio-political method in such a protective atmosphere coincided with, and was 
therefore influenced by, the language and concept of absolute sovereignty and absolute 
monarchy of early modern Europe, and their efforts toward an increasingly greater 
centralisation. And it is precisely from the post-Tridentine period that many (most?) 
structural features and theoretical justifications of the contemporary RC Church date 
back: so that absolute monarchy has remained the unchallenged political model of 
reference until now, if not always in theory at least in practice. 
2.5 The Relationship between Ecclesiology and Political Philosophy in 
the Justification of Monarchy 
As noted earlier, the fact that the ecclesial and the civil polities were considered 
fundamentally analogous is suggested by the fact that foundational insights and 
principles from legal and political philosophy were naturally considered valid for both 
polities. Ecclesiology was not construed as separated from political philosophy, and 
certainly not as contradictory to it on the grounds of some supernatural character or 
divine institution of the church—a move which will be made later by papalist apologist 
(consult 4.5–4.7 and 3.5 respectively). 
An analysis of the parallel justifications ecclesiology and political philosophy 
gave for the monarchical form of government in the ecclesial and civil societies 
respectively can both supply a most significant instance of this and, by the same token, 
bring to focus the historical survey about the relationship of both disciplines during the 
second millennium. 
From a world-historical perspective, it has been kingship which has dominated for 
millennia the political landscape of the major civilizations from the Neolithic 
Revolution (c.8,000–c.5,000 BC) to pretty much the nineteenth century.78 Throughout 
this period, there is some evidence that ‘the ideological pattern that in one form or 
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another served for long millennia to sustain’ monarchical kingship has remained 
remarkably similar, so much so that it ‘can lay strong claim to having been nothing less 
than the political commonsense of humankind’.79 Two insights among others have been 
central to such commonsense, one religious and the other functional. The former 
perceives the sacredness and divine character of the monarch; the latter the greater 
likeliness and efficiency of a single decision-maker for the preservation of the peace and 
unity of the community. 
The Middle Ages largely followed that pattern of understanding and justifying 
monarchy. Moreover, they did so with regard to not only the civil but also the ecclesial 
society. With regard to the first point, it is evident that throughout the Middle Ages 
authority, whether in the ecclesial or in the temporal domain, has consistently been 
understood as divine in origin. 
It is true, of course, that from a purely logical point of view, the divine origin of 
authority does not necessarily entail a monarchical government, and much less an 
absolutist one. This is because God was ordinarily understood as acting through 
secondary causes—specifically, the electors or, in Nicholas of Cusa’s more fundamental 
perspective, human consent (6.2)—and thus as abiding by the customary electoral 
procedures and institutional forms, of which monarchy was but one. Moreover, even 
were God to be conceived as (miraculously) bestowing political or ecclesial authority 
directly and immediately, that would still determine nothing as to the person(s) to whom 
God decided to grant it, unless positive proofs could be produced from scripture and/or 
experience.80 
Logic, then, did not allow justifying monarchy simply on the grounds that all 
authority came from a unique God. But there were two other possible justifications: the 
scriptural one appealing to the revealed Word of God, and the philosophical one 
appealing to the way the universe was structured. 
Select scriptural passages were generally referred to as vindicating the 
monarchical conclusions inferred from the contention that all powers came from God: 
on the one hand, Rm. 13.1–7; 1 Peter 2.13–17; Matt. 22.20–21; 1 Samuel 8; Ezekiel 
37.24; and elsewhere in the Old Testament in support of monarchy in the civil domain; 
on the other hand, the Petrine passages, in support of monarchy in the ecclesiastical 
domain. 
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Yet, with regard to the first list of scriptural passages, it was evident that most of 
them have nothing to say about monarchy in particular, and the few that do cannot in 
any way be taken to justify monarchy as the necessary or even only most excellent 
polity. Last but not least, they represent but one approach of several in the bible with 
regard to political authority, and the most positive one at that. To limit oneself to the NT 
alone, 
Side by side with [the above passages] should be placed those other New 
Testament texts which cover a whole doctrinal spectrum, ranging from 
the more guarded affirmations of Peter’s First Epistle to the blank 
hostility of the Apocalypse of John, which, in the name of the Kingship of 
God, denounces as Satanic the blasphemously deified emperors of Rome. 
If these texts are to be regarded as any less ‘Christian’ than those of Paul, 
then the reason for so discriminating should clearly be stated.81 
Exactly the same considerations can be made with regard to the Petrine passages 
regularly enlisted to defend the papal monarchy. Despite affirmations concerning the 
unambiguity of their witness to a supposed dominical establishment of such an 
institution, their papalist interpretation was far from being self-evident and ultimately 
exegetically justified. Again, as had been the case with the apologetic exegeses in 
defence of monarchical authority in the civil sphere, papalist exegesis was noticeably 
unilateral in its overlooking both different yet traditional interpretations of the Petrine 
passages—chief among which those by Origen and Augustine—and other scriptural 
passages advancing quite a different picture of the nature as well as organization of 
ecclesial authority—primarily those giving the power of the keys to the twelve and the 
whole church (the mainstream, ecumenically accepted contemporary approach to those 
passages is summed up in 3.3). 
Scripture too, then—just as it had been the case with strict logic—can hardly be 
regarded as successful in providing an unambiguous justification of monarchy as God’s 
will for the civil and/or ecclesial societies. A third argument was to prove equally 
unconvincing: it appealed to the way the entire universe was patterned. In the Medieval 
Latin west, the most widespread philosophic-theological reconstruction of the order to 
the universe was the pseudo-Dionysian neo-Platonic hierarchical cosmology. Its 
constitutive and essential axiom affirmed that the cosmos is a descending hierarchy of 
mediating causal powers, with lower levels being contingent on the higher ones for their 
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being, continuing existence, and perfection. Its central role in justifying the monarchical 
form of government in Christendom, in both its ecclesiastical and its civil sections, is 
particularly evident in that short yet epochal document which is Pope Boniface VIII’s 
Unam Sanctam (1302). In it, the central Dionysian axiom that ‘it is a law of the divinity 
that the lowest things reach the highest place by intermediaries’ is the only authority 
other than Scripture cited by the pope to justify the subordination of the secular to the 
ecclesiastical power.82 (Of course, such a ‘sacral’ justification was not the only or 
primary one; as we will see, functionalist justifications were ordinarily to play a much 
larger role in the royalist and papalist literature alike). 
It has been partly due to precisely the abiding influence of such a cosmology—if 
we leave aside the more pragmatic and political considerations—that the first official 
acknowledgment by Roman Catholicism of the insight that the divine origin of power 
does not per se call for a monarchical form of government only took place in 1893 by 
Pope Leo XIII, somewhat belatedly and solely with regard to civil society.83 
Not only could the conception of authority as coming from God, and thus sacred, 
not be ultimately understood as entailing the necessity of a monarchical government: it 
could not even be ordinarily understood as excluding its dependence on and 
accountability to the people. ‘Despite the example of ancient Near Eastern monarchies 
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http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-
dei_en.html. 
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or of early-modern divine right theory, there is nothing a priori necessary about the 
opposition’ between understanding kingship as dependent on the divine and 
understanding it as rooted in popular consent: quite the contrary in fact, accountability 
to the community was often understood as springing precisely from the monarchs’ 
sacral status.84 So it is that ‘the Christian emphasis on the derivation of the king’s 
powers from God, symbolized so effectively in the reception of unction and the 
adoption of the title “king by the grace of God”,’ did not also generally involve ‘an 
emphasis on the independence [and unaccountability] of the king in his relations with 
his people’.85 
In summary, neither concrete scriptural passages or the abstract claims that 
authority comes from God and that the entire cosmos is organized as a descending 
monarchical hierarchy, have ultimately proved sufficiently convincing to demonstrate a 
divine endorsement of monarchy in either civil society or the church, and much less to 
demonstrate that such monarchical exercise of authority had to be unaccountable. 
Thus, both ecclesiology and political philosophy ordinarily complemented such 
considerations by strictly philosophical ones which, indeed, bore the substantial share of 
the justification of the monarchical form of government in the church and civil society 
respectively. Differently put, the ‘sacred’ justification of monarchy on the basis of its 
immediate divine origin never excluded, and indeed was most often complemented by, 
its functionalist justification as an efficient institution for carrying out certain tasks 
fostering the common good of the community—ordinarily only the limited ones of 
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http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15108a.htm. 
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maintaining internal and external peace by providing justice and leading in war 
respectively. 
The only contention essential to monarchical theories of civil authority is the one 
about the uniqueness of authority—there can or should be but a single supreme 
authority. Its primary non-scriptural and non-cosmological justification is that a single 
supreme authority would be more apt than a polyarchy to maintain the unity of 
operation essential to any society. In effect, according to the classic argument developed 
by the young Aquinas in favour of the civil monarchy in his treatise On Kingship, ‘the 
dissension which often follows government by several persons is contrary to the good of 
peace [i.e. unity], which is the foremost goal of any social community’, while the 
degeneration of the rule of one into a tyranny would not ordinarily be as disruptive of 
unity as the former.86 Aquinas regarded such a tenet as vindicated not only by past and 
present experience, but also by logic: as he put it, ‘Clearly [...] something which is itself 
one can bring about unity more effectively than something which is many can’.87 
This argument, which Aquinas had developed for civil society, was to become, 
most significantly, a central—if not the central—philosophical justification advanced in 
support of ecclesiastical monarchy in the writings of papalist theologians, including the 
Cajetan of the 1512 tract.88 (Although it should be recalled that such a distinctly 
functionalist justification from political philosophy was adopted very early on—indeed 
from at least the fourth century—by the emerging Christian hierarchy).89 
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Such was, then, the only tenet both sufficient and necessary for justifying 
monarchy. In addition, however, a second argument defended specifically the absolute 
or unaccountable aspect of monarchy—or, differently put, defended obedience as the 
only possible response to (monarchical) authority. It contended, first and foremost, that 
if it were possible to judge the supreme authority, the latter would not be supreme 
anymore, and the problem would simply shift from controlling the former to controlling 
its controller. If one allows the possibility of subjecting the supreme authority to a 
regulatory agency, then one cannot logically dismiss a potentially infinite series of 
controllers.90 And on the assumption that a unique authority is necessary for the very 
existence or at least good of a community, it is concluded that the latter would be either 
destroyed or seriously weakened by such a multiplication of controlling authorities.91 
Secondly, while it is true that the absolute monarch is bound to serve the common 
good of the community, nobody has the right to judge whether it is actually doing so or 
is rather tyrannically operating towards the destruction of the community. In any 
bilateral contract, one party can never unilaterally declare that the other is not fulfilling 
its duty: rather, appeal must be made to a judge: and because, as just noted, no 
supervisory agency can be had, such judge can be no one but God. Accordingly, the 
only remedy to a tyrannical king or pope is prayer.92 
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Once again, and quite significantly, that argument was shared both by supporters 
of absolute monarchy in the civil sphere, and by those supporting it in the church. As 
noted earlier, forced to admit that a pope could become heretic or teach or do something 
potentially harmful to the body of the faithful at large, Cajetan stubbornly refused to 
allow for a structural provision through a system of checks and balances, as the 
conciliarists proposed (a general council with exceptional policing powers over a 
heretical pope). Rather, he admitted that the only solution to such cases was prayer. The 
neglect of structural in favour of a unilateral emphasis on personal reform could not be 
clearer. Given the widespread currency such a point has enjoyed during the second 
millennium, it is perhaps less surprising that it is still being reiterated nowadays, in the 
form of an emphasis on personal over structural reform.93 
It can be said, then, that the above core insights in favour of absolute, 
unaccountable monarchy have been underlining the works of papalist theologians and 
monarchical political philosophers alike from the late eleventh well into the nineteenth 
century in the case of the latter, and indeed till now for ecclesiologists, although 
primarily from within Roman Catholicism. For, as we will see at length in chapters five 
and six, while political philosophy has long both integrated what was sound and 
overcome what was mistaken in those arguments into a democratic theory—on the 
basis, I will suggest, that a political institutional arrangement is to be evaluated not 
against the number of (delegated) people involved in making the final decision, but in 
whether the delegation itself was intelligent and responsible—RC ecclesiology still 
assumes their essential validity, in contrast even with most Christian ecclesiologies born 
of the Reformation. 
A final similarity between ecclesiology and political philosophy should be noted, 
for it touches a general and quite significant trend. I have previously observed that 
historical evidence clearly witnesses that the sacral justification of monarchy has not 
ordinarily excluded its functionalist justification, as an excellent decision-making 
arrangement for fulfilling certain tasks. Albeit to a smaller degree of certainty, historical 
evidence also suggests that the early modern period in Europe is distinctive in its 
displaying a shift of balance towards treating monarchy increasingly as a social 
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convention rather than as an aspect of a divinely established cosmic order,94 and so 
towards assessing it primarily against its functional value to the community it was 
meant to serve. 
Now, as we will see, the very same general shift from a divine-right to a 
functionalist justification is also taking place—although somewhat belatedly—with 
regard to the papacy in particular and all ecclesial structures more generally (see 3.5). In 
conclusion, then, ecclesiology and political philosophy have shared not only the specific 
arguments in favour of a monarchical form of government—namely, both the 
theological ones, including those appealing to some scriptural passages and those based 
on a descending monarchical cosmology, and the strictly philosophical and functionalist 
ones, based on an understanding of community as requiring monarchical authority for 
its existence and well-being. They also shared the general trend towards assessing a 
political structure primarily against its functional value—that is, as we will see, against 
how it abides by the requirements of intelligent and responsible cooperation. While such 
trend has matured more quickly in the political reflection on civil society, it is taking 
longer in the ecclesiological sphere: but it is, nonetheless, advancing there as well. 
2.6 Conclusion 
At the end of his historical assessment of ecclesiology between 1300 and Vatican I, 
Francis Oakley advanced a conclusion both compelling and in harmony with what has 
been said so far. He began by noticing that after Vatican II the rejection of the use of 
political philosophy by ecclesiology has been voiced repeatedly. This, as he suggested 
and as we will see more in details later (4.5), has been part of the reaction to the reform 
proposals towards a democratisation of the church recommended in the wake of the 
council, and the consequent fear or at least uneasiness it arouse in conservative 
theologians faced with the need to make constitutional the papal absolute monarchy. 
Still, he went on, such an ad hoc, apologetically driven stance 
should not be permitted to screen from us the fact […] that for 700 years 
and more arguments based on secular political analogies, or arguments 
based on constitutional overlap between political and ecclesiastical modes 
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of governance, served as a mainstay of ecclesiological discourse, whether 
high papalist or constitutionalist.95 
A default instinct of the Christian communities since their birth has been to 
consider it safe to model their own organizational outlooks by borrowing both practical 
structures and theoretical insights from the civil community. Christians arguably 
recognised that the structures devised for civil society were also attempts to answer the 
same problem of ordering a community with a common goal to be achieved through 
common action. 
Another insight suggested by the historical survey is that practical structural 
imports can gain and have in fact gained wider acceptance when backed by a theoretical 
justification, and that this latter was by no means always confined to scriptural appeals, 
but rather often carried its most decisive and convincing weight by drawing upon 
political philosophy. If the former type of ‘practical’ borrowings has probably been 
chronologically the first, the ‘theoretical’ type has helped clarify the rationale behind 
the practical importations, thus revealing why they were justified. 
It is in this perspective that the period starting from the Middle Ages is 
particularly significant. This period displays a massive expansion of importation at the 
theoretical level, thanks to the complementary use in ecclesiology of theological as well 
as legal, political, and philosophical reasons. It makes it easier to appreciate both the 
contribution which political philosophy made to ecclesiology and the necessity today to 
retrieve the study of the former in order to address problems arising in the latter. The 
evidence is that most if not all ecclesiological issues are fundamentally an attempt at 
individuating who or which body is competent and responsible to make a given decision 
or carry out a given action. 
Indeed, it appears from history that a systematic ecclesiology was born only when 
there was a legal and political philosophy to permit it. An increasingly systematic 
political philosophy made possible an increasingly systematic ecclesiology. Brian 
Tierney has recently observed that ‘Modern critical discussions about Catholic 
institutions of church governance often raise the question of whether, or how far, the 
practice of representative government in the secular sphere can provide a fitting model 
for ecclesiastical institutions’; and he added: ‘our secular practices of representation and 
consent are themselves derived from a complex interplay between ecclesiastical and 
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temporal institutions and ideas from the twelfth and thirteenth century onward’.96 But 
additional specific references to those already supplied are superfluous for a practice 
which runs throughout church history. 
It would be an anachronism to blame medieval canonists for having introduced 
extraneous elements in the discipline or for marking the beginning of a regrettable 
development towards an arid ‘juridicism’.97 On the contrary, theirs was not simply the 
appropriate method, but the only possible one: the principle of analogy in theology does 
not leave other choices, and the use of cultural developments is required for a deeper 
penetration of revelation. Medieval canonists could not do otherwise than either try to 
solve the problem of the relationship between pope, bishops, and the whole Church with 
the help of the theoretical tools of the time, or simply give up the attempt altogether. 
Nor has the use of Roman law and political philosophy been an idiosyncrasy of the 
Middle Ages: rather, it has been a constant feature right until our time—even if the 
traditional consensus over this method has been once again challenged since Vatican II. 
The correctness of understanding ecclesiology as in continuity with legal and 
political philosophy appears also vindicated by its fruits. Historians and political 
philosophers are nowadays almost unanimous in recognizing the outstanding place in 
the history of ideas of the insights contained in the discussions by middle to late 
medieval canonists and theologians on the origins of authority, the role of consent and 
competence, delegation and representation, majority voting, and on the importance of 
the common judgment of the community, insofar as they have laid the foundations for 
the development of later democratic constitutional thought.98 It is somewhat ironical that 
what scholars in other disciplines have come to recognize as an achievement, is still 
looked at with suspicion in the very discipline in which those insights were first 
applied.99 
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3 DIVINELY-WILLED STRUCTURES 
3.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I have related some historical findings suggesting that the 
development of ecclesial structures and of ecclesiology was fostered, among other 
things, also by the importation of both theoretical insights and concrete practices or 
structures from the civil into the Christian community. The practice of importing 
political insights and practices on the human community into the Christian one has been 
the ordinary one from the very beginning of church history, even pre-dating a self-
consciously autonomous ecclesiology. Thus, the correctness of its theoretical 
justification is already strongly suggested by history. 
Still, the ecclesiological method assessing ecclesial structures against whether or 
not they conformed with the sound insights into human social life expressed by 
(Aristotelian) political philosophy and Roman law was bound to clash sooner or later 
with those unprecedented and increasingly disproportionate claims whose 
characteristics seemed contrary to the ‘natural’ political precepts of reason and justice—
in primis those advanced by the Popes Gregory VII and Innocent III concerning their 
absolute jurisdictional power on both the spiritual and the temporal domains, and their 
complete unaccountability in the exercise of such power. 
It is important to clarify what papalists truly contended in order to understand why 
it was perceived as contrary to the natural ordering of human polities. What papalists 
claimed was not merely the legitimacy and usefulness of the monarchical form of 
exercising ecclesiastical authority (‘ἐpiισκοpiή’, or supervision, as it would be called 
today) at the regional, supra-regional, and even worldwide level. After all, a 
monarchical institution can very well be democratic—i.e. respectful of the conditions 
for cooperation and subordination to be responsible—provided it has been freely chosen 
by those subject to it and acts within the limits of its delegation as well as those set by 
the principle of subsidiarity (see 5.13). And under the same conditions, a monarchical 
institution can very well fulfil its (limited) task efficiently. Rather, papalist literature 
maintained not only that that authority was to be exercised monarchically but also, 
contrary to the ‘natural’ insights in that regard, that it was unique, indivisible, absolute 
(i.e. unaccountable), omnicompetent, and perhaps even necessary for the church to exist. 
Thus, absolute monarchy needs to justify at the very least both the unicity of 
authority—there is but a single supreme authority—and its unaccountability. The 
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former assertion has been vindicated primarily by arguing that a supreme authority 
cannot be subject to any supervising authority, otherwise there could logically follow a 
potentially infinite chain of supervising authorities all claiming for supremacy. But that 
would lead to chaos, and chaos is the very opposite of the peace and unity for which 
such authorities exist in the first place. That has been called the ‘regress argument’ in 
favour of absolute sovereignty (examined in 5.7.1). Unaccountability, in turn, has been 
defended primarily by observing that, as established by God, the only legitimate 
response to monarchical authority was obedience. 
Such are the core insights in favour of a unique, supreme, unaccountable 
monarchy underlying the works of papalist theologians and royalist political 
philosophers alike. Among the latter they enjoyed some success from roughly the late 
eleventh to the American and French Revolutions, with a revival during the nineteenth 
century, before insights into the foundations of authority—which will be analysed at 
length later (5.3–5.8)—repudiated some of them, and integrated others into a democratic 
theory. Not that the arguments of royalists had ever been without strong criticisms: but 
since the scientific revolution and the growing specialisation of society the decline of 
the theory supporting a single supreme, indivisible and unaccountable authority, 
necessary for the being or at least well-being of any society has proved—from the 
perspective of the lengthy historical dominance of the institution of kingship—both 
quick and dramatic (5.7). 
This has presented a significant problem for papalist ecclesiology which—in 
contrast with political philosophy and arguably even other Christian ecclesiologies—
persists in accepting the validity of the common justification at the basis of the 
monarchical theory shared by papalist and royalists alike: indeed, even after Vatican II 
and up to the present day the official Roman Catholic ecclesiology has continued to 
operate on the implicit assumption that the unity and ultimately existence of a 
community require a unique supreme authority devoted to that task (6.4). 
Two further developments, particularly evident since Vatican II, have rendered 
the need for finding new justifications even more urgent: the first is the insubstantiality 
of the scriptural evidence in favour of the papal absolute monarchy, which has since 
been ascertained in some details and largely accepted at the ecumenical level; and the 
second is that, thanks to the renewed freedom of theological inquiry inaugurated by that 
council in comparison with the post-Tridentine period and especially with the first half 
of the twentieth century, which witnessed a sweeping crackdown on Modernism, the 
demands for reforming those absolutist institutions in a way more congruent with such 
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exegetical and historical findings—as well as with the insights from political 
philosophy, into the proper ordering of a human polity and the moral requirements for 
cooperation and subordination to be responsible—have no longer been coming only or 
even primarily from Protestants but rather, as it had already been the case with the 
Conciliarists, from the best and brightest Catholic theologians. 
To address those challenges, there have been two main arguments advanced to 
defend the papalist understanding of the church. One justifies the non-democratic 
character of the church by questioning the very soundness and value of some central 
features of democracy. Throughout the post-Tridentine period, and particularly from the 
French Revolution to Vatican II, the official stance of Roman Catholicism has been one 
of firm opposition to the application of the (democratic) principles of freedom of 
conscience, expression, information, debate, and majority rule in both the civil and the 
ecclesial societies.1 Even after Vatican II, the validity of majority rule has not yet been 
accepted without serious reservations by the papal magisterium, which is quite 
significant to the extent that, as it will be argued (5.9–5.11), to reject it is tantamount to 
rejecting an essential element of democracy. The reluctance to accept the validity of 
those freedoms in any society, and especially in the church, coupled with the firm 
rejection of majority rule as a prudential means for discerning the truth, indicate that the 
non-democratic character of the papal monarchy is being upheld because the above 
mentioned democratic features are not evaluated positively. A new critical evaluation of 
those insights is thus needed, and it will be offered in chapter five. 
The other stance adopted to defend the understanding of the church as an absolute 
papal monarchy is older, and consists in denying the continuity between grace and 
nature in the case of the church—although such a conclusion is not ordinarily 
acknowledged explicitly. It is probably true, the reasoning goes, that in the natural order 
of things, power resides originally and fundamentally in the community, which can then 
conditionally delegate to elected representatives certain powers to be exercised on its 
behalf. In the post-Vatican II period, this translates as an acknowledgment that 
democracy—understood as that political system both most respectful of the ethical 
norms to be observed if the individual’s cooperation in the common action of her group 
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is to be intelligent/responsible and maximising the exploitation of the common fund of 
knowledge and values of the community in order to understand a given social situation, 
elaborate policies, and decide in favour of the best possible courses of action—might be 
the ‘natural’, most intelligent and responsible way of organising political relations.2 
Still, it is concluded, such cannot be the case with the church. 
There are two interrelated theological arguments justifying such a rejection of the 
continuity between the Christian and the human polity, and thus between ecclesiology 
and political philosophy. One appeals to the church being a supernatural mystery, a 
creature of God’s inscrutable will, and as such impossible to understand or criticize on 
the basis of what has been understood of the working of purely natural communities. 
The next chapter will both offer concrete instances of the contemporary usage of this 
argument, and offer a critique of its theoretical underpinnings. 
The present chapter will instead deal with the traditional and chronologically prior 
contention justifying the apparent ‘irrational’ and ‘unnatural’ character of the papal 
absolute monarchy by purporting that scriptures witness—in a sufficiently unambiguous 
way, given the matter at stake—a direct establishment by Christ (in his inscrutable 
wisdom) of such an institution. It is on this objection only that the present chapter will 
focus. There will be four main sections: the first will briefly recall the main rationale for 
appealing to God’s will as witnessed by scripture; the second will examine whether the 
external form of any ecclesial structure might be said to be permanent and thus 
necessary. In turn, the third and fourth sections will highlight a twofold shift in the 
recent discussion on ius divinum: first, from understanding it as an explicit scriptural 
institution to conceiving it as a post-apostolic, Spirit-led development; secondly, from 
being predicated of the external institutional embodiment of church structures to being 
predicated of their function (of ἐpiισκοpiή). The final section will then move to assess 
whether the function fulfilled by ecclesial institutions is necessary for the very existence 
(esse) or only well-being (bene esse) of a community. 
                                                 
2
 ‘It is in full accord with human nature that juridical-political structures should afford all their 
citizens the chance to participate freely and actively in establishing the constitutional bases of a political 
community, governing the state, determining the scope and purpose of various institutions, and choosing 
leaders.’ GS §75. 
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3.2 The Appeal to Scripture to justify a Direct Dominical Establishment 
of the Ecclesiastical Monarchy 
As noted earlier (2.5), several justifications existed for absolutist monarchical power, 
whether in the ecclesial or in the temporal domain. One was the affirmation that the 
structure of authority had to be analogous to that of the cosmos which, according to the 
neo-Platonist and pseudo-Dionysian view, was a top-down hierarchy of beings, where 
each lower level depended on the higher. Another was the regress argument, whereby a 
unique, supreme and indivisible authority is necessary for the stability and perhaps even 
existence of a society. The necessity of such a monarchical authority was justified not 
only on purely logical viewpoint, but also on pragmatist and functional grounds, as the 
most efficient arrangement for providing for order, stability, and unity in a society. The 
third one appealed to select scriptural passages interpreted as mandating absolutist 
monarchical power. It was the only argument from authority, and was used to 
complement and at times even substitute for the cosmological and philosophical 
arguments when the latter were regarded as insufficient or mistaken. Cajetan offers a 
good instance of this: forced by Jacques Almain to acknowledge that such an absolutist 
understanding of the papacy could not be justified from the ‘natural’ order of things, as 
discerned by political philosophy, he decided to redeem it exclusively by appealing to 
the fact that it had been thus willed by God.3 He did so by appealing to the correct 
interpretation of a portfolio of some NT (Petrine) passages, treated as proof-texts 
(Cajetan’s methodology will be analysed in detail at 4.4). 
The appeal to direct divine institution, implicit in the traditional expression ‘ius 
divinum’, has played a key role in post-Tridentine Catholicism, as an apologetic 
argument for the ecclesiastical establishment against the criticisms of Protestants. This 
has been especially the case with regard to ecclesial structures appearing quite 
irrational, in primis the understanding of the Roman pontiff as a unique, universal, 
omnicompetent, and absolute/unaccountable sovereign authority. Far from being limited 
to Cajetan’s polemics with Almain, the argument that the constitution of the church is 
divinely-ordered and thus immutable and beyond human reach has enjoyed—especially 
since the Reformation—a very widespread diffusion, particularly within Roman 
                                                 
3
 ‘[O]ur Savior […] although He could have disposed the Christian commonwealth on earth in 
diverse ways, nevertheless, willed and established that the government would not be popular, nor that of 
the rich, the powerful, the nobles, many or few, but only of one’, namely Peter: Cajetan, ‘On the 
Comparison of the Authority of Pope and Council’ [Auctoritas papae et concilii sive ecclesiae 
comparata], in Conciliarism and Papalism, Burns and Izbicki (eds.), 1–133 (ch. 1, p. 3). 
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Catholicism, where it has been and still is standardly used to close debates regarding 
proposed structural changes. Indeed, it has persisted somewhat anachronistically as a 
default mindset among some RC theologians until now, surviving not only Vatican II 
but also recent ecumenical studies from bilateral dialogues which put it in perspective. 
The historical continuity of this argument is easy to discern. The post-Vatican II 
period offers a paradigmatic instance of this in the writings of Joseph Ratzinger, then 
Cardinal prefect of the CDF: ‘the fundamental structures [of the Church] are willed by 
God himself, and therefore they are inviolable. Behind the human exterior stands the 
mystery of a more than human reality, in which reformers, sociologists, organizers have 
no authority whatsoever’.4 The existence of divinely-willed (monarchical) structures, 
then, certainly represents a most formidable, properly theological objection to the 
project entertained in this thesis—or does it? 
3.3 Is the External Form of Any Ecclesial Structure 
Permanent, Immutable, and Necessary? 
The expression ‘divinely willed’ has traditionally been understood as entailing that 
church structures so labelled display several distinctive features. First, they are 
permanent, immutable, and necessary.5 Second, they can boast of a direct dominical or 
at least apostolic foundation, viz. could be shown to have been positively revealed and 
mandated in scripture. A first issue to arise in post-Vatican II ecumenical dialogues on 
the issue was that exegetical and historical studies did not anymore support that to be 
uncontroversially the case for hardly any structure. Let us briefly see why. 
The most relevant passages with a direct ecclesiological injunction by Jesus have 
as their object not external structures but principles concerning cooperation. The 
majority of them deals with the political relationship of authority, that is with the very 
heart of any ecclesiology or political philosophy: seven times the NT reiterates the 
command that those in authority be servants and not overlords (Mt. 20.24–7, 23.8–12, 
Mk 10.42–44, Lk. 22.26, Jn 13.1–17, 1 Pt. 5.3, and 2 Cor. 1.24). To this one must add 
the fundamental ecclesiological principles explicitly advanced in Paul’s epistles, which 
can be quickly summarized as follows: 1) equality in Christ regardless of race, gender, 
or social status (Gal. 2.28); 2) need for a variety of different competences/charisms, 
                                                 
4
 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger with Vittorio Messori, The Ratzinger Report, trans. Salvator Attanasio 
and Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985), 46, emphasis original. 
5
 J. Michael Miller, The Divine Right of the Papacy in Recent Ecumenical Theology (Rome: 
Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1980), 61–2. 
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some of which are humanly acquired natural abilities, while others are divinely 
bestowed supernatural skills (1 Cor. 12); 3) impossibility for any one single person of 
having all the competences and charisms required; and thus impossibility for any one 
single person to be in charge of all ecclesial functions (1 Cor. 12.29–30);6 4) distinction 
of competences and division of labour as, accordingly, necessary (1 Cor. 12.8–10; 28–
30); hence 5) every member of the body can and should be an active member (1 Cor. 
12.7,11; Eph. 2.10; also Rm. 12.6; 1 Cor. 12.7 and 1 Pt. 4.10): ministry should not and 
cannot be limited to a few.7 All those principles are stated as central to church life. 
Finally, one should also mention both Mt. 18.18, which envisages judicial 
authority—the power to ‘bind and loose’—as exercised by the entire community, and 1 
Pt. 2.4–10, conceiving the latter, rather than any distinct class within it, as the priestly 
mediatorial agent between God and the world. In contrast, the famous Petrine passages 
do not explicitly concern the institution of any structure, being addressed, as we will 
see, to a specific person—Peter—and not to any hypothetical line of Petrine successors. 
Apart from the local congregation (with judicial and thus self-governing power), 
then, no other structure appears to be mandated in the NT as necessary for the church 
being: and things could not be otherwise for, quite the contrary, a certain variety of 
organizational patterns are witnessed to and, by the same token, endorsed. 
Still, RC official theology has long defended two structures as divinely willed 
(especially since the Reformation, and in an apologetic way): the monarchical 
episcopate and, to an even greater extent, the Roman papacy. As it was clearly noted in 
the past, such justification requires proof that those structures were mandated either 
directly by Jesus, or indirectly by the apostles, acting on what they knew was Jesus’ 
will. Traditionally, the status as divinely willed of episcopacy has been defended by 
affirming that scripture implies that bishops are the successors of the apostles in 
accordance with Jesus’ will; on the other hand, the ius divinum status of the papacy was 
justified by appealing to the well-known Petrine passages (Mt. 16.18–21; Jn 21.15–17; 
Lk. 22.31–32). Yet today, the uncertainty regarding the traditional conclusions as to the 
                                                 
6
 ‘The idea of “mono-ministry or ministerial autocracy”, that is, of all the most important gifts 
concentrated on one person or in a select group, is totally unsustainable both from the Pauline viewpoint of 
the charisms and the needs of the present church’. Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, ‘The Calling of the Whole 
People of God into Ministry: The Spirit, Church, and Laity’, Studia Theologica 53 (1999), 144–62 (158 no. 
45), referring in turn to James D. G. Dunn, Unity and Diversity in the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 
1977), 114. 
7
 The NT also supplies some concrete examples of practices embodying those normative insights, 
such as the appointment of church officials by the community (e.g. Acts 6.1–6; cf. Didachè 15.1 requiring 
that ἐpiίσκοpiοι and διάκονοι be elected, and 1 Clem. 44.3, insisting on the consent of the whole local 
church as necessary for the appointment of church officials), and the common deliberation over 
contentious issues, including doctrinal ones (e.g. Acts 15). 
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necessity and permanence of both institutions is considerable. Here I can offer but a 
brief summary of what many exegetical studies have highlighted. 
With regard to the monarchical papacy, several points should be considered. First, 
it is doubtful whether the Petrine passages envisage any specific power granted to 
Peter—the ‘power of the keys’—beyond that of ‘binding and loosing’ bestowed to all 
the disciplines (Mt. 18.18). Second, and most significantly, even granted that the Petrine 
passages do witness to a divine choice in favour of Peter, it is most likely—in fact 
almost certain—that it was a question of a personal mandate: there is no scriptural 
support for the notion of a succession of Peter’s special authority and function to the 
bishops of Rome or any other institution.8 Third, the lack of a clear scriptural 
requirement for such a function of unity at the universal level is perhaps most evidently 
suggested by the fact that the first appeal to those passages in order to support the 
primacy of the bishop of Rome occurred in the third century and, as has been noted, 
‘How can a case a for papal primacy be built on a passage of Scripture that no one 
bothered to cite as a supporting text until, presumably, several hundred years after the 
fact?’.9 Fourth, and equally significant, is the fact that Peter does not appear to have 
been the only or the most important disciple to have exercised a function of supra-
regional coordination in a personal way.10 Fifth, if, on the one hand, it is clear that the 
                                                 
8
 See e.g. Klaus Schatz, S.J.: ‘If we ask whether the historical Jesus, in commissioning Peter, 
expected him to have successors, or whether the author of the Gospel of Matthew, writing after Peter’s 
death, was aware that Peter and his commission survived in the leaders of the Roman community who 
succeeded him, the answer in both cases is probably “no”.’ Papal Primacy: From Its Origins to the 
Present, trans. John A. Otto and Linda M. Maloney (Collegeville MN: Liturgical Press, 1996), 1–2. One 
of the best concise assessments of the NT evidence concerning the Petrine ministry is Theodore 
Stylianopoulos, ‘Concerning the Biblical Foundation of Primacy’, Greek Orthodox Theological Review 
49, 1–2 (2004), 1–31, originally printed in Walter Kasper (ed.), The Petrine Ministry: Catholics and 
Orthodox in Dialogue. Academic Symposium Held at the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian 
Unity, trans. the staff of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity (Mahwah NJ: Newman 
Press, 2003), 37–64; also Veselin Kesich, ‘Peter’s Primacy in the New Testament and the Early 
Tradition’, in John Meyendorff (ed.), The Primacy of Peter. Essays in Ecclesiology and the Early Church 
(Crestwood NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary, 2nd ed. 1992), 35–66 (esp. 43; 51–6; 61–6); Raymond E. 
Brown, Karl P. Donfried, and John Reumann (eds.), Peter in the New Testament: A Collaborative 
Assessment by Protestant and Roman Catholic Scholars (Minneapolis: Augsburg; New 
York/Paramus/Toronto: Paulist Press, 1973, 2nd ed. 2002); and the conclusions drawn in Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 
429-30. One of the first comprehensive attempts at linking Peter with the office of the pope has been Leo 
I’s, described in 2.2 above. 
9
 David William Kling, The Bible in History: How the Texts have Shaped the Times (Oxford: OUP, 
2004), 48. As he added a few lines later: ‘the Petrine text is what one scholar suggests may be a 
“hermeneutically secondary legitimation” to justify those already in power or what another calls a “retreat 
from exegesis to later history”.’ Ibid. 
10
 James the brother of the Lord being a much more well known figure in this regard: ‘in the period 
of his supremacy in Jerusalem [James] was no merely local leader, but the personal embodiment of the 
Jerusalem church’s constitutional and eschatological centrality in relation to the whole developing 
Christian movement, Jewish and Gentile’, R. Bauckham, ‘James the Just and the Jerusalem Church’, in 
Bauckham (ed.), The Book of Acts in Its Palestinian Setting, (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 415–80 
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external way of fulfilling such function by means of ‘one individual Minister, under the 
Gospel’ is not in principle contrary to the NT,11 it is likewise evident from both the NT 
and tradition that other institutional patterns are equally legitimate: 
At every stage, the Petrine function developed according to the 
possibilities available at that time. Councils, individual leaders, specific 
local churches, credal statements and the papacy have all in various ways 
ministered to the unity of the church. Further, the papal form of the 
universal Ministry has not always involved the centralized, juridical 
apparatus which now exists, nor need we assume that it will always 
continue to do so.12 
Finally, the Church of Rome itself seems to have been fractioned in many local 
congregations relatively autonomous and with no strong monarchical coordinator until 
late into the third century.13 Hence, ‘Acceptance of the conclusions of modern studies 
leads to the position that Roman primacy was neither claimed nor recognized in the 
second century. […] Not only was papal primacy not recognized during this period, it 
was not even “there” as earlier Catholic apologists had assumed’.14 Canonical evidence 
is even more restrained on the subject. The canonical legislation of the first millennium 
mentioning the role of the Roman church and/or the bishop of Rome can be briefly 
listed: can. 3 of the First Council of Constantinople; can. 28 of the Council of 
Chalcedon; can. 36 of the Sixth Council in Trullo; canons 17 and 21 of the Council of 
Constantinople of 869–70; and can. 1 of the Council of Constantinople of 879–80. Yet, 
as Nicolae Dura recently observed, no one such canon mentions either a universal 
Petrine primacy of the Roman church/bishop over all the churches or a primatial office 
of the bishop of Rome as successor of Peter.15 
                                                                                                                                               
(450); also J. Dunn, Christianity in the Making, vol. 2, Beginning from Jerusalem (Grand Rapids MI: 
Eerdmans, 2009), 1077–89. 
The point that is also touched on in the Lutheran-RC Dialogue in the US, ‘Differing Attitudes 
Toward Papal Primacy’ (1973), in Joseph A. Burgess and Jeffrey Gros (eds.), Building Unity: Ecumenical 
Dialogues with Roman Catholic Participation in the United States, (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), §11, 
available at http://www.usccb.org/seia/differingattutidues.pdf. 
11
 ‘Differing Attitudes Toward Papal Primacy’, §29. 
12
 ‘Differing Attitudes Toward Papal Primacy’, §34. 
13
 Peter Lampe, ‘Fractionation, Monarchical Episcopacy, and Presbyterial Governance’, in his 
Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries. From Paul to Valentinus, ed. Marshall D. Johnson, trans. 
Michael Steinhauser (London: Continuum, 2003 [2nd ed. 1989]), 397–408; and more recently Allen Brent, 
Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century: Communities in Tension Before the Emergence 
of a Monarch-Bishop (Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill, 1995), esp. 453–8. 
14
 Miller, The Divine Right of the Papacy, 187. 
15
 Nicolae Dura, ‘The “Petrine Primacy”: The Role of the Bishop of Rome according to the 
Canonical Legislation of the Ecumenical Councils of the First Millennium, an Ecclesiological-Canonical 
Evaluation’, in Kasper (ed.), The Petrine Ministry, 159–87 (185). 
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The same applies to the justification for the divine institution of the monarchical 
episcopacy. Just as it is the case with regard to the ius divinum status of the papacy, so 
too that of the episcopacy necessitates for its vindication an unambiguous scriptural 
witness of a dominical institution or wish in that direction. 
In fact, the NT does not support the affirmation that ἐpiίσκοpiοι, or any other class 
of institutional church officials, were the successors of the apostles. What is does 
support, in contrast, is that 1) the Twelve (a group distinct from and much smaller than 
that of the apostles) did not appoint successors, and were not replaced;16 and, most to the 
point, 2) there is no clear understanding of apostolic succession in the NT: nowhere are 
the apostles construed as preoccupied with the need for creating a line of successors.17 
Equally—pace Trent’s justification of episcopacy—there is no evidence that they 
understood themselves as patriarchs of a priestly class necessary for the Eucharistic 
sacrifice sealing the New Covenant. 
In the main, apostles appear to have simply confirmed the leadership that was 
already in place in the house churches, rather than directly appoint successors.18 In light 
of the important role unambiguously given to the congregation, especially concerning 
their prior approval of candidates for office (e.g. Acts 6; Didachè 15.1 and 1 Clem. 
44.3), it would be hardly appropriate to interpret those other passages in Acts and the 
Pastorals where the full appointment procedure is never described (Acts 14.14, 23; 
20.32, 36; Tit. 1.5; 1 Tim. 5.22) as implying—much less explicitly mandating—a direct 
appointment by Paul, Timothy, or Titus. The fact that the last two are indeed told to 
appoint elders by no means exclude that they did so in collaboration with the whole 
community and conditionally upon the latter’s consent, as explicitly mandated in both 
Didachè 15.1 and 1 Clem. 44.3, which are only slightly more recent. This is further 
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 Consult Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza, ‘The Twelve and the Discipleship of Equals’, in 
Discipleship of Equals: A Critical Feminist Ekklēsia-logy of Liberation (London: SCM, 1993), 104–16. 
17
 For a thorough treatment of the lack of the concept in the NT, see Robert Lee Williams, Bishop 
Lists: Formation of Apostolic Succession in Ecclesiastical Crises (Piscataway NJ: Gorgias Press, 2005), 
59–65. With regard to 1 Tim. 5.22 (the only NT passage generally advanced as suggesting an 
understanding of a chain of apostolic succession), see LWF, PCPCU, The Apostolicity of the Church: 
Study Document of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Commission on Unity (Minneapolis MN: Lutheran 
University Press, 2006), §182 available at http://www.prounione.urbe.it/dia-int/l-rc/doc/e_l-rc_ap-
01.html. For the argument that Irenaeus’ understanding of ‘apostolic succession’ was of a ‘succession of 
teaching’ rather than of individual teachers, see Allen Brent, ‘Was Hippolytus a Schismatic?’, Vigiliae 
Christianae 49, no. 3 (1995), 215–44 (esp. 228–9 and 234). That means that apostolic succession 
concerns the Christian community’s distinctively Christian meanings and values: and to the extent that 
the carrier of such meanings and values is the community in its entirety, apostolicity resides primarily in 
the latter, see 3.6 below. 
18
 Such has been, for instance, an interpretation of Paul’s farewell to the elders of Ephesus (Acts 
20.32, 36), see R. A. Campbell, The Elders: Seniority within Earliest Christianity (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1994), 243. The same might have been the case in Acts 14.14, 23. 
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supported by the fact that even Paul’s choosing of Timothy himself seems to have 
started first with the latter being evaluated by the congregation in Lystra and Iconium 
(see Acts 16.2); the elders’ subsequent laying on of hands over him (1 Tim. 4.14) came 
most likely as a confirmation of such a collective testimony and evaluation. Likewise, 
Acts 14.14, 23; 20.32, 36, simply report that Paul and Barnabas laid their hands on 
elders in every city: but that still says nothing as to who chose the elders in the first 
place, what ecclesiological value did that gesture have, whether that gesture was 
necessary for those elders to become church leaders; and whether only apostles or also 
the entire local congregation could commend someone into a specific ministry by the 
laying on of hands. Williams’ summary of the available data is worth reporting at 
length: 
Evidence has been taken to suggest that the Spirit’s appointment was 
implemented by the apostle Paul. Luke claims that leaders he calls by the 
same title as he uses in Acts 20:17, ‘elders’, were ‘appointed’ by ‘the 
apostles Barnabas and Paul’ when returning from the first missionary 
journey (14:14, 23). Everett Ferguson has argued that the term used there 
for appointing, i.e. χειροτονέω, is properly understood as blessing or 
commending in a context of laying on of hands and prayer. As Campbell 
observed, this accords well with the commissioning of Paul and Barnabas 
in the church at Antioch (13:1) and with Paul’s commending the 
Ephesians elders to God (20:32, 36): ‘In this way it is possible to see how 
the elders could be both “in place” already, as household leaders, and also 
set apart for their ministry of leadership by the departing missionaries’. 
Luke is then referring to elders who have ‘emerged’ rather than been 
‘appointed.’ Furthermore, by κατ’ἐκκλεσίαν he apparently means that 
several house-congregations collectively (cf. 13:1), in contrast to the 
individual congregation signified by κατ’οἰκίαν (2:46). Luke is describing 
Paul’s approval and encouragement, not his appointment, of the group 
who were leaders of the house congregation of that city.19 
From this perspective, the evidence available makes the generalization reasonably 
safe that the congregations of the first century were deeply involved in the choosing of 
their leadership and more generally assessing charisms. Congregational input into the 
choice of leaders was probably substantial, as suggested by the widespread usage of 
popular elections of ἐpiίσκοpiοι already at the very end of the apostolic period;20 on the 
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 Bishop Lists, 54, note omitted. 
20
 Didachè 15.1, written most likely with first-hand knowledge of the practice of the apostolic 
church, unambiguously requires that ἐpiίσκοpiοι and διάκονοι be elected; and to this one must add the 
witness of Clement’s First Letter, insisting that ministers be chosen with the consent of the whole church 
(1 Clement 44.3). The selection of Matthias and the Seven (Acts 1.15–26 and 6.1–6 respectively) by the 
entire congregation provide the most unambiguous scriptural examples we have in this regard. 
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other hand, direct appointment was probably the exception, not the rule, and even then it 
was subject to the acceptance of the people. The function of ἐpiισκοpiή was carried out 
through different institutional patterns, both collegial and monarchical in form, but 
democratic in essence, to the extent that those exercising ἐpiισκοpiή were directly chosen 
by the congregation(s) they were going to preside over, or at least with their assent.21 
This is some of the exegetical and historical evidence arguably behind the 
following summary affirmations by the recent ecumenical study document Nature and 
Mission of the Church:22 that ‘from the earliest times there were those chosen by the 
community under the guidance of the Spirit, and given specific authority and 
responsibility’ (§86); that ‘There is no single pattern of conferring ministry in the New 
Testament’ (§87); and that their ministry requires the ‘assent of the whole community’ 
(§90). Finally, that document also observed that ‘Like every other aspect of ministry, 
episkopé both belongs to the whole church and is entrusted as a particular charge on 
specific persons. For this reason it is frequently stressed that, at every level of the 
Church’s life, the ministry must be exercised in personal, communal and collegial ways’ 
(§94). 
It is noteworthy that in two of the most important urban centres of early 
Christianity, Rome and Alexandria, there does not appear to have been a monarchical 
overseer before the second half of the second century.23 To the extent that leadership on 
many primitive Christian congregations was collegial, through a board of elders, a 
monarchical succession from the apostles could hardly have been possible. 
In fact, it is only beginning from the post-apostolic period—with Clement of 
Rome first and then especially with Irenaeus—that, faced with tensions within the 
Christian communities themselves due to doctrinal differences between Christian and 
Gnostic teachers, the emerging episcopal office was to be both strengthened and 
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 As I will argue later (5.13), there is no opposition between a monarchical institution and 
democracy: the democratic character of a political arrangement is to be measured against the rationality 
and responsibility of the delegation of authority alone, rather than exclusively or even primarily on the 
number of people to whom ultimate decisional power has been freely, intelligently, and responsibly 
delegated. 
22
 Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches, The Nature And Mission of the 
Church: A Stage on the Way to a Common Statement, Faith and Order Paper no. 198, (Geneva: WCC, 
2005), available at http://www.oikoumene.org/fileadmin/files/wcc-
main/documents/p2/FO2005_198_en.pdf. 
23
 For Rome, see no. 64 here; for Alexandria and the rest of Egypt, see C. Wilfred Griggs, Early 
Egyptian Christianity. From Its Origins to 451 CE (Leiden: Brill, 2000), vi, 21–2, 79, 86–8, 100. 
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ideologically legitimated by insisting that it was in a direct succession from the 
apostles.24 
It should be noted, in parenthesis, that this historical justification claiming that 
episcopacy is an apostolic institution was largely unknown to the Middles Ages—
despite its being now officially used in the RC Church since Vatican II. Indeed, the 
primary justification for episcopacy at the council of Trent was not that it was an 
apostolically instituted ministerial succession—a contention which was tucked in a 
secondary clause—but rather that it fulfilled the priesthood necessary for the sacrifice of 
the Eucharist.25 At Vatican II, in contrast, the justification for episcopacy was 
understood as requiring evidence for its dominical or at least apostolic pedigree: but all 
it was possible to do was to refer to the favourable opinion in that regard of post-
apostolic writers.26 
It is significant that, analogously to the scriptural witness, also the common, 
ecumenical Tradition has consistently been very cautious in officialising claims of 
divine prescription for any one ecclesial structure as either necessary or permanent. In 
fact, the only important ecclesiological doctrine officially formulated as normative and 
(arguably) necessary by the common Tradition of the first millennium is the very 
general one concerning the four marks of the church (first ecumenical council of Nicea, 
325): unity, holiness, catholicity (or universality), and apostolicity (or fidelity to the 
witness of the apostles).27 All additional ecclesiological insights of some relevance—
and the point is highly significant—have been officially defined by particular churches 
only. 
Two occurred when western Christianity was still united: in 1415 the decree Haec 
sancta of the general (as distinct from ecumenical) council of Constance established that 
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 That the emergence of both the monepiscopate and of its legitimation by appealing to the existence 
of an ‘apostolic succession’ have been stimulated by tensions due to doctrinal differences within the 
Christian communities, is the central thesis of Williams, Bishop Lists. Ernst Käsemann had already 
suggested something similar with regard to the emergence of the presbyterate in ‘Ministry and 
Community in the New Testament’, in Essays on New Testament Themes, trans. W. J. Montague 
(London: SCM, 1964 [2nd ed. 1960]), 63–94 (85–6, 88, and 91). 
25
 LWF, PCPCU, The Apostolicity of the Church, §239, which also quotes the relevant passage of the 
council of Trent, in DS 1768. 
26
 Ibid., §241, referring to LG §§18, 20, and 22. 
27
 In addition, there are two very secondary ones stating, on the one hand, that ‘the bishop of 
Constantinople […] shall have the prerogative of honour after the bishop of Rome; because 
Constantinople is New Rome’ (can. 3 of the first ecumenical council of Constantinople, 381) and, on the 
other hand, that Constantinople and Rome have the same privileges (‘ίσα piρεσβεία’, can. 28 of the second 
ecumenical council of Chalcedon, 451). 
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a general council is superior to the pope.28 In 1439 the Council of Florence produced 
Laetentur coeli, the bull of union with the Greek Church, whose last section affirmed 
the existence of a papal primacy—something which will be recalled almost four and a 
half centuries later during the general council of Vatican I. Several other doctrinal 
ecclesiological statements occurred following the Reformation (chief among which 
those contained in the Augsburg Confession and in the twenty-third session of the 
Council of Trent, on the sacrament of Orders). From that moment onwards it was the 
RC establishment which was to insist the most on the existence of divinely-willed, 
immutable and necessary church structures, other Protestants such as the Lutherans 
being often content of regarding church structures as adiaphora—as long as, of course, 
they did not infringe upon Christian freedom. That distinctively RC conviction 
concerning the existence of God-willed church structures has been the remote 
presupposition eventually enabling its papal leadership to officialise what it believed 
was one of them, namely that the pope possesses an ordinary, universal, and immediate 
jurisdictional authority over all the church, and that he is infallible when speaking ex 
cathedra (1870 decree Pastor aeternus of Vatican I). It was only at Vatican II, and more 
specifically with Lumen gentium (1965), that the first attempt ever in church history was 
made at officialising a more or less comprehensive ecclesiology: notable in this 
connection is LG’s first ever official affirmation of the infallibility of the sensus 
fidelium (§12), its endorsement of Vatican I’s teaching concerning the papal primacy, 
and its concomitant affirmation that bishops receive their sacra potestas immediately 
from God. 
Even the threefold pattern of ministry cannot boast an ecumenical pedigree, and 
the question whether it is essential or not for the being of the church is still an unsolved 
ecumenical problem.29 Indeed, its status has undergone changes even within the RC 
tradition itself: from being described as ‘instituted by divine ordinance’ (divina 
ordinatione instituta) at Trent (a formula expressly chosen to leave open whether the 
distinction between the three degrees of ‘order’, the episcopal, presbyterial, and 
diaconal, was of divine or of human right) to being described simply as having existed 
‘from antiquity’ (ab antiquo) at Vatican II.30 
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The history of dogmatic development, then, supplies no official doctrine 
canonizing any ecclesial structure. (The closest it reaches to do so are Laetentur coeli, 
Haec sancta, Pastor aeternus, and Lumen gentium: however, none of them—with the 
arguable exception of the first—has been promulgated by a truly ecumenical council). It 
is only slightly an exaggeration to affirm that, after two millennia of church history, we 
still lack an officially established ecumenical doctrine on any concrete institution of the 
church polity. No scriptural statements or clearly ecumenical dogmas exist defining a 
given ecclesial structure as divinely willed. And yet this remarkable fact is today often 
overlooked—arguably because of our being still too close temporally to, and thus 
influenced by, the recent past of opposed ecclesiological dogmatisms—rather than 
being interpreted as a sign of the freedom Christians have of structuring their 
community, subject of course to the ordinary norms for cooperation to be responsible, 
which are echoed by Jesus’ and Paul’s ecclesiological principles recalled above. 
It may be objected that not all that is ius divinum has been officially defined, and 
that, rather than looking to Tradition for dogmas canonizing specific church structures, 
one should search it for church structures displaying permanence and thus, potentially, 
their necessity for the church to exist. (In effect, the rationale behind the contention that 
a church structure was directly instituted by Jesus or otherwise divinely-willed was to 
justify its permanent and thus necessary character). And yet again, as the sketchy 
outline above suggests and the evidence brought below (3.3 and 3.6) will establish more 
clearly, history disproves both permanence and, as a consequence, also necessity. 
Lack of permanence, and thus necessity, applies even to an institution for which 
claims of its being divinely-willed have been both more ancient than the comparatively 
late ones advanced for the papacy, and more explicit. The necessity to appoint church 
officials by popular elections of the Christians concerned has been considered of divine-
right and necessary for the well-being of the church by many of the most important 
Fathers, as well as by numerous councils, popes, canonists, and theologians since.31 
Noteworthy in this regard is Blessed Antonio Rosmini, who regarded episcopal 
elections—in virtue of their unambiguous scriptural and post-apostolic foundations, as 
well as their being the surest expression of the faithful’s consent—as necessary for the 
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subsistence of the church, their gradual elimination from the RC Church during the 
second millennium as a potentially fatal ‘wound’ to the church communion, and their 
reintroduction as a matter of the utmost urgency.32 
The point of attention here is that, despite its strong scriptural, traditional and 
philosophical foundations, such a practice has been largely abandoned during the last 
millennium of church history, where in fact a variety of different methods of 
appointment have been adopted, including some contradictory with it (not least the 
centralised, worldwide top-down appointment currently in use in Roman Catholicism). 
Now, if a large—in fact the largest—portion of the church existed and continues to exist 
even without local elections of church officials, it means that the latter are not necessary 
for the church to exist. Such lack might be extremely damaging to the church—as 
Rosmini convincingly argued at length—yet not to the point of completely destroying it. 
In summary, even those institutions which have often been regarded as divinely willed 
by RC theology—e.g. monarchical episcopacy, the Petrine primacy, electoral 
appointment of officials—have not always existed, and so can hardly be regarded as 
indispensable for the latter to exist. Far from supporting a view of immutable, 
permanent and necessary ecclesial structures, scripture and history display both a 
synchronic and a diachronic variety of ecclesial organizational patterns and institutions 
differing from one time and place to another. 
3.4 Ius Divinum: From an Explicit Scriptural Institution to a Post-
apostolic, Spirit-led Development 
Granted, the conditions implicit to the traditional RC understanding of ius divinum—
‘first, institution by a formal act of Jesus himself, and second, a clear attestation of that 
act by the New Testament or by some tradition believed to go back to apostolic 
times’33—would not allow considering the monarchical form of fulfilling the regional 
and supra-regional ἐpiισκοpiή in the persons of the diocesan bishop and Roman pope as 
divinely willed—indeed, they would not allow any church structure to be bestowed that 
title. 
In order to avoid this conclusion and salvage something from the post-Tridentine 
insistence on permanence, immutability and absolute necessity—the characteristics 
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generally associated during that period with the expression ius divinum—two strategies 
have been adopted. 
The first is the one that discards the traditional understanding of ius divinum, 
requiring an explicit scriptural basis, in favour of a larger interpretation allowing for 
select post-apostolic developments on the ground that they were assisted by the Spirit. 
However, far from resolving the issue, this fresh understanding of ius divinum poses the 
further problem characteristic of dogmatic development: what is the criterion for 
discerning between those developments which are divinely-willed and those which are 
not? At the most general level, an answer to this question presupposes the resolution of 
the basic theological issue concerning the relationship between divine action and human 
cooperation. If it is postulated that God’s action ordinarily preserves the proper laws of 
creation and, specifically, that the Spirit’s assistance is universal and operates by 
perfecting without destroying human attention, intelligence, freedom/responsibility, and 
love, then such assistance cannot be isolated and separated from human history, for it 
runs through, undergirds, and encompasses all of it. The only alternative would be an 
exceptional, miraculous divine intervention explicitly mandating a given church 
structure as necessary and thus immutable: such may only be either an unambiguous 
scriptural order, or at most an extra-scriptural public revelation recognized by the 
church: and because the latter can safely be excluded, an explicit scriptural institution 
remains the only sure criterion. When Pannenberg affirmed with regard to the papacy 
that ‘the authority of such an office [of universal ἐpiισκοpiή], and of those who hold it, 
can be only of human law because we cannot trace it back to any express institution by 
Jesus Christ’,34 he was ultimately acknowledging that the only possible criterion for 
speaking of an ecclesial structure as divinely-willed is an explicit scriptural institution—
just as, arguably, the only possible criterion for describing any phenomenon as divinely-
willed in the strict sense is the kind of divine action traditionally labelled as miraculous. 
Put differently, in the absence of a positive scriptural mandate uncovering God’s direct 
revelation of his will, the only alternative for affirming the divinely-willed status of any 
given church structure would be to acknowledge its being a historical development in 
agreement with God’s will, i.e. resulting from God’s indirect action through secondary 
causes. In the specific case at hand, that would entail demonstrating that supposedly ius 
divinum church structures have developed by means of divine inspiration working 
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though the social, political, and cultural processes of ecclesial institutionalization, 
without subverting them. 
Yet such a solution is insufficient for upholding a distinct set of supposedly 
divinely willed ecclesial structures. When everything humanly achieved through 
cooperation with God’s grace can be said to be divinely-willed, the latter adjective 
becomes much too undefined and ultimately unhelpful for discerning which ecclesial 
structural development is divinely willed and which instead is not.35 The requirement for 
a clear and unmistakable divine command in favour of a specific ecclesial structure 
remains unavoidable. Unless such divine instruction can be shown to exist in scripture, 
the expression ius divinum should not be used. This is in fact implied in what already 
Hans Küng once observed, namely that all ecclesial institutions which originated in the 
apostolic age or later and for which no explicit scriptural text exists attesting their being 
divinely mandated—e.g. the monarchical episcopate and the Roman primacy—while 
they are to be respected and not changed arbitrarily, have no claim to permanence and 
are in principle reversible.36 However, what he did not stress sufficiently is that it is 
today safe to affirm that this applies not only to the monarchical episcopate and the 
papacy, but to all church structures for, as touched on in the above, no explicit divine 
prescription for any one ecclesial structure as either necessary or permanent can be 
found in scripture. 
RC canon law prescribes that ‘no doctrine is understood to be infallibly defined 
unless it is clearly established as such’ (can. 749.3). The same general principle should 
apply to defining church institutions to be divinely willed. In the absence of a clear 
scriptural positive indication that an ecclesial structure is ‘divinely willed’, the 
judgment that a given church structure is such would have to establish the fulfilment of 
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three chief conditions quite difficult to affirm in the kind of clear-cut, unambiguous way 
demanded by the importance of the matter at stake: namely, that it is a Spirit-assisted 
development; that such development is absolutely necessary for church being and is, 
accordingly, unchangeable and irreversible; that that it is not counterproductive but 
rather efficacious in fulfilling its function. Unless such conditions are unambiguously 
fulfilled, no church structure should be understood to be divinely willed in the strict 
sense of the word. 
3.5 Ius Divinum: From being predicated of the External Institutional 
Embodiment of Church Structures to being predicated of their 
Function of Ἐpiισκοpiή 
The second strategy for retaining the past insistence on the permanence, immutability 
and absolute necessity implied by the expression ius divinum, consists in affirming that 
those characteristics apply to the function (of ἐpiισκοpiή) a given ecclesial institution 
fulfils, rather than to its external institutional embodiment. As George Lindbeck 
observed, Lutherans ‘have no difficulty with the functionalist interpretation of the ius 
divinum character of certain post-biblical developments, for this simply affirms that 
what is historically and functionally necessary for the welfare of the church is also what 
God wills that the church be and do.’37 Both RC and Lutherans see papal primacy as 
necessary ‘only as a means, only as an instrument, for the proclamation of the gospel.’38 
Another Lutheran scholar, Herding Meyer, has proposed to go beyond the 
traditional distinction between structures of divine and human right towards 
understanding the need for the papacy in the light of its distinctive function of fostering 
the unity at the level of the universal church has been advanced by. That function he 
recognized as necessary not much for the being as for the well-being of the community 
of the faithful.39 
On a similar line, David Yeago advanced that 
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The central theological achievement of the U.S. [Lutheran-Roman 
Catholic ecumenical] dialogue was to relocate the issue of primacy in a 
teleological context, within which we can ask what good the primacy of 
Rome might serve, in what ways, and under what conditions. […] [T]he 
claim of divine institution need by no means be surrendered, but its force 
is altered when the function of papal primacy in a teleology of mission 
becomes central evidence for it.40 
By locating the Petrine primacy within the perspective of the mission of the 
church, such ecumenical dialogue has yielded 
a functional account of primacy as common ground for dialogue—not 
functional as in “non-theological”, but rather as in “sociological-
pragmatic,” because what is at stake is an understanding of primacy 
within the drama of the church’s apostolic mission, given by Jesus 
Christ.41 
The ultimate (and exclusive?) criterion for evaluating the necessity of ecclesial 
structures (i.e. their being divinely willed) is, as Avery Dulles suggested some time ago, 
the purely functional one of whether they promote the divinely given mission of the 
Church.42 Already the 1986 Nairobi report agreed by the Methodist-Roman Catholic 
international commission under the general title Towards a Statement on the Church 
had taken a similar stance. In its thirty-seven paragraphs devoted to ‘The Petrine 
Office’, it deployed its argument through a tightly knotted series of distinctly 
sociological considerations:43 
§48 In looking at the question of universal primacy one may begin with 
the desirability of unity focused around leadership. §49 All local churches 
need a ministry of leadership. […] §50 Analogously the question arises 
whether the whole Church needs a leader to exercise a similar unifying 
role in service to the worldwide κοινωνία. §51. Given this context, one 
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then has to face the claim that the Roman see already exercises such a 
ministry of universal unity.44 
From these premises, a conclusion was drawn hinting that 
Methodists might become receptive to a pragmatically formulated 
justification of the Roman claim in the present: “Methodists accept that 
whatever is properly required for the unity of the whole of Christ’s 
Church must by that very fact be God’s will for his Church. A universal 
primacy might well serve as focus of and ministry for the unity of the 
whole Church”’.45 
Again, Roman Catholic ecclesiologist Patrick Granfield argued for the need for 
the papacy primarily from socio-political grounds, by recalling the necessity any large 
organization has for a centre of unity providing coordination, communication, direction 
and leadership.46 As its current external institutional embodiment can best be understood 
and assessed against how it fulfils its proper function, so its past emergence can best be 
understood and assessed 
as a response to the early Church’s need for a center of unity: ‘On the 
basis of any other criterion than that of pastoral-theological efficiency, it 
does not seem possible to justify the primacy of the Roman bishop as an 
element in the structure of a particular Church.’47 
As noted above, those remarks manifest a shift in the main criterion of 
ecclesiological evaluation: permanence, immutability and absolute necessity—the 
characteristics traditionally associated with the expression ius divinum—are predicated 
of the function a given ecclesial institution fulfils, rather than its external institutional 
embodiment. The function in question is ἐpiισκοpiή. 
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3.6 Is the Function of Ἐpiισκοpiή Necessary for the Existence of the 
Church? 
The final issue concerning ius divinum is thus clear. Ἐpiισκοpiή might always have been 
carried out through different institutional forms which have varied considerably from an 
early age, both diachronically and synchronically. So while the permanence and 
necessity conveyed by the expression ius divinum is not to be found with regard to any 
one ecclesial structure, might it not be predicated of that common political function 
which ecclesial structures, in their different forms, exist to fulfil? The answer requires, 
again, an examination of scripture, Tradition, and reason. 
With regard to scripture, the answer appears to be negative. The only explicit 
scriptural mandates concern the proclamation of the Good News, baptising, and 
remembering Jesus’ last supper; while the political function of control and oversight of 
common action, i.e. ἐpiισκοpiή, is nowhere explicitly mandated as necessary and 
permanent. The same can be said even more forcefully of universal ἐpiισκοpiή. As it has 
been observed, ‘a responsibility for the universal church cannot be ruled out on the basis 
of the biblical evidence’,48 and is thus in principle compatible with it: but that is a far 
claim from affirming that it is required as an essential element for the church to exist. 
Still, one might argue that because ἐpiισκοpiή has been present from the very 
beginning, if embodied in different institutions, it should be regarded as necessary even 
in the absence of an explicit scriptural requirement. It is best to limit our enquiry to the 
most clear-cut case, by focusing on whether ἐpiισκοpiή is truly necessary at the supra-
regional or universal level. If ἐpiισκοpiή at the universal level cannot be shown to have 
been necessary for the church to exist and develop—if, in other words, it is correct that 
the early church has lived for several centuries without the ordinary exercise of such 
ἐpiισκοpiή at the universal level—it cannot be affirmed to be such also at all other levels, 
viz. the regional and local.49 From a strictly logical point of view, the burden of proof is 
on those who argue otherwise. In addition, RC theologians should also prove that the 
ἐpiισκοpiή is not only necessary but must also be exercised monarchically, and this at 
every level: from the local to the ecumenical. 
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From the point of view of scripture, there is some evidence in the NT of a 
communal, collegial (conciliar or synodal) and a personal exercise of supra-regional 
ἐpiισκοpiή from a very early period in the church’s history. An example of the first 
concerns the judicial role of the entire local church (Matt. 18.15–8); an instance of the 
second might have been the Jerusalem representative gathering where each party 
concerned, Jewish Christians and Hellenists, had sent its chosen delegates (Acts 15). 
Such events prefigured the subsequent tradition of ecumenical councils, which were to 
prove an admittedly rare, extraordinary means of fulfilling supra-regional, even 
universal ἐpiισκοpiή. On the other hand, the oldest illustration of a personal exercise of 
such supra-regional ἐpiισκοpiή is arguably the ministry fulfilled by James the brother of 
Jesus. 
Two points are worth noting. First, such an exercise of ἐpiισκοpiή, whether 
personal, collegial, or communal in form, seems to have been largely democratic in 
substance. At the gathering in Acts 15, as noted, all parties concerned sent their 
representatives; conversely, James did not decide unilaterally the issues at stake; rather, 
he mediated between the various parties by suggesting a compromise, and then 
supervised the implementation of the agreements reached. 
Secondly, while there are traces of a budding exercise of supra-regional ἐpiισκοpiή 
in the primitive church, other data from both the NT—e.g. James’ ultimately fruitless 
attempt to enforce some of the Jewish laws of purity upon Christian converts from 
paganism, or the relatively autonomous Johannine community—and the first centuries 
of church life suggest that supra-regional ἐpiισκοpiή was not yet ordinarily exercised 
over all Christian groups, and even over those it was in fact exercised, it was not always 
efficacious. 
In fact, the picture emerging from those data is that of a federal network of 
Christian communities based on households, each of which was fully church, 
completely autonomous, cooperating with the others even while retaining important 
differences on several matters, including differences in organizational layout.50 
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This independence by the local church is often called ‘congregational 
autonomy’, that is, self-governing congregations. [...] 
But autonomy is not isolation. The early churches practiced a fullness of 
fellowship, cooperation, mutual assistance, and communication. There 
was a sense of being one body under one Lord (Eph. 4:4–5). There were 
to be no dividing barriers between believers, whether racial (Eph. 2) or 
cultural (Rom. 14–15). Examples of local churches cooperating together 
may be seen in Acts 11:28–30; Romans 15:25–26; and 2 Corinthians 8:1–
5. Such mutual cooperation is evident throughout the pages of the New 
Testament, but this was done without creating an organization higher than 
local churches.51 
In light of the NT and post-apostolic evidence, a schematization of the initial 
development of church structures has been suggested as occurring in two stages: the 
initial one in which the believers gathered κατ’οίκον, and the subsequent one in which 
the household heads gathered κατ’ἐκκλησίαν, in a general assembly of the 
representatives of the various house-churches in a city.52 As was the case for similar 
professional and religious gatherings in the Greco-Roman world, whether organized by 
primarily socio-economical or religious associations—house churches were arguably 
guided by their benefactors or patrons, following the accepted pattern of social 
cooperation in the Greco-Roman world.53 
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The case of Corinth is particularly valuable in that it is ‘the Church which we 
know so much more about than any other of the New Testament Churches’.54 Küng, 
among others, observed that the evidence we have suggests that 
there existed in the Corinth community, in Paul’s time, [no] office of 
leadership, whether elders or the later monarchical kind of episcopate. 
Faced with disorders which threatened the very existence of the Corinth 
community, in preaching (1 Cor. 14), the Lord’s Supper (11) and in 
Church discipline (5); faced, moreover, with divisions in the community 
(1–3) with regard to the settling of disputes within the community (6), and 
with regard to the collection for Jerusalem (16; 2 Cor. 8–9)—Paul would 
have had to address himself to the responsible leaders of the community, 
if such had existed. But here there is evidently no one to whom Paul could 
say: ‘Command and teach these things’ (1 Tim. 4.11), not even in 
connection with the Lord’s Supper.55 
As he further remarked, ‘All this is much more than an argumentum e silentio. The 
burden of proof lies’ with those wishing to affirm the existence of a supra-
congregational ministry of leadership during Paul’s time.56 
This basic, household-based organizational pattern remained the default one 
roughly until Constantine. As has been observed, ‘the New Testament Church began as 
a small group house church (Col. 4.15) and it remained so until the middle or end of the 
third century’.57 In contrast, the development of supra-local coordination has been quite 
slow: 
There is, in fact, no evidence of consultation and common action among 
the Christian communities themselves until late in the second century. 
Intra-congregational deliberative meetings, however, evidently took place 
in early times and were presumably common. Ignatius, for example, 
advised Polycarp to call together a congregational assembly (συµβούλιον) 
at Smyrna to take care of an important matter that had arisen there 
(Polycarp 7.2). [...] 
It seems evident also that the struggles for identity and mutual 
recognition among the groups were increasingly the occasion of both 
intra-and inter-congregational discussion and that the discussions and 
decisions regarding acceptable teachings resulting from these attempts 
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towards the resolution of issues were, in fact, the beginnings of conciliar 
action.58 
So it is that the organizational development of early Christianity has been aptly 
summarized as follows: 
in the pre-Nicene centuries the local ekklesia was largely self-sufficient 
and to a surprising degree autonomous. Unity among churches manifested 
itself in agreement on faith rather than in institutional structures.59 In fact, 
no permanent organizational machinery existed above the level of the 
local church. Except of the necessity of having a new bishop consecrated 
by several neighboring bishops, there was little constitutional dependence 
of one church upon another. As late as 340 A.D. the liturgy of Serapion, 
for example, even in its intercessory prayers did not look beyond the 
horizon of the bishopric of Thumis in Lower Egypt. 
At this early stage of development it was possible for each locality to 
have its own canon and text tradition of Scripture, its own disciplinary 
regulations. [...] Of course there was borrowing and interaction among the 
various communities, but what conformity resulted was due to 
spontaneous adoption, not to authoritative imposition. Councils were 
convened to achieve a consensus, a common course of action, with no 
defined powers of overriding or interfering with local decisions.60 It 
remained up to the individual churches whether or not to implement 
conciliar enactments.61 
The growth in the interconnectedness of Christian communities proportionally 
increased the need for an ordinary exercise of a universal oversight. It was only as an 
evolution of the initial situation of small, autonomous local communities of Christians 
(with different liturgical customs, doctrinal outlooks, and political organizations) that a 
function of supra-regional and, eventually, universal ἐpiισκοpiή gradually developed, 
arguably to increase the unity required by cooperation.62 What is crucial for present 
purposes is that for the existence as well as growth of such house churches no universal 
ἐpiισκοpiή had been necessary. 
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To the extent, then, that the gradual development of the function of supra-regional 
ἐpiισκοpiή only occurred as a modification—and an arguably positive development—of 
the original network of self-governing house churches, it is impossible to conceive it as 
absolutely necessary for church being.63 This is most evident with regard to the 
ecumenical or universal ἐpiισκοpiή.64 For the greater part of the first millennium—i.e. 
when a curia-assisted monarchical papacy claiming universal and absolute doctrinal and 
jurisdictional authority in ecclesial matters had not yet developed—supra-regional 
ἐpiισκοpiή has been fulfilled in both monarchical and collegial (synodal and conciliar) 
forms, and universal ἐpiισκοpiή only extraordinarily and in a collegial manner only, 
through the great ecumenical councils. As has been noted, 
the papacy as we know it today, an essentially monarchical power 
possessed of sovereign authority over the entire Roman Catholic Church 
worldwide, is very much the product of the second thousand years of 
Christian history. 
Indeed, in the degree to which, via effectively centralized governmental 
agencies, mechanisms, procedures, and instrumentalities of 
communication, it is actually able on a day-to-day basis to impose its 
sovereign will on the provincial Churches of Roman Catholic 
Christendom, the papacy is the achievement, more precisely, of the past 
two hundred years at most...65 
The development of the papacy can be conceived as the provision for a permanent 
institution capable of exercising universal ἐpiισκοpiή in an ordinary (as distinct from 
extraordinary) manner. This Petrine function exercised by the popes began very 
gradually only since the fourth century and on very limited areas at first—mostly with 
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regard to the fulfilment of the function roughly analogous to contemporary courts of 
cassation or of last resort, which have jurisdiction over all matters triable in the judicial 
stream but only scope of review to determine a miscarriage of justice and demand that 
the trial be repeated. This is what, at least, is suggested by canons 3–5 of the council of 
Sardica (c. 343), which have been summarized as affirming that ‘papal competence 
would be limited to declare that a council has misjudged and that another council—but 
not the pope himself—should revise the trial’, albeit the pope would have the authority 
of choosing the members of this second, independent jury.66 
Noteworthy in this connection is that ἐpiισκοpiή, whether local or supra-regional, 
personal or collegial, appears to have been initially limited to the judicial domain. It was 
arguably the local churches which decided what they felt unable to decide or settle 
themselves and thus called for external evaluation, advice, or adjudication: it was thus a 
question not of a central authority unilaterally legislating what it felt was right in 
isolation from everybody else, but rather of a true judicial service.67 And, initially at 
least, such judicial task in both disciplinary and doctrinal matters was arguably the 
primary function of official leaders—something which fits well with understanding 
their creation and development as a response to ecclesiastical crises. Noteworthy in this 
regard is the fact that this mirrors the general development of political structures as 
highlighted by political anthropology, where administering justice—maintaining 
internal peace—especially as a court of last resort, has normally been among the first 
functions of any (centralized) political authority, along with maintaining external peace. 
Finally, it is important to underline that there has never been a unique, truly 
ecumenical ἐpiισκοpiή in the history of Christianity: not even the bishop of Rome has 
ever exercised such a function de facto, as distinct from having claimed to be de iure 
entitled to do so. Even granted that before the 1054 schism he did exceptionally exercise 
a minimal ἐpiισκοpiή over Greek Christians—as a judicial court of last resort—such has 
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never been the case before the fourth century. Again, even after the papacy became 
increasingly operative as the ordinary agent of universal ἐpiισκοpiή for the Latin Church 
(especially since the gradual development of the Roman Curia in the second 
millennium), that function has at crucial times been fulfilled by others. In extraordinary 
circumstances, when the papacy betrayed its role, the latter has eventually been 
discharged by a general council. This occurred most famously during the Great Schism 
(1378 to 1417)—when more than one pope claimed legitimacy and the Christian 
allegiance in the West was split—which was eventually ended by the council of 
Constance (1414–1418). And since the Reformation, what we have had is a variety of 
different institutional arrangements fulfilling a function of worldwide ἐpiισκοpiή for each 
of the mainstream Christian churches. Hence, as a Lutheran-RC bilateral dialogues 
remarked, 
there is for Lutherans no single or uniquely legitimate form of the 
exercise of the Petrine function. At every stage, the Petrine function 
developed according to the possibilities available at that time. Councils, 
individual leaders, specific local churches, credal statements and the 
papacy have all in various ways ministered to the unity of the church. [...] 
Even if it should be desirable that the Petrine function be exercised by a 
single individual, the question of his powers would still be open.68 
In addition, then, to the diachronic variety of institutional ways of exercising 
ἐpiισκοpiή, both local and supra-regional, there exists the synchronic variety evident 
nowadays. For example, at the universal level, today most if not all mainstream 
Christian churches have a specific institution for fulfilling ἐpiισκοpiή: in the RC 
communion such function is exercised primarily monarchically, with no real collegial 
elements (the international Synod of Bishops has a purely advisory role, while all 
powers exercised by the curial Cardinals and officers are delegated by and thus 
dependent on the pope); in the Anglican communion the situation is the exact opposite: 
worldwide ἐpiισκοpiή is exercised mostly collegially (Lambeth Conference, Anglican 
Consultative Council, and Primates’ Meeting), the role of the Primate of Canterbury 
being almost purely honorary; Lutheranism has a predominantly collegial outlook 
which embodies subsidiarity (Assembly, Council, and Secretariat of the Lutheran World 
Federation); and so has Methodism (World Methodist Council). 
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Not only, then, do Scripture as well as history attest that the function of ἐpiισκοpiή, 
at every level, has been carried out in different ways, personally, communally, or 
collegially.69 They also suggest that its existence has not been absolutely necessary for 
the church to exist. As noted earlier, this is particularly evident with regard to the 
specifically monarchical exercise of ἐpiισκοpiή—whether at the local, supra-regional, or 
ecumenical level—in light of the two facts mentioned above: first, the diachronic 
variety of institutions fulfilling such task, which have not been only monarchical but 
also collegial; second, the fact that the monarchical form of exercising the episcopal 
function stopped fulfilling its function during crucial periods in history—and this at 
both the local level of diocesan bishops and at the supra-regional level of the 
metropolitans, patriarchs, and pope—without the church thereby ceasing to exist. 
At the local level, failure of monarchical ἐpiισκοpiή arguably occurred on a vast 
scale already during the Arian crisis, due to the heterodoxy of so many bishops; at the 
supra-regional level, failure of monarchical ἐpiισκοpiή occurred most visibly during the 
Great Schism in 1054 and then again, more seriously still, during the Western Schism 
from 1378 to 1417, and since the Reformation a century later. The failure of the nascent 
function of supra-regional ἐpiισκοpiή during the Arian crisis is particularly noteworthy, 
according to Newman, in that throughout its duration it was the shepherdless laity 
throughout the empire which discerned orthodoxy from heterodoxy, mostly unhelped by 
the episcopate.70 Despite Newman’s simplified depiction suggesting a greater degree of 
doctrinal unity than might have been the case in a situation of widespread doctrinal 
fragmentation,71 his central perception about the role of the church at large, if correct, is 
a good demonstration that it is the community as a whole (laity and office-holders) 
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which is the primary carrier of the common fund of Christian meanings and values, viz. 
the primary carrier of apostolicity. 
Furthermore, a failure of (monarchical) ἐpiισκοpiή in fulfilling its proper task also 
occurred at all levels—whether the regional or supra-regional—every time in history 
that it has been exercised by coercion, or more generally in an unchristian way which 
quenched instead of supporting the freedom of Christians it is supposed to serve, thus 
stunting the possibility for true self-transcendence. A most evident instance of this are 
the mistaken excommunications of or accusations against theologians, mystics, founders 
of religious orders, ordinary laymen and women, whether by diocesan bishops, 
archbishops, or popes, which punctuate the history of the church. Such acts were and 
are inherently divisive, and contrary to the function of fostering unity and coordination 
in a community. 
In all the above instances, ἐpiισκοpiή has been de facto unavailable to a greater or 
lesser extent in significant portions of Christianity for extended periods of time, with 
often damaging yet hardly ever lethal consequences for the existence of the churches 
concerned. Finally, there have always been throughout most if not all the history of 
Christianity non-episcopal churches. Their nature as churches—i.e. as Christian 
communities in the technical sense of groups sharing distinctively Christian 
experiences, insights, judgments of facts, values, and goals—is undeniable. All the 
above examples would point to the conclusion that a church can come to existence, 
survive, and even thrive without a structure of authority—never mind monarchical 
authority. They point, in other words, to the fact that ἐpiισκοpiή is not strictly speaking 
necessary for a church to exist as church and to survive as such. 
From this perspective, it is plausible to assume that the only necessary element of 
unity vis-à-vis the great variety of socio-cultural and religious backgrounds of new 
converts (including the sundry charismatic experiences common in Corinth) was not 
structural but personal, viz. the common experience of the Spirit.72 Arguably such 
experience of the transcendent was then to be necessarily complemented at the 
propositional level of belief by an orthodox confession of Jesus as Lord: in either case, 
the point here is that neither Paul nor James, Peter, John or any other inspired writer 
envisaged any ecclesial structure as necessary for there to be church.73 
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This is consistent with a widespread understanding of what formally constitutes a 
human community (see further below): the latter is not just any group of persons within 
the same geographical boundaries or under the same political chief, but one sharing 
experiences, insights, judgments of facts, and values. It is such shared fund of meanings 
and values that is the necessary and sufficient element formally constitutive of a 
community qua community.74 Analogously, a Christian community is a group of 
persons sharing, through the assent of faith (hence the supernatural character of the 
resulting community), the distinctive meanings and values of the Good News of 
Christian revelation. From this viewpoint, ‘apostolicity’ is constitutive of the Christian 
church because it signifies precisely the common Christian meanings, values, and goals 
which bind Christians together. 
In light of this, neither monarchical episcopate nor ἐpiισκοpiή in general can be 
understood as essential for the formation, development, or survival of the Christian 
community: on the contrary, that can only be the role of the inner word of the Spirit in 
people’s hearts—identifiable with the (religious experience of) God’s gift of his love 
(Rom. 5.5)—and of the outer word of divine positive revelation, particularly in the 
person of Jesus and the Good News he proclaimed. Such an insight has been central to 
the traditional sola fide ecclesiology of most non-episcopal Christian churches. The 
latter reject the understanding of the monarchical exercise of ἐpiισκοpiή at every level not 
per se, but inasmuch as it is claimed to be absolutely necessary for the church to exist—
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a claim repeated in several ecumenical documents.75 They object with the same reasons 
already highlighted: first, the diachronic variety of its institutional embodiments, 
monarchical and collegial alike; second, the failure of its monarchical form at several 
crucial points in church history and its supplementation by other forms.76 From this 
perspective, ‘apostolicity and unity depend [not] upon the church’s having the episcopal 
office’,77 but rather on fidelity to a shared fund of common experiences, meanings and 
values distinctive of Christ’s Good News and of the Spirit’s grace. 
Also noteworthy in this regard is the fact that one of the primary meanings of the 
NT term κοινωνία, used to describe the church, is that of ‘partnership’, ‘fellowship’, or 
‘association’, acceptations which, while they certainly indicate a group of people 
sharing experiences, meanings, values, and goals, do not per se imply that such group 
possesses a structure of authority (i.e. was organized hierarchically).78 As Paul S. 
Minear put it in his discussion of the term: 
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It is important to note also that certain things were not mentioned as being 
essential to faith’s common life. Nothing was said about a structure of 
offices and officials whose authority must be recognized by believers. 
Paul did not even urge the community to adopt a single day for worship 
or a single set of rules concerning clean and unclean foods.79 
Again, as it has been noted as some length, the basic concern of the ancient 
councils of the early church was indeed the unity of the church, but such unity ‘was 
based on the identity of Tradition and the unanimity in faith, rather than on any 
institutional pattern’.80 In short, as Congar put it, ‘The first and shared reality by which 
the Church exists is faith: the Church is the congregatio fidelium.’81 
With this we move from an examination of the data from scripture and tradition to 
more theoretical considerations. For the assertion that what essentially constitutes 
apostolicity and unity is a common fund of distinctively Christian shared meanings and 
values is fundamentally opposed to the central belief underlying many ecclesiologies 
and even past political philosophies, especially of a conservative bent, according to 
which the unity of a community—and thus much more its very existence—would 
necessarily require, and is thus essentially constituted by, a single supreme authority at 
its highest level and at each of the lower decisional levels, in a hierarchical pyramid.82 
But political anthropology suggests that a central political authority, while 
potentially very useful, is not strictly speaking necessary to have a community in the 
technical sense of a group sharing common experiences, insights, judgments of fact, 
values, and goals. Those past political philosophers who have considered political 
authority to be ‘natural’, were inclined to make such an assumption by the relative lack 
of historical and anthropological knowledge typical of pre- and early modern times and 
often found well into the nineteenth century. In contrast, those two disciplines have 
highlighted that social and political stratification is not a universal phenomenon or a 
standard for all human societies. Non-stratified, egalitarian or ‘acephalous’ societies 
have always existed with hardly any political authority. Indeed, such has generally been 
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the situation before the Neolithic Revolution, as well as subsequently for all human 
communities which did not become part of the great civilizations but remained at a 
largely pre-political level: American Indians, Australian Aborigines, many African 
peoples, Maoris, and more in general all nomadic peoples. 
The same can be said of the church. Christian communities can and in fact do 
exist and carry out their mission even without an institutionalization of that particular 
political relationship or type of cooperation we call subordination or authority proper. 
Contemporary Baptist as well as Free Churches, and parts of the rapidly increasing 
Pentecostal movements offer good examples of such Christian communities with little 
or no political authority. This latter cannot accordingly be said to be necessary for the 
church to exist.83 
What has just been said, of course, does not mean that the institutionalization of 
political authority is not useful, as indeed is made evident both in the human and in the 
Christian sphere by the history of the major civilizations as well as of the traditional, 
mainstream Christian churches respectively. While, then, church political 
(jurisdictional) structures cannot be deemed necessary for the esse of the church, they 
can be deemed, when well devised, necessary for the bene esse of the church, viz. quite 
advantageous to fulfilling the evangelizing mission they exist to serve. In short, insights 
from political philosophy also highlight the potential for a community’s effectiveness in 
attaining its goal of structures for exercising authority or ἐpiισκοpiή, a potential much 
greater than that possible in unstructured communities. 
We can conclude, accordingly, that to the extent that the entire and only purpose 
of the expression ius divinum was to affirm the permanence and even necessity of 
certain church structures, it should be discarded as it does not have a referent anymore. 
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In light of the following facts: (1) no binding indication on the necessity and 
permanence of any church structure has been found so far; (2) Tradition likewise lacks 
ecumenically binding doctrinal statements as to the external form of any one ecclesial 
structure; (3) both Scripture and the entire Tradition, from the very beginning until the 
present day, attest a remarkable developmental variety of ecclesial polities, it appears 
safe to say that so far God’s will for the political organization leaves Christians with the 
greatest freedom of adaptation and development of ecclesial structures. There should be 
a complete freedom of devising ecclesial structures84—if within the limits, as we will 
see, of the normative anthropological and political guidelines found in the gospel and 
developed in Tradition (6.5). 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the traditional appeal to God’s will to justify church 
structures—a claim especially although not exclusively raised by Roman Catholics 
since the Reformation—has lost of its force in a measure directly proportional to the 
increased acceptance among exegetes of the fact that no ecclesial structure/political 
function (e.g. ἐpiισκοpiή) is mandated in the NT. 
The alternatives to an unambiguous scriptural command—namely, an appeal to 
the Spirit’s assistance (as distinct from inspiration) in developing fresh ecclesial 
structures—is far too vague a criterion for determining with certitude whether a given 
development is according to God’s mind or not. In effect, the Spirit’s assistance must be 
necessarily understood as working in continuity with the nature, and thus in continuity 
with the sound ‘natural’ insights concerning the right ordering of social and political 
relationships expressed in the socio-political institutions of any given age and place. 
This is confirmed by Christians’ free and critical adoption and adaptation throughout 
history of foundational insights and institutions from the societies and cultures they 
lived in. 
Of course, some ecumenically recognized and scripturally based official doctrinal 
judgments on the necessity of any one church structure would largely solve the problem 
of the discernment of developments which are divinely-willed from those who are not 
                                                 
84
 See the opening remarks by Lewis S. Mudge in his ‘Ecclesia as Counter-Consciousness’ [1971] in 
Rethinking the Beloved Community. Ecclesiology, Hermeneutics, Social Theory (Lanham MD: University 
Press of America, 2001), 63–75 (63). 
 102 
such. However, the common Tradition of the first millennium is remarkably silent in 
this regard, being limited chiefly to affirming the four distinctive marks of the church. 
Finally, the difficulty of defending the necessity of the political function of 
ἐpiισκοpiή is most evident from the point of view of the social and political branches of 
both anthropology and philosophy. Just as the political relationship of cooperation 
through subordination, which we term ‘political authority’, is not strictly speaking 
absolutely essential for a community to exist, but only relatively essential because of its 
greatly enhancing cooperation and efficaciousness, so the same can be said of ἐpiισκοpiή. 
The same is affirmed, from a different viewpoint, by stating that—contrary to an 
assumption which was both widespread and understandable in the relatively little 
differentiated societies of the pre-modern period—the unity of a community does not 
require a unique, supreme and absolute (monarchical) authority, but only a unity of 
shared meanings, values, and goals. The way of attaining such common goals does not 
necessarily require cooperation through subordination—that is, hierarchical authority—
but can equally be achieved—although often not as efficiently—through horizontal 
cooperation and division of labour. 
Because it had always been strongly contested, the scriptural demonstration of a 
direct dominical institution has hardly ever been the only argument advanced to justify 
the absolutist papal monarchy. 
Other arguments have been advanced which have been used to defend 
monarchical absolutism in the civil sphere too. Some, it may be recalled, were mostly 
philosophical (see 2.5)—those justifying the necessity that there be but one unique 
supreme authority, and that as supreme such authority be unaccountable and not subject 
to supervision—and were equally advanced in the works of papalist theologians and 
royalist political philosophers alike. They will be addressed in the course of analysing 
some central categories of (democratic) political philosophy in chapter five. Others have 
been more distinctively theological, and will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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4 THEOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM AND THE 
MYSTIFICATION OF THE CHURCH 
4.1 Introduction 
A concern of Christian theology throughout history has been to investigate the 
distinctiveness of Christians vis-à-vis non-Christians. It was not only the specificity of 
the Christian as individual that was inquired about, but also that of the Christian 
community, the church, vis-à-vis civil society. There are two fundamental, mutually 
exclusive stances which can be taken in that regard: one argues for the discontinuity of 
all that is Christian from what it is not; this has been often regarded as characteristic of 
the Augustinian tradition. In contrast, the other conceives the Christian dimension of 
grace as in continuity with creation and the natural plane, which it perfects. Such has 
been the approach peculiar to the Thomist tradition. With regard to the church, Joan 
Lockwood O’Donovan has observed that 
[E]cclesial and civil political concepts […] are linked to the established 
relationship between the law of the gospel and the law of creation, 
between love and justice, supernatural and natural virtues, reason and 
revelation. Generally speaking, the greater the opposition between these 
notions, the more church and state have divergent political theories. The 
weaker the opposition, the closer are the church and state political 
theories. Historically, the pressures for theoretical and practical 
parallelism have predominated: the Latin church and the Western empire 
[...] engaged in ceaseless mutual plundering of each other’s political 
ideology, organization, and political operations. [...] [T]he trend toward 
institutional homogeneity still dominates: today, church and state alike 
must conform to the prevailing liberal and democratic political ethos. The 
more radical theological dualisms, with their antithetical constructions of 
ecclesial and civil community, have tended to be historical undercurrents 
that periodically erupt into challenges to the status quo.1 
The latter statement probably downplays somewhat the relevance of the 
Augustinian position. As we will see, both Cajetan and Bellarmine roundly rejected the 
continuity between the ecclesial and the civil communities (see 4.4 below), and their 
arguments on this point have been very influential within Roman Catholicism at least 
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throughout the post-Tridentine period and indeed till now. Again, as I have suggested in 
the introduction to the previous chapter, the urge towards stressing the discontinuity 
between the ecclesial and the civil community, and thus between ecclesiology and 
political philosophy, has increased with the abandonment by the latter of absolutism in 
favour of democracy through a process which came to the limelight with the American 
and French Revolutions. To the extent that the RC ecclesiastical establishment has been 
suspicious of and contrary to this new development, to that extent it has felt the need to 
distinguish the ecclesial from the civil polity, and justify the former on different grounds 
than those of political philosophy—and such is still, to an important extent, the current 
approach of RC ecclesiology. 
I have already examined one way of justifying such a discontinuity between grace 
and nature, fides and ratio, in the case of the church, namely, the one attempting to 
demonstrate that the ecclesial polity has been willed by God—the implication being that 
it is to be regarded as immutable, necessary and most excellent even if seemingly 
contrary to reason and nature. 
Still, such a justification had never been very convincing in the past, and it is even 
less now: the scriptural exegesis supposedly demonstrating a direct divine establishment 
of the papal absolute monarchy—and thus by the same token vindicating what seemed 
as an ‘unnatural’ institution—was already strongly contested during Cajetan’s time, and 
as I have noted is today rejected by the great majority of NT scholars. Since the late 
eighteenth century, in particular, the birth and development of critical exegesis and 
church history made it increasingly impracticable to justify any one church structure or 
function (such as ἐpiισκοpiή) as dominically instituted, permanent, and absolutely 
necessary for the church to exist. 
However, the appeal to a scriptural witness of God’s will was but a way of solving 
the most momentous and fundamental problem, namely, the inconsistency and real 
discontinuity between the Christian and the human polities. While in the past such 
discontinuity has ordinarily been justified simply by affirming that God willed it, today 
essentially the same is accomplished by affirming that the church is a (partially 
supernatural) mystery and the creature of God’s inscrutable will. The implication, it is 
argued, is that the church, its organizational polity included, cannot be either understood 
or criticized on the basis of what has been grasped of the working of purely natural 
communities. It may indeed be true, it is argued, that in the natural order of things, 
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power resides originally and primarily in the community, which can then decide to 
create official authorities to carry out limited functions on behalf of the community and 
at the service of the common good. Indeed, democracy might well be the ‘natural’, most 
intelligent and responsible way of organising political relations.2 And yet that does not 
mean that it is applicable to that mysterious reality which is the church. 
It is assumed that, if not at the level of the Christian qua individual Christian, at 
least at the level of the Christian polity, grace does not perfect nature without destroying 
it, but rather brings about a completely new creation, radically discontinuous with its 
human, natural substratum. As a consequence, the cognitive and moral requirements for 
cooperation, delegation, and obedience to authority to be responsible which are binding 
in a human polity are not necessarily such in the church of Christ. Already Cajetan had 
implicitly accepted as much when he insisted that the church, as distinct from the proper 
natural order of the purely human societies, is indeed a ‘servile’ society.3 For him, the 
apparent irrationality, from the point of view of political philosophy, of the ecclesial 
structures labelled as divinely-willed—and primarily of the absolute papal monarchy—
is justified as the expression of a higher rationality, viz. of God’s inscrutable will. In this 
way, however, what was inconceivable to the medieval mind was postulated, at least 
with regard to the church: namely, the opposition of divine with natural law, and 
ultimately the discontinuity between nature and grace as well as between fides and ratio. 
Lest it be thought that the above is simply an abstract generalization with no 
factual basis, its role in rejecting specific, fundamental elements of democracy should 
be noted. Thus, for instance, while majority rule is inapplicable to the church on its own 
‘natural’ grounds—because inherently conducive to a dictatorship of the majority and 
ultimately of relativism—the freedoms of information, debate, public dissent or 
criticism, and even conscience are considered largely inapplicable to the church for 
quite a different reason, namely, on the basis of the church being a ‘mystery’ (see 4.5 
below). Conversely, the obedience and conformity required towards the non-
irreformable policies and decisions of the hierarchy far exceed the standards for a 
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responsible cooperation which are now generally recognized for civil society—the 
achievement of centuries of political reflection. (Hence the charge against Catholics—
common in the past but still widespread today—that they are blind sheep who obey 
irrationally and irresponsibly, that is, without the normal rational and moral grounds 
required before a decision to obey can be responsibly taken). 
An analogous reasoning is often advanced with regard to the discernment and 
decision-making procedure to determine a common course of action or define a 
normative shared meaning or value: a mistaken conception of, or a unilateral emphasis 
on, the Spirit’s gracious assistance towards attaining the truth often hides the fact that 
all Christians, popes and bishops included, must fulfil certain cognitive operations 
before taking a decision, at the personal as much as the ecclesial or political levels. The 
traditional idea of a carisma veritatis inherent in the bishops cannot be invoked to 
bypass the proper procedure for maximising the knowledge and wisdom of the 
community made to bear to determine a common course of action, and such procedure 
ordinarily requires public debate and consultation of the relevant experts for the 
problem at hand in the community (see 5.6 and 6.5). 
Two, then, are the distinct problems to be addressed: first, is the Christian 
community in continuity with the natural one, so that what is best for one remains best 
for the other? Second, is democracy or at least some fundamental democratic features 
the best (or least bad) way of ordering political relations in any given society? 
The latter question will be addressed in the next chapter; the former, here. The 
argument will unfold through several stages. I shall first highlight how the post-Vatican 
II debates concerning the democratization of the RC Church were a de facto revival of 
the understanding of ecclesiology as in continuity and agreement with political 
philosophy which occurred (4.2). The investigation will then turn to uncovering the 
theological foundations of such a stance (4.3), as well as those of the opposite one, 
conceiving ecclesiology as discontinuous with political philosophy (4.4–4.5). Section 
4.6 will examine some of the (apologetic) ecclesiological conclusions which have been 
drawn from such a postulate of discontinuity. The final part of the chapter (4.7) will 
illustrate how the continuity ordinarily recognized between the individual Christian and 
the individual human being at both the cognitive and the moral levels, requires that the 
Christian community too be continuous with its human substratum with regard to its 
constitutive norms for responsible cooperation. 
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4.2 The Post-Vatican II Revival of the Symbiosis between Ecclesiology 
and Political Philosophy 
Significantly, the post-Vatican II ecclesiological debates saw a forceful resurrection of 
the two methods—both the one acknowledging and the one denying ecclesiology’s 
continuity with political philosophy—and a consequent re-enactment of their clash, 
displaying the same chronological succession. First came the democratic aggiornamento 
of the traditional method which understood the political insights into the organisation of 
a human community and the ethical norms for responsible cooperation as normative 
within the church too. After Vatican II, many RC theologians argued for a 
democratization of the church, often with explicit reference to what resources from 
democratic political philosophy the church could exploit in working out its internal 
reform. 
This renewed awareness of the symbiosis between ecclesiology and political 
theory was fostered, among other factors, by the historical and sociological studies on 
the development of ecclesial structures.4 They brought to the realization that, in its effort 
towards organising itself, the Christian community had constantly sought inspiration 
and mirrored the structures of the wider society. Indeed, as noted earlier, the symbiosis 
between the two disciplines was to be explicitly and repeatedly theorized since the birth 
of a self-conscious and increasingly systematic ecclesiology, and is particularly evident 
in the writings of what Oakley has dubbed the conciliarist tradition. 
The passage from this realization to the affirmation that such a practice needed 
aggiornamento in light of contemporary democratic political philosophy was not a 
difficult one and, as touched on earlier, has been done by a most consistent portion of 
post-Vatican II Catholic ecclesiologists and theologians. The particular democratic 
conclusions of this ecclesiological method have been made possible by the 
developments of ecclesiology’s ‘natural’ counterpart. Political philosophy today is 
arguably more cognisant than it was during the Middle Ages of democracy’s cognitional 
and ethical value. There are cognitional and moral steps to be fulfilled in order to 
understand a given social situation, elaborate policies, and decide in favour of the best 
possible courses of action, just as there are ethical norms to be observed if the 
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individual’s cooperation in the common action of her group is to be intelligent and 
responsible. Democracy can be and has been understood heuristically as that political 
organization which best allows for both the fulfilment of those cognitional and moral 
steps and the respect of those ethical norms. That, as we will see (chapter five), entails 
understanding delegation, representation, and authority as based on free consent, and 
regarding free and public discussion as necessary for maximising the exploitation in 
policy-making of the common fund of knowledge and values of a community. From this 
perspective it is unsurprising that the traditional ecclesiological method suggests today 
reforms of the Christian polity in agreement with those insights. 
This is not to deny that, in the post-Vatican II period, properly theological insights 
had a complementary and perhaps even primary role in reaching those conclusions 
about ecclesial democratization. Suffice here to think of the primacy of conscience;5 the 
sensus fidelium;6 the canonical principle of reception deriving from it;7 the baptismal 
priesthood of the faithful;8 the charismatic/pneumatic aspect of the ecclesial community; 
the Pauline insistence both that there are different functions within the ecclesial 
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community to be carried out by different persons on the basis of their specialised 
competence, and that there can be no omnicompetent ministry; the biblical description 
of the church as the People of God; Vatican II’s generally optimistic and open position 
vis-à-vis the world, whose specific consequences for ecclesiology had been spelled out 
by GS §44, and so on.9 
The difficulty in determining what influence has been primary comes from the 
very interrelatedness of political and ecclesiological insights throughout history, 
including at Vatican II and beyond. Foundational political insights had already been 
imported into ecclesiology long before they were to assume a central role in modern 
democratic political philosophy: famous are the Patristic ‘ecclesio-political’ principles 
such as Popes Siricius’ and Innocent I’s ‘A judgment confirmed by the approvals of 
many people is complete’;10 St. Augustine’s ‘the judgment of the whole world is 
certain’; St. Leo I’s ‘Who is to preside all, must be elected by all’;11 and St. Celestine’s 
‘No unwanted person must be imposed’.12 As was briefly noted in the historical survey, 
those principles underwent a first enhancement at the hands of medieval canonists who 
expanded them in the light of similar principles taken from Roman law, chief among 
which ‘quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet’. Once incorporated 
in the increasingly systematic medieval ecclesiology, they contributed with it to the 
subsequent development of early modern constitutional and later democratic political 
theory.13 The need for checks and balances as additional precautions against the 
sinfulness of the individuals in power was perhaps the primary concern of conciliarist 
theologians and of the minority at Vatican I (and what distinguished them from their 
papalist/ultramontanist colleagues) well before being taken up by James Madison in the 
Federalist Paper n. 10—and there again, within the very same theological perspective 
explicitly concerned with restraining the personal sinfulness of political leaders. 
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Contemporary democratic political philosophy generally retains the essence of those 
patristic and medieval ecclesiological principles; and the current widespread 
acknowledgment concerning the high epistemic and consensus-building value of 
democratic procedures of free and public discussion and deliberation simply echoes 
those principles already received much earlier by the Christian community. 
To the extent that post-Vatican II proposals for a democratization of the church 
took inspiration not only from the scripturally warranted charismatic/pneumatic aspect 
of the church but also from sound insights of political philosophy, they were operating, 
implicitly or explicitly, according to the traditional ecclesiological method, guided by 
the conviction that the correct interpretation of the scriptural and historical data on the 
organisational structure of the Christian community cannot be contradictory with—but 
rather should be harmonious with—the correct insights into the organisation of human 
communities.14 
4.3 The Theological Basis of the Ecclesio-political Method in the 
Principle that ‘Gratia non destruit sed supponit et perficit 
natura’ 
Such traditional ecclesiological method has consistently been understood to have its 
theological basis in one of Christian theology’s foundational insights, namely that grace 
perfects nature without destroying it. That traditional Thomist principle was often 
flaunted by conciliarists and their successors whenever papalists rejected the 
ecclesiological validity of the ‘natural’ insights of political philosophy by appealing to 
the inscrutable divine will in establishing ecclesial structures.15 Most non-papalist 
ecclesiologists, ‘as John Neville Figgis pointed out long ago, simply assumed that 
“arguments applicable to government in general could not be inapplicable to the 
Church”.’16 Thus they were capable of theorizing a constitutionalism within the Church 
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‘on grounds of reason, policy, and [not only] Scripture’.17 Their lasting legacy, 
therefore—and we touch here a point of decisive methodological importance—was that 
they grounded [their] case not simply in scripture, or Church history, or 
ecclesiastical custom, or canon law (though of course they did all those 
things), not simply, that is, in the rights, privileges, customs, and laws 
proper to the communitas fidelium, but also in the mandates of the natural 
law, the law that pertained to all political bodies and, indeed, to the 
community of mankind itself.18 
With this, Figgis justified his bold interpretation of the decree of the Council of 
Constance Haec sancta (on the conciliar superiority to the pope in certain cases) as 
‘[p]robably the most revolutionary official document in the history of the world’, 
precisely because it ‘treat[ed] the Church definitively as one of a class, political 
societies’.19 Such a method would be in effect revolutionary if consistently followed. 
Analogously, to describe Almain’s ecclesiology as ‘applying his “political theory” to his 
exegesis’ simply highlights what has been a dominant and distinctive trait of 
ecclesiology since medieval times.20 As Figgis put it and Oakley concurred, ‘conciliar 
theory was not only an ecclesiological but also a political theory’.21 Indeed, the 
historical survey offered in chapter two shows that ecclesiology, since its very birth as a 
distinct discipline, was carried out as a special branch of political theory, dealing with 
the ecclesial community, its laws, traditions, customs, and structures. All this, it should 
be noted, was possible only if the insight is true that grace perfects nature without 
destroying it. 
The same theological justification is arguably behind the calls for a 
democratization of the church since Vatican II. As Charles Curran remarked, ‘the 
comparatively late linking of the internal life of the church with the life of human 
political society’ and the persistent blindness as to the intrinsic link between 
‘anthropology in general, with the important role of freedom called for in the temporal 
political order, and the anthropology and freedom required in the life of the church’ 
were due, among other things, to the eventual ‘overcoming of the supernatural-natural 
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 Figgis, Political Thought, 47. 
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 Oakley, Conciliarist Tradition, 241. 
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 Figgis, Political Thought, 41, cited in Oakley, Conciliarist Tradition, 223. 
20
 J. H. Burns and Thomas M. Izbicki, ‘Introduction’, in Burns and Izbicki (eds.), Conciliarism and 
Papalism, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), vii–xxiii (xix). 
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dichotomy, which had become almost a dualism in Catholic thought and practice’, the 
goal having often been that of preventing any importation of political insights into 
ecclesiology.22 
4.4 The Historical Rejection of the Continuity between Nature and 
Grace in the Case of the Church 
The revolutionary potential of the consistent treatment of ecclesiology as the theological 
integration of political philosophy has never been ignored by conciliarists, Protestants, 
and, finally, those post-Vatican II RC ecclesiologists and theologians calling for the 
democratization of the church. 
Each time, however, the revival of the traditional ecclesiological method based on 
the socio-political analogy triggered objections aiming at dismissing the democratic 
conclusions at which such a method ordinarily arrived. Just as the traditional 
ecclesiological method had not gone unchallenged in the past when it clashed with the 
increasing centralisation of the papalist church in the Latin West, so likewise it has been 
forcefully attacked in the post-Vatican II period, when it clashed with the ingrained anti-
democratic sentiment and ecclesiology which had flourished among the RC ecclesial 
establishment during the post-Tridentine period, and particularly in the century and a 
half immediately preceding Vatican II. It is noteworthy that objections to such method 
seem to have been generally advanced a posteriori—i.e. as a reaction to the prior, age-
old use of the political analogy in ecclesiology—and in an ad hoc fashion. There are 
two main ‘reactionary’ arguments: the older is the traditional contention that Christ 
willed certain structures as they are, as unnatural as they may seem. Its more recent 
incarnation, which has become particularly widespread in the post-Vatican II period, 
contends that the church is essentially a mystery and, as such, cannot be simply studied 
from the viewpoint of other sciences—specifically the social and political sciences—
lest a supposedly ‘pure’ ecclesiology degenerate into a ‘sociological reductionism’. 
Just as the ecclesiologies of both conciliarists and post-Vatican II RC theologians 
calling for a democratization of the church shared their fundamental theological tenet in 
the principle that grace perfects nature without destroying it, so both the appeal to God’s 
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 Charles E. Curran, ‘What Catholic Ecclesiology Can Learn from Official Catholic Social 
Teaching’, in Eugene C. Bianchi and Rosemary Radford Ruether (eds.), A Democratic Catholic Church: 
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will and that to the church being a partially supernatural mystery are based on the tacit 
rejection of such principle. The arguments of medieval, post-Tridentine, and post-
Vatican II papalists have thus remained remarkably similar throughout, their central 
tacit assumption and original fallacy being the rejection of the principle that grace 
perfects nature without destroying it, at least with regard to the church. This is well 
illustrated by the greatly influential debate from the later stages of the Conciliarist 
controversy between the Master of the Dominican Order Tommaso da Vio (later made 
Cardinal, and thus better known as Cardinal Cajetan) and the newly appointed doctor of 
the Sorbonne Jacques Almain.23 
In his first 1511 tract24 Cajetan reiterated that the Church was an absolute 
monarchy where all authority resides entirely in the pope, from whom it goes to all 
other people within the Church (and primarily to the bishops) who—either individually 
or communally—exercise it.25 He justified that contention, common in papalist thought, 
on both scriptural and philosophical grounds. The former asserted that the church was a 
papal monarchy—and an absolute one at that, where the ruler wields supreme and 
unaccountable power—because Christ had thus wished, as clearly witnessed by some 
scriptural passages (e.g. Matt. 16.19 and John 21.17). 
In turn, Cajetan’s philosophical arguments defended Christ’s choice by asserting 
monarchy’s intrinsic merit as the best form of government.26 Yet—most interestingly for 
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 Their first full translation into English is available in Burns and (eds.), Conciliarism and Papalism. 
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25
 Van Liere, ‘Vitoria, Cajetan and the Conciliarists’, 613; see Cajetan, ‘On the Comparison of the 
Authority of Pope and Council’, chs. i and iii (pp. 3–4 and 10 respectively). 
26
 Ibid., ch. i, 3–4: ‘We say that this proposition is certain: the pope has supreme power in God’s 
Church; [the papacy] is founded on Jesus Christ’s institution [Matt. 16:18-19]. Indeed, our Savior, king of 
kings and lord of lords, although He could have disposed the Christian commonwealth on earth in diverse 
ways, nevertheless, willed and established that the government would not be popular, nor that of the rich, 
the powerful, the nobles, many or few, but only of one, promising Peter alone, I will give to thee the keys 
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our purposes—by so doing Cajetan ‘had implicitly acknowledged the analogy between 
popes and secular rulers’27 and, indeed, between the church and the political community. 
In response to Cajetan’s contention that Christ chose to give authority entirely to 
the pope, Almain maintained on the contrary that Christ conferred it to the whole 
community of the faithful, which then ordinarily delegates it to some officers of their 
choice to be exercised on their behalf for the common good. Again, Almain too 
defended his claim with scriptural as well as philosophical arguments. The former 
asserted that the understanding of authority as residing in the community was Christ’s 
will as witnessed by scripture, and were based on an exegesis of the ‘Tell the church’ 
passage (Matt. 18.15–8); on Acts 15.22–3, 28–9 concerning the decision made by the 
‘council of Jerusalem’ on the authority of ‘the apostles and the ancients, with the whole 
Church’;28 as well as on the traditional interpretation—backed with Augustine’s 
authority—that in Matt. 16.19 Peter received the keys as representative of the whole 
church. 
Through opposed scriptural exegeses, then, both Cajetan and Almain could claim 
that their respective ecclesial models were iure divino: Cajetan asserted that it was 
Christ’s explicit will that authority reside on one man only; in the same way, Almain 
affirmed that Christ envisaged authority as naturally residing in the whole community of 
Christians.29 Their opposed stances are a further example that the acknowledgement of 
the supernatural character and thus divine origin of ecclesiastical power does not yet say 
anything as to the person(s), within the ecclesial community, to whom God conferred it 
(the reason being, as it will be noted below, that God’s action in the cosmos occurs 
through secondary causes). That is one key difference, on which Cajetan and Almain 
parted company. 
But there is another and—for our purposes—more interesting methodological 
parallel between Almain’s pamphlet and Cajetan’s first treatise. They both attempted to 
justify their respective model of ecclesial polity also by the more philosophical means 
                                                                                                                                               
Such argument was common among papalist theologians, and had in fact already been advanced by 
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 Almain, ‘A Book Concerning the Authority of the Church’ [Tractatus de Auctoritate Ecclesiæ et 
Conciliorum Generalium adversus Thomas de Vio], in Conciliarism and Papalism, Burns and Izbicki 
(eds.), 134-200, ch. vi (p. 154) (emphasis original). 
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 The subtitle of ch. vi of Almain’s treatise (ibid., p. 153) is: ‘In which it is shown on whom 
supreme ecclesiastical power was conferred immediately by Christ’. 
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of drawing on the analogy with the human polity—consistently with their shared 
theological tenet that grace perfects nature without destroying it—and thus appealing to 
the ‘natural law’ insights political reflection yielded in that regard. Cajetan’s 
philosophical defence was a simple affirmation with little elaboration: Christ’s choice of 
monarchy as the institutional form for the Church is in harmony with what political 
philosophy tells us, inasmuch as monarchy is the best form of governance. This last 
contention he defended by recalling Aristotle’s judgment on the matter and by arguing 
that the uniqueness of authority, necessary for the unity of the community, requires a 
single leader.30 
Yet by assuming that the church’s constitution was to be identical to that of a 
well-organized polity Cajetan had unwittingly played into the conciliarists’ hands. His 
brief foray in political philosophy, in order to argue in favour of monarchy being just 
such best political arrangement, was the biggest gift he could have given Almain, who 
did not lose the opportunity to engage him on this terrain.31 Thus the Sorbonne’s 
theologian opened his 1512 reply with an examination of the origins of authority within 
civil society. He observed that authority resides in the (consent of) the entire 
community, who might then decide to delegate it to some officials to fulfil specific tasks 
on behalf of the community for the common good.32 The civil community, insofar as it 
cannot always assemble together—inasmuch as, that is, direct democracy is utopian in 
groups larger than a few dozen persons—will ordinarily proceed to conditionally 
delegate its authority to a ruler—or many rulers—who will be bound to act on behalf of 
the community and for its common good only. 
Thus, Almain noted, there is indeed a sense in which it can be said that kings 
receive (civil) power from God, or that they are ‘God’s ministers for the punishment of 
malefactors’ but this is not to be understood as if ‘they received that [power] in the first 
way, immediately from God, but because they have, by the consent of the people, the 
exercise of the power which God gave the people’.33 
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 For a criticism of this philosophical position, which has been central to papalist ecclesiology till 
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For Almain, as for many and perhaps most of the best late medieval theologians, 
in the church too, just as in civil society, jurisdictional power has its ultimate origin in 
God; and in the church too, as he had noted for civil society, such power resides 
primarily in the community which, inasmuch as it ‘cannot always be assembled’, may, 
and indeed is bound to, delegate it conditionally to some individual, who is to exercise it 
‘as the church’s minister’.34 Thus, just as individual kings are said to be God’s ministers 
even if they have not received that power immediately from God, but rather mediately 
through the community,35 so likewise the pope ‘is Christ’s immediate vicar in respect of 
the exercise of power instituted immediately by Christ […] and conferred on the 
Church’.36 This is evident in the fact that the power of electing a pope resides in the 
Christian people: Cardinals do not possess that power immediately but rather exercise it 
by delegation as representatives of the whole church; likewise, ‘if it now falls to the 
popes to regulate the procedures in accordance with which that electoral power is 
exercised, they must not for that reason be assumed to be themselves endowed with the 
prerogative of choosing their successors’;37 for the same reason, just as a secular king, 
the pope is to exercise that power ‘on behalf of the Church’.38 Indeed, the common 
understanding of a general council as representing the whole church and exercising 
jurisdictional authority on its behalf, is necessarily based on the assumption that, in the 
church, authority resides primarily in the people, and only secondarily, that is by 
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delegation, in the official representatives, either individuals (pope, bishops) or collective 
juridical bodies (councils, synods).39 
In this way Almain complemented the scriptural evidence mentioned above—
which he interpreted as suggesting that God left authority to the whole community of 
the faithful—with philosophical arguments from the analogy with civil society. It is 
important, finally, to highlight the presuppositions he did not explicitly thematise but 
which appear to underline his reasoning: (1) ‘grace does not destroy nature’; therefore 
(2) the Church does not lose its nature as a corpus politicum, so that what applies to the 
latter remains valid in the church;40 hence (3) correct insights into the human polity—
Almain could refer especially to those expressed in Roman and canon Law as well as 
Aristotelian political philosophy—inasmuch as they express something of the ‘natural 
law’, are valid within the Church, and must therefore be respected by its organizational 
structure. As Francis Oakley among others has observed, the crucial assumption of 
Almain’s argument is the analogy between the church as a corpus politicum and the 
civil commonwealth.41 The resulting methodology sees ecclesiology as the theological 
integration of political philosophy. Thus, as many have noted, Almain’s refutation of 
Cajetan rested to a considerable extent ‘on applying the rules of natural law to the 
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Church itself’, that is, on demonstrating how insights into the good, ‘natural’ ordering 
of the civil society retain their validity—and should therefore be exploited—in the 
Church.42 If the insight is correct that grace always perfects nature without destroying it, 
then there can be no jettisoning by the ecclesial community of what is true of and good 
for the ‘natural’ government of human societies at large. 
It is noteworthy that such an assumption is common to both the Cajetan of the 
first treatise and to Almain, despite the different conclusions they reached—absolute 
and constitutional monarchy respectively. But there is an important difference. The 
assumption was merely implicit and unacknowledged in Cajetan—it can only be 
inferred that he holds it from the analogy he makes between the ecclesial and the civil 
form of monarchy—but explicit and thematised in Almain. It was precisely by making it 
explicit that the latter obliged Cajetan to face the paradox that the methodological 
premise he had tacitly assumed in his first tract—viz. that the church’s organizational 
form should mirror the best political organizational form—could be developed to 
support conclusions opposite to those he was defending. The ambiguity of his own 
argument only dawned upon Cajetan through Almain’s disturbing exploitation of the 
implications of precisely that secular analogy in his outline of a theory of authority.43 To 
the extent that such implications appeared to him theologically awkward, they urged 
him to re-examine the posited analogous relationship between the civil and the 
ecclesiastical polity which constituted the central contention of conciliarists’ 
methodology. Hence, Cajetan’s 1512 Apology of his first tract against Almain’s work 
opens precisely by challenging head-on the correctness of such method. We touch here 
the very heart of the century-old debate on the method of ecclesiology, in that such 
rejection of the continuity of the Christian with the human community, and thus of 
ecclesiology with political philosophy, will remain the default position all papalist 
ecclesiologists were to fall back on each time the ecclesial organization they supported 
ran against insights from political philosophy—that which was to happen with 
increasing frequency from the early modern period onwards. 
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Cajetan’s strategy was in two parts, and displayed a revealing adjustment with 
respect to the argument he had deployed in the first tract. There, it may be recalled, he 
had briefly resorted to the opinion that Christ instituted monarchical rule in the ecclesial 
society because it was the best way of organizing a polity. But Almain’s reply forced 
him to concede in his second tract that ‘In any kind of commonwealth […], be it 
popular, aristocratic, or monarchical, political power originates with the community’.44 
To accept that the natural, created order is that power resides in the community 
does not leave any alternative but to acknowledge that that must be the case in the 
Christian community as well, unless one wants to argue that the grace does in fact 
radically supersede the natural, created order—a point which was implicit in the 
arguments of Almain and most non-papalist theologians. 
Accordingly, papalist theologians have tried variously to reject the insight that 
grace perfects nature without destroying it. Almost a century after Cajetan, Bellarmine 
was to do so most explicitly: his only crucial argument against conciliarist theory and in 
defence of the absolute papal monarchy was that ‘the Holy Church is not like the 
Republic of Venice, or of Genoa, or of any other City’, where it can be said that ‘the 
Republic is above the Prince’. To express explicitly what Bellarmine was asserting only 
implicitly: the church is different from civil society because while in the latter, 
according to the natural order, it is the community to be above its rulers, in the former it 
is the pope to be above the community, as a supreme and absolute monarch. The only 
justification Bellarmine advanced for this is that God willed it to be so.45 Thus, for 
Bellarmine, as Oakley noted, ‘given the uniquely supernatural grounding of 
ecclesiastical power, analogies drawn from the profane world of secular politics are 
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altogether irrelevant’.46 Such a contention tacitly assumes that God established the 
Christian community in an unnatural situation objectively against the created, natural 
order. 
In contrast, Cajetan attempted more carefully—although ultimately just as 
unsuccessfully—to avoid such an open denial of the insight that grace does not destroy 
nature. Indeed, he expressly acknowledged the principle at the beginning of his second 
tract directed at answering Almain’s argument from nature: however, he went on to 
contend that, once the ‘nature’ of the church is properly understood, that principle leads 
to different conclusions than those proposed by Almain. His crucial contention was 
that—differently from what Cajetan himself acknowledged was the nature of human 
societies, which is such that power resides in the community as a whole—God 
established the ‘nature’ of the church to be a servile community to its only Lord: 
the order of grace does not take away in the Church the order of nature, 
which was intended to be there. The order intended in the Church was not 
such that the right to rule belongs to it and [this right] is taken away by 
the order of grace. But in the Church, by its nature, such an order was 
intended that the right to rule is not in it but in its natural Lord. The 
consequence is that grace does not take away but perfects this order of 
nature in the Church.47 
The church has not been created free to organize itself: for that is the Lord’s 
exclusive responsibility.48 Now, the Lord decided to give absolute, unaccountable 
authority to his vicar, the pope: ‘just as the prince of the Church [i.e. Jesus Christ] does 
not have authority naturally from the community of the Church, so His vicar has 
authority naturally not from that community but from Jesus Christ.’49 Ergo, no council 
and not even the church as a whole can have any authority over the pope. 
The significance has been noted of considering 
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a position Cajetan did not take. It was possible for a defender of the papal 
monarchy to base himself upon a conception of monarchy as such which 
precluded the element of consent that was fundamental in theories like 
those of Mair and Almain. […] Cajetan’s approach is more radical. He 
bluntly rejects the suggested parallel between civil and ecclesiastical 
government, insisting rather that the papal monarchy enjoys a unique 
position and unique authority. Temporal government rests upon natural 
law; temporal kingship may be based on the consent of its subjects. 
Perhaps, indeed, in the final analysis, all temporal monarchies—and, for 
that matter, all other forms of civil government—must have that consent 
as their basis. The authority of Peter and of his successors, however, can 
never be so understood: it is based directly and unconditionally upon 
God’s ordinance.50 
Because he could no more affirm that Christ’s choice of absolute monarchy was in 
continuity with the natural state of things as shown by political philosophy, Cajetan’s 
only alternative—as it will be also the case for Bellarmine a century later—was (1) to 
demonstrate that in the case of the church grace does in fact destroy nature and, in turn, 
(2) to justify that by showing its being necessarily implied by Christ’s specific 
ecclesiological decisions, notably but not exclusively his words in the classical Petrine 
passages. Both points need further examination. 
With regard to the first point, Cajetan’s somewhat convoluted argument can be 
summarised as follows: while according to the (correct understanding of the) natural 
order of things it is the community that delegates authority to its officials, still in the 
church this is reversed (i.e. authority comes from God to the pope, who mediates it to 
the lower rungs and eventually to the entire community):51 but such an ‘unnatural’ 
constitution of the Christian community—radically reversing the natural, created 
order—is nonetheless justified because Christ willed it to be so. 
Apparently, Cajetan failed to grasp the contradiction of defining as ‘natural’ a 
constitution contrary to and subversive of what he regarded, by his own admission, as 
the proper natural ordering of human societies. He appears to have missed that such a 
hypothesis assumed a radical subversion by the Christian God of the ‘natural’ freedom 
and responsibility with which the Creator endowed each individual, nor did he offer any 
justification for postulating such a momentous and ordinary discontinuity between the 
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order of creation and that of redemption, the world of the human and of the Christian, 
the level of nature and that of grace. 
Ultimately, Cajetan’s position is based on a misconception about the way divine 
and human cooperation works. In his view, God imposes (and potentially forces) his 
will—a specific, anti-democratic ecclesial polity—on (or even over against) Christian 
subjects, who are thereby deprived of the exercise of the intelligence, responsibility, and 
freedom God endowed them with to discern His will for them and carry it out, thus in a 
truly ‘servile’ condition (if limited to the matter of determining the constitution of their 
faith community). As we will see, that misconception is still at the heart of current 
appeals to divine right structures. The alternative view, often reiterated by conciliarists 
and most Scholastic theologians, is that God ordinarily governs everything in the 
universe through secondary causes: so that, with regard to the specific case of human 
beings, God’s sovereignty over them occurs by a gracious and ongoing offer of 
communion in love, which however compelling leaves intact their freedom, intelligence 
and responsibility. In the language of the Scholastics, God is indeed the causa prima of 
authority, but it is human consent which, ordinarily, is its causa secunda, in the church 
just as in the civil society. 
With regard to the second point, concerning the scriptural justification of such 
discontinuity between nature and grace in the case of the church by showing that Christ 
has established an unnatural, anti-democratic, absolutist papal monarchy, it should be 
pointed out that the plausibility of high papalist interpretations of Jesus’ words in the 
classical Petrine passages has never been uncontroversial nor without challengers. The 
more papalist theologians were aware that such scriptural grounds had never been firm, 
the more they stressed that the pope was the absolute monarch he was simply because 
Christ willed it, and so the argument continued to go in a vicious circle and presupposed 
something—a specific choice by Christ concerning future successors of the apostle 
Peter—which needed to be proved, and for which the scriptural evidence was 
understood to be ambiguous then, and inexistent now (3.3). To justify something as 
momentous as the radical discontinuity between nature and grace in the case of the 
church on the basis of such scriptural foundations would be equivalent to justifying the 
rejection of evolution on the basis of a simplistic interpretation of Gen 1–2. In both 
cases, largely accepted insights into the natural order of things would be rejected on the 
grounds of brittle and ultimately mistaken scriptural interpretations. 
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4.5 Post-Vatican II Mystification of the Church 
As touched on, the contemporary emphasis on the church being a mystery is motivated 
by exactly the same goal of justifying the discontinuity between the ecclesial and the 
human polities—whereby the former’s political organization is contrary in important 
respects to the insights of political philosophy—which was already behind the appeal to 
God’s will. Such ‘mystification’ of the church, as it has been dubbed, had already been 
criticised almost fifty years ago as ‘theological reductionism’, defined as ‘the explicit or 
tacit assumption that the Church is so absolutely unique in character that it can be 
understood only in its own private language’ of biblical metaphorical images.52 
Insistence on ‘the exclusive use of Biblical and doctrinal language in the interpretation 
of the Church’ has been a way to indirectly affirm that church institutions should not be 
evaluated against the insights of political philosophy.53 Edward P. Hahnenberg observed 
that ‘For extreme versions of this approach, the church as mystery becomes the church 
mysterious, as traditional structures and the exercise of hierarchy becomes sacrosanct, 
immune to question or criticism’.54 In this connection, Edward Schillebeeckx once 
remarked that ‘[i]n recent times, use, but above all much misuse, has been made of the 
deep insight that the church is a “mystery”’ in order to dismiss critical insights from 
sociology and political philosophy. He highlighted two main issues with such a stance: 
the first is the ‘pseudo-problem that one and the same reality which can be discussed in 
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different languages (e.g. scientific and religious) is wrongly regarded as two different 
opposed or parallel realities. This is to overlook the fact that this one reality, because of 
its riches, is fully accessible (and then still in a human way) only from two (or more) 
different perspectives, questions and language games’.55 The second is ‘a tenacious, 
dualistic misunderstanding’ unaware of the historically and culturally conditioned 
structure of the Church, which does not seem to realize that ‘the religious language of 
faith becomes empty and meaningless unless it contains a recognizable reference to real 
human experiences and the autonomous structures implied in them’.56 Joseph 
Komonchak, for his part, remarked that 
[I]t is hard to see why, if St. Thomas could appeal in his theology of faith 
to the principle that cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum 
cognoscentis and use in his theology of justification the principle that 
Deus movet omnia secundum modum uniuscuiusque, a contemporary 
ecclesiologist cannot appeal to social theory to learn how social realities 
are constituted in order to understand how the Church is constituted as a 
social reality. Just as one cannot construct an ecclesiology without an at 
least implicit philosophy, so one cannot construct an ecclesiology without 
an implicit social theory.57 
Even more recently, Paul Lakeland suggested that ‘The single biggest problem 
bedeviling both ecclesiology in general and theological reflection on the lay state in 
particular is the mystification of the church.’58 
The position against which those theologians have been reacting can perhaps be 
summarized as follows. The church is a mystery and as such transcends human 
understanding. Furthermore, as a community divinely instituted and empowered, it is 
also incommensurably different from any other community: there exists a radical 
discontinuity between the Christian and the human communities, which encompasses at 
least the way authority is exercised—their respective polities—if not also their formal 
element—their common fund of meanings and values. Ergo, any analogy of the church 
with political models would be either altogether mistaken or dangerously reductionist. 
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4.6 Examples of the Mystification of the Church 
Of course, this is precisely the syllogism, implicitly presupposed yet never explicitly 
defended, which is typical of the theologically reductionist ecclesiology. It is as true as 
regrettable that, because of the high degree of generality of the then Cardinal Joseph 
Ratzinger’s repeated warnings that ‘the church is not like other societies’,59 their 
dominant interpretation has been a kind of quite narrow ‘radical mystification’ of the 
church which, in a manner akin to Cajetan’s, places a radical discontinuity between the 
organisation of the supernatural community of Christians on this earth and that of (well-
devised) human communities. 
As a matter of fact, such interpretation has enjoyed considerable success, not least 
among members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The warning of the then bishop of 
Pittsburgh Donald Wuerl (now archbishop of Washington D.C.), when discussing the 
possibility of structures of episcopal accountability, that ‘we must be careful not to use a 
political model for a reality that transcends human political institutions’, displays the 
main characteristics of the tendency illustrated above: to that extent, his assertion—as 
well as similarly phrased ones—put this way, that is, without additional qualifications, 
are at best incomplete and at worst incorrect, depending on whether one understands 
them as implying either a mere neglect or a straightforward denial of the church being 
primarily a society, as quite evident from history.60 
Lest it might be thought of as a simple theoretical issue with little relevance or 
influence over church life, it should be noted that the ecclesiological principle behind 
the reasoning of Wuerl and Ratzinger has been applied to specific ecclesiological issues 
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with quite concrete consequences. In what follows I shall outline some of the more 
concrete uses to which the same principle of unqualified ‘uniqueness’ of the church has 
been subject to, which might help to dispel the doubts as to whether the tendency 
described above is a mere artificial construct with little if any substantiation in 
contemporary ecclesiology. The contention that the church is a ‘mystery’ is here used 
both to justify those ecclesial structures—primarily the absolutist, unaccountable papal 
and episcopal monarchies—which appear unsupported by, and indeed positively 
contrary to, the insights developed by political philosophy, and to ban democratic 
ecclesial practices and institutions which are perceived as threatening such absolutism. 
A list of the latter which the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has explicitly 
rejected on the grounds that the church is a mystery includes regarding public opinion 
and the consensus among theologians as guides for knowledge or action—arguably in 
alternative to the episcopal hierarchy and the pope, and allowing public dissent on any 
magisterial teaching, including non-irreformable ones.61 
An alternative way of banning those practices would have entailed proving wrong 
the principles which undergird them, namely those in favour of public discussion and 
majority voting. And, as a matter of fact, several recent papal pronouncements have 
rejected the majority principle while, on the other hand, the canon law currently in force 
in the RC Church carefully circumscribes public discussion within that church.62 In both 
cases, however, the main rationale for the rejection/restriction appears to have been 
based on purely philosophical considerations: the inherent relativism of majority rule, 
and the danger to unity of public discussion not oriented towards the common good, 
respectively. In contrast, the ‘Donum veritatis’ instruction by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith does not explicitly affirm that it is philosophically mistaken to 
regard either public opinion or expert consensus as prudential criteria for the 
discernment of truth in general and in specialised areas respectively. Rather, it clearly 
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and a priori states that that cannot be the case in the church because of the latter being a 
mystery. 
The second instance likewise reiterates the juxtaposing of the appeal to mystery 
with the negation of the social analogy: ‘Clearly the relationship between the universal 
Church and the particular churches is a mystery and cannot be compared to that which 
exists between the whole and the parts in a purely human group or society’.63 The 
thought of explaining such relationship in accordance to the ethical principle of 
subsidiarity—whereby the higher level only supplies what the lower does not deem 
possible to achieve by itself—does not (cannot?) apparently constitute a solution for the 
CDF (see below). 
Precisely subsidiarity is arguably the most important socio-ethical principle whose 
validity has been dismissed in the church on the grounds that the latter is a mystery. 
Subsidiarity is a fundamental ethical and social principle, directly linked to human 
beings’ responsibility and freedom of self-determination. It demands that, on the one 
hand, each decisional level (from the individual upward) has an inalienable 
responsibility to decide and act within its own operational range and, on the other hand, 
that only those actions which cannot be achieved by the individual or the smaller group 
alone, can be appropriately achieved through recourse to the higher level of a structured 
community. It is essential to observe that the divide between what can be decided 
autonomously and what should be decided by delegation, must be determined by the 
delegating individual or group and not by the higher levels (see the lengthier discussion 
of subsidiarity in 5.4). 
To affirm that subsidiarity is not valid in the church is to state that the latter is 
exempt from the key ethical requirement for cooperation to be responsible, which is 
rightly thought to be normative in civil society. It means, in other words, that the church 
is a totalitarian society in which its members and intermediate bodies do not have the 
right of self-determination, but are rather subject to the higher authorities even on those 
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matters falling within their operational range and thus inalienable responsibility. Put 
differently still, respect of subsidiarity determines whether a polity is ethical and 
democratic, or whether it is unethical and dictatorial (see for further 5.4). 
The history of subsidiarity would offer an ideal case-study for both the historical 
symbiosis and the real, essential continuity between ecclesiology and political 
philosophy, for it has long been a key insight operative, implicitly or explicitly, in both 
disciplines. Already Aristotle had grasped it in his description of the various 
organisational levels of society: a city-state is composed of several villages, and each 
village is composed of several families. Each group governs and administers what lies 
within its capacities and range: the family is concerned with everyday’s needs, the 
village with needs which are not daily, and the city-state is concerned not simply with 
living, but with living well: in other words, it supplies what smaller communities are 
unable to provide.64 But the insights contained in that principle can also be found often 
enough in the history of ecclesiology. And so it is significant that not long before its 
first ever official formulation by Pius XI in his 1931 encyclical ‘Quadragesimo Anno’, 
which commended subsidiarity as morally binding for all human societies, Pius XII 
clarified that subsidiarity was a necessary constitutive foundation of the ecclesial polity 
too. A timid application of this has been the acknowledgment that subsidiarity is one of 
the constitutive principles informing canon law, which should accordingly guide its 
interpretation.65 
Moreover, the insight behind subsidiarity, presented in a slightly different form 
and under a different name, has been dubbed one of the foundational principles of 
democratic political liberalism.66 The significance cannot be overstressed of the 
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acknowledgment that subsidiarity is a, if not the, foundational principle for cooperation 
to be responsible in the ecclesial just as in the civil polities. In effect, for ecclesiology 
and political philosophy to share such a fundamental insight would further suggest the 
essential continuity between the ecclesial and the civil communities at the 
organizational level at least. 
Arguably the most important theoretical tool Catholic thought has contributed to 
democratic philosophy in the recent past, subsidiarity is seen by several ecclesiologists 
as the only hermeneutical key to a meaningful (as opposed to merely rhetorical) solution 
of the relationship between local and universal church.67 Yet Walter Kasper, among 
many others, noted that often an appeal to the supernatural character 
(‘Geheimnischarakter’) of the church is the basis for dismissing the application of 
subsidiarity within the church: such a unilaterally supernatural view of the church leads, 
he contended, to nothing less than ‘religious totalitarianism’.68 The same problem arose 
again recently in a debate between the late Cardinal Avery Dulles and Ladislas Örsy 
precisely on subsidiarity.69 More generally, the forceful rejection by ecclesiologists on 
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the basis of the uniqueness of the church as a supernatural mystery offers a good 
example of the very concrete consequences one’s ecclesiological method can bring to, 
for the rejection of subsidiarity has been used to maintain a decision-making method 
where numerous important decisions—from the various problems of inculturation of the 
gospel, liturgy, to the choice of bishops and priests—are immorally taken away from the 
local as well as national churches, and reserved to the micro-management of the pope 
and the Roman Curia (see for further 6.5). 
Another crucial example of ‘mystification’ touches on magisterial teaching 
authority at all its levels: episcopal as well as papal, ordinary as well as extraordinary. 
On this subject too the appeal is made to magisterial teaching authority being God-
given, and is played against the call for making legally binding the use of the correct 
human procedures and means for assuring an attentive, intelligent, reasonable and 
responsible choice. For instance, it was precisely the Deputatio de fide (doctrinal 
commission) at Vatican I that had to clarify—against the proponents of a mystical 
infallibility of the pope graciously and directly bestowed from above by divine 
inspiration without human cooperation—that papal infallibility, albeit divinely granted, 
did not in any way exclude the use of all appropriate human prudential means for 
avoiding error and reaching the truth.70 Indeed, acceptance or rejection of the via 
humana in discerning the truth had been the crux of the conflict among those discussing 
papal infallibility from at least the sixteenth century forward.71 A remarkable amount of 
debate went into determining whether when an ordained Christian—and more 
specifically a bishop—teaches, he is bound—whether only morally or also legally was a 
further question—to inform himself by consulting the faith of the church, theologians, 
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other bishops, and even—in the case of the pope—a general council, or whether he can 
in fact solve a controversial theological issue and propose a new teaching in virtue of 
his carisma veritatis understood as entailing divine inspiration. But this second stance 
understanding the carisma veritatis as divine inspiration was to be repeatedly dismissed 
as heretical for it postulated new revelations, which have traditionally been excluded. 
And yet, it is striking to notice how such a position, despite its very dubious orthodoxy, 
managed not only to avoid an explicit condemnation but also to effectively guide and 
structure decision-making in the RC Church for several centuries up till now. Even 
Vatican I, while rejecting it in theory, as evident from the explanation put forward by 
the Deputatio de fide to the conciliar fathers, in practice refused what the minority asked 
most, viz. an explicit mention that in teaching infallibly the pope needs to undertake the 
via humana.72 
A final notable instance of theological reductionism, quite revealing of its 
pragmatic goal of preserving the current balance of power in the church, is the argument 
denying the necessity of a system of checks and balances for the exercise of papal 
power on the grounds that personal reform would be both sufficient and necessary in 
order to avoid abuses. Structural reform, in contrast, would be secondary or even 
unnecessary, and its requests a sign of arrogance and lack of self-reform. Cajetan was to 
set the standard in this regard: forced to admit that a pope could become heretic or teach 
or do something potentially harmful to the body of the faithful at large, he stubbornly 
refused to allow for a structural provision through a system of checks and balances, as 
the conciliarists proposed (a general council with exceptional policing powers over a 
heretical pope). Rather, he admitted that, because there existed no higher tribunal than 
the pope to which to appeal in case of papal misgovernment, the only solution to such 
cases was prayer to God.73 
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 ‘The real concern of the minority was that […] it [be] clearly understood that when defining ex 
cathedra the pope is articulating the sensus ecclesiae; that he is acting not only as head, but as mouth of 
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It is quite significant that exactly the same argument was also to be used to defend 
absolute monarchy in the civil sphere (see 2.5). In both cases, the neglect of structural in 
favour of a unilateral emphasis on personal reform could not be clearer. While now by 
and large discarded by political philosophy, such an argument is still upheld in RC 
ecclesiology, in the form of stressing the necessity of personal over structural reform, at 
times coming close to a rejection of the latter.74 
There are two main problems with such a stance. The first is that, according to 
mainstream Christian spirituality, a prayer of petition is misguided if it is not matched 
with a genuine human effort towards doing, with God’s help, what is humanly possible 
with regard to what is being asked of God. As Saint Ignatius de Loyola put it, ‘Pray as 
though everything depended on God, and work as though everything depended on 
you’.75 As it is clearly possible to work towards setting up human checks and balances 
for the exercise of papal power, negligence in doing so cannot be excused on the 
grounds that God will be asked for help if things turn ugly.76 
Secondly, such a stance also overlooks how economic, social, political (including 
ecclesial), and cultural structures can not only support but also actively hinder human 
(and Christian) development and self-transcendence, with evident negative 
consequences for the possibilities of physical, moral and spiritual progress of those 
subject to them (1.1). It is therefore impossible to sharply separate personal from 
structural conversion (see for further 5.6). 
The centrality of the above mentioned issues for ecclesiology can hardly be 
overstressed. Depending on how they are solved, the church is to be structured either 
democratically or as a non-democratic, totalitarian society. If decisions in doctrinal as 
well as pastoral matters must follow the human way and cannot avoid it—even while 
granting their being graciously assisted by the Spirit—then the Christian community is 
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to be structured according to the best way in which such discernment can occur: and 
that means, as it is now generally perceived and will be explained in details later, that 
the Christian community will have to embody the constitutive and essential elements of 
an intelligent and responsible polity: on the one hand, subsidiarity; and on the other the 
freedoms of information, expression, and public debate. (In effect, as it will be seen, it is 
only in this way that the common fund of knowledge and wisdom of the community can 
be attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly exploited). It is thus important 
to probe their assumptions further. 
4.7 Elements of the Continuity between the Christian and the Human 
Polity 
The continuity between political philosophy and ecclesiology is real because of the real 
continuity existing between the Christian and the non-Christian with regard to the 
cognitional and moral operations required of both to come to know intelligently and 
decide responsibly. Such continuity at the level of individual, solitary understanding, 
deciding, and acting extends necessarily at the public level of cooperating in common 
decision-making and action. Thus, the solution which the Scholastics reached for 
preserving the supernatural distinctiveness of the Christian as individual—i.e. an 
intelligent and moral agent—vis-à-vis the non-Christian, will prove foundational for 
understanding how to preserve the supernatural distinctiveness of the church vis-à-vis 
the human community. 
The Scholastics’ account of the specificity of the Christian as an individual was to 
acknowledge that human nature is perfected, but not destroyed, by the ‘new creation’ or 
supernatural state in which the justified was graciously established. That meant, more in 
detail, preserving the best philosophical descriptions of the human person, understood in 
its distinctive intellectual as well as moral faculties (sense, intellect, and will), even 
while integrating them with the distinctive insights of Christian theology. Scholastic 
theologians explained Christian intentionality in its cognitional and moral capacity as 
well as operations—what Lonergan has detailed as (attentive) experiencing, (intelligent) 
coming to know, (responsible) deciding, and (loving) acting—by theologically 
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integrating, while fully preserving, the best available explanation of human 
intentionality, as described by ‘natural’ anthropology and ethics.77 
The theological integration consisted in hypothesising that divine grace, by means 
of the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity, perfected the natural faculties and 
virtues even while preserving them. The problem of pinpointing the distinctiveness of 
the Christian as Christian was, in other words, that of understanding how divine grace 
influences human nature in its coming to know and deciding. Ultimately and 
fundamentally, the problem was the one, foundational to Christian theology, of 
understanding how divine and human cooperation works. It is not a coincidence, as we 
will see (6.2), that opposed understandings of divine-human cooperation lay at the very 
basis of the opposed divine-right and consensual understandings of authority. 
It is not necessary here to illustrate the complex solution Scholastic theologians 
advanced in that regard, which included the distinction of several kinds of divine graces 
operating or cooperating with human freedom and responsibility. Its only relevant 
aspect for present purposes is that the systematic categories used in the description of 
the supernatural were the natural ones, which were analogically extended to indicate the 
supplementation grace provides to nature: thus love was conceived as sublated by 
charity (i.e. self-less love), intellect by faith, human hope by supernatural (theological) 
hope.78 Such methodology is in itself traditional, being arguably implicit in Paul’s 
description of the supernatural virtue charity exclusively by comparison with a list of 
natural virtues and vices (1 Cor. 13.4–7).79 In other words, a fairly systematic 
understanding of the Christian individual as Christian was developed by integrating 
(without essentially changing them) the systematic philosophical understanding of the 
human being already achieved. Without the latter, it would have been very difficult—if 
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at all possible—to develop the former. Integration here means a sublation of the natural 
level, whereby all the latter’s characteristics are retained. 
The problem of what was central in determining the distinctiveness of the 
Christian vis-à-vis the non-Christians, then, became the problem of explaining how 
grace influences and perfects those human faculties and virtues without destroying 
them: but, crucially for present purposes, there was no question of dismissing what had 
been already correctly understood and systematized by ‘natural’ philosophy and ethics. 
The theological reflection on the individual has used for centuries natural categories 
(natural law) without particular warnings or reservations, in the conviction that there 
exists a supernatural dimension of the redeemed human being in perfect continuity with 
the natural one. What the Scholastics did, in other words, was to integrate theologically 
the best available philosophical understanding of human intentionality in its cognitive 
and moral faculties and operations. 
Now, such an understanding is the necessary basis of any political philosophy. 
Paradigmatically, Aristotle conceived political philosophy as the application of practical 
wisdom to political problems. For him ‘politics, in the strict sense of legislative science, 
is a form of practical wisdom or prudence […] (EN [Nicomachean Ethics] VI.8 and 
X.9)’.80 The first point to be noted is that the individual’s decision to cooperate through 
delegation cannot and does not abolish her personal responsibility, but rather includes it. 
Accordingly, cooperation derives from (and dramatically expands) individual ethics. To 
the questions concerning the morality of the individual’s personal actions, it adds all the 
issues linked to the morality of the individual’s cooperation in common actions: What 
are the moral norms for a person’s decision to cooperate in a common action to be 
intelligent and responsible? More specifically, when are 
delegation/subordination/obedience responsible and not, instead, a desertion of 
responsibility? 
The study of the criteria for the responsibility of the individual’s collaboration in a 
common action of a group is the specific task of political philosophy. Differently put, 
political philosophy is based on a social ethics, viz. it is an expansion of traditional 
individual ethics by considering not only the morality of personal actions but also the 
                                                 
80
 Fred Miller, ‘Aristotle’s Political Theory’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/aristotle-
politics/. 
  137 
morality of cooperation in common actions. Analogously, ecclesiology can be 
conceived as including also an expansion of a Christian ethics to encompass the analysis 
of the morality of the Christians’ cooperation in ecclesial actions. 
As just noted, mainstream Christian theology does not conceive the influence of 
grace or divine action on the individual Christian as destroying his freedom and 
responsibility in general, and the cognitional and moral operations necessary to discern 
the truth and the good, and to act accordingly. It follows that, as Christian ethics has 
been based on philosophical ethics, so likewise ecclesiology will be based on political 
philosophy. Whether with regard to evaluating the intelligence and moral worth of 
solitary courses of actions, or with regard to evaluating the intelligence and moral worth 
of cooperation with others, the theological reflection is always and necessarily grounded 
on what has already been understood of human coming to know the true and the good: 
on the one hand, (individual) cognitional and moral theory, and on the other, political 
philosophy and political ethics. No theological ground should therefore hinder the use 
of natural categories in the theological reflection about the social dimension of the 
redeemed human being, and therefore in ecclesiology. 
From this perspective, just as medieval theologians were correct in understanding 
the Christian subject as in perfect continuity with the human subject (and consequently 
Christian anthropology and ethics as fundamentally in continuity with the best available 
philosophical grasp of human coming to know, deciding, and acting in general), so they 
were right in conceiving the Christian community as in perfect continuity with the 
human one (and consequently ecclesiology as fundamentally continuous with the best 
available philosophical explanation of human coming to know, deciding, and acting 
when cooperating with others—the most systematic bodies of knowledge on the subject 
being, again, Aristotle’s political philosophy, and Roman Law). Inasmuch as political 
philosophy can be understood as a branch of ethics, viz. that studying the morality of 
cooperation (and thus of delegation), medieval theologians and canonists were correct in 
solving the problem of the specificity of the church by the same method that had been 
utilised for explaining the distinctiveness of the Christian. 
An examination of what a community is can further clarify the extent of the 
continuity between the church and human society. On an ancient and traditional view, 
κοινωνία/community is conceived as the organized collaboration of individuals for the 
pursuit of a common aim or aims. In line with Aristotle’s classical formulation, I 
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characterise the community or polity as a group of people sharing some common 
experiences, understandings, values, and in which some relationships of coordination 
and subordination for common action toward a common goal obtain. The only element 
formally constitutive of a community qua community is, accordingly, not geographical 
vicinity or ethnic/linguistic homogeneity, but rather a shared fund of meanings and 
values (see 5.2.2). 
Now, on precisely the level of meanings and values, no discontinuity has 
ordinarily been acknowledged between the Christian and the human plane; rather, faith 
has generally been understood as in perfect continuity with reason. It can hardly be 
justifiable, then, to postulate a discontinuity with regard to the patterns of cooperation 
and authority, which are not strictly speaking essential for the formation and existence 
of a community (see 3.6). Moreover, as noted above, the continuity does in fact extend 
to the patterns of cooperation: for the ethical requirements for cooperation, 
subordination, and obedience to be responsible are the same for the Christian as for the 
non-Christian. 
This clarifies the post-Vatican II ecclesiological debate. It affirms that it is 
‘theologically reductionist’ to reject the use and validity of critical (i.e. correct) socio-
political categories in ecclesiology, and/or to contend that the traditional metaphors are 
sufficient for an understanding of the church at the level of our times. On the contrary, 
ecclesiology will be critical, explanatory, and systematic, to the extent that it is based on 
and integrates a critical, explanatory, and systematic political philosophy. It builds on 
the relationship between ecclesiology and political philosophy outlined in a relatively 
clear passage in Vatican II’s notoriously ambiguous ecclesiological teaching: 
Since the Church has a visible and social structure as a sign of her unity in 
Christ, she can and ought to be enriched by the development of human 
social life, not that there is any lack in the constitution given her by 
Christ, but that she can understand it more penetratingly, express it better, 
and adjust it more successfully to our times.81 
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4.8 Conclusion 
One of Lonergan’s central insights is that what assures both the continuity and the 
scientific status of any discipline is more its method than its field, ‘for the field tends to 
expand to include every area in which the method can be applied successfully’.82 
Evidently, ecclesiology is no exception, as is witnessed by the uninterrupted usage of 
the traditional ecclesiological method throughout church history, even by those opposed 
to it in general, to the extent that they have always de facto resorted to it in an ad hoc 
fashion, and most notably when describing the Petrine primacy. From this perspective, 
the post-conciliar disagreements on the interpretation of Vatican II’s ecclesiological 
texts have a further, deeper root alongside the motivations generally agreed on—
incompleteness of its teaching, unaccomplished synthesis of the metaphorical and the 
more systematic juridical languages—namely, the lack of agreement upon how 
ecclesiology is to be carried out, and how the church is to be studied. 
The examples of theological reductionism reported above (4.6) show the very 
concrete ecclesiological conclusions that one’s ecclesiological method can bring to. 
They are all instances—central to ecclesiology, and themselves with a rich history of 
theological debate and pragmatic/political justifications—of the appeal to the 
supernatural, sacred level to dismiss or neglect the human level, a radical and so far 
relatively effective rejection of the insight that grace perfects nature without 
superseding it. Whilst it would be very difficult to find in any one contemporary 
theologian (and much less in documents of the CDF) an explicit rejection of that 
principle, or even only of the fact that political philosophy cannot or has nothing to 
contribute to ecclesiology because of the essential mystery which the church is, still on 
particular ecclesiological issues—indeed on the crucial ones of authority, subsidiarity, 
and freedom of expression and debate—this general rule seems to be de facto implicitly 
presupposed and operative for reasons which can be identified with a defensive attitude 
aiming at preserving the institutional status quo. 
The resulting erroneous methodology excludes precisely those philosophical tools 
which could not only be of great aid to theological questions, but which are in fact 
required to reach a certain systematization of thought. As the refusal of the insight 
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embodied in the principle of subsidiarity shows, to dispense with political philosophy 
entails the condemnation of ecclesiology to an abstract sterility actually making it 
impossible at the practical level to adequately solve concrete ecclesiological issues, as 
opposed to offering a mere rhetorical solution of them. The obdurate exclusion of 
political philosophy at the systematic level means that ecclesiology lacks its human 
referent and, consequently, that communication with non-Christians in general and 
political philosophers specifically will be difficult. Put differently, the prohibition 
against critically drawing from the categories of political philosophy would condemn 
ecclesiology to a pre-systematic and uncritical pluralism of metaphorical images. 
Perhaps even worse is the fact that the constitution of the RC church will continue to 
appear irrational as well as unintelligible to Christians and non-Christians alike, as well 
as to political philosophers. 
As suggested above, the theological basis of such exclusivist methodology is that 
grace is discontinuous with nature in the specific case of the structured community of 
Christians. In contrast, the theological basis of the opposed methodology—the one 
envisaging ecclesiology as in continuity with political philosophy—is, of course, that 
the Scholastic solution in favour of the continuity to the relationship between nature and 
grace at the level of the individual Christian remains normative with regard to that same 
relationship at the communal, ecclesial level. Because continuity between nature and 
grace is considered to be the norm in Christian theology, the burden of proof lies with 
those wanting to uphold the admittedly momentous exception to that rule in the case of 
the church. To justify it simply on the basis of some scriptural passages supposedly 
witnessing a divine establishment of certain church structures as irreversible and 
necessary, and/or by appealing to the church being a ‘mystery’, does not appear to be 
sufficient. I have recalled previously the requirement in RC canon law that ‘no doctrine 
is understood to be infallibly defined unless it is clearly established as such’ (can. 749.3, 
see section 3.4). Such a prudential principle is particularly relevant in the case of 
ecclesial structures supposedly willed by God as necessary and immutable, and the 
more so to the extent that they appear contrary to the precepts of nature and reason—
summed up in the principle of subsidiarity, or the self-determination of each moral 
body, which translates concretely in giving individuals the freedom ‘to participate freely 
and actively in establishing the constitutional bases of a political community, governing 
the state, determining the scope and purpose of various institutions, and choosing 
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leaders’83—whose observance provides the heuristic definition of democracy. 
Accordingly, the next chapter will turn to analyzing the contemporary understanding of 
(democratic) authority. 
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5 CENTRAL INSIGHTS AND CATEGORIES OF 
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter and the next are based on the traditional theological axiom that grace does 
not destroy nature, but perfects it according to the manner of the nature. This is valid 
both at the individual and at the social levels. Hence, lacking specific and unambiguous 
dictates from revelation to the contrary, the principles for responsible cooperation 
should be the same in the church as in civil society. Indeed, the church should be a 
model society, thus bearing witness even on that point to the divine work of redemption. 
The assumption that the church has to develop and refine the rules of human societies is 
even more confirmed by contemporary historical studies which show that the church 
has always adopted the political forms of the surrounding civil societies.1 
From this perspective, it becomes necessary to critically investigate the insights 
political philosophy has developed with regard to the requirements for the individual’s 
cooperation to be responsible, as well as the political categories developed to express 
the relationships constitutive of community, authority, and democracy. However, a 
problem immediately arises, in that the meaning of the central political categories has 
historically divided, and still divides, political philosophers. It is thus essential to state 
clearly the method which will be adopted for discerning between correct and incorrect 
understandings of such categories. 
Political philosophy is understood here as having as its primary object of study the 
data concerning the relationships of cooperation and authority among members of a 
human polity. Inasmuch as the study of the intelligence and morality of common action 
presupposes the understanding of the cognitional and moral operations involved in 
individual action, by which social cooperation is constituted, political philosophy—just 
like ecclesiology—is based on a theory of how we come to know, decide, and act on our 
knowledge. The fact that it is by his/her intentional operations that each individual 
contributes to the common action of a group means that the categories developed to 
understand the political relationships constitutive of common action—cooperation and 
subordination/authority—will be the more systematic and explanatory the more they 
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have traced the various intentional steps involved in the decision to cooperate.2 The 
decision to cooperate should not be blind; and the best way to provide general 
guidelines to assess its intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility is by means of 
uncovering the general cognitional and moral operations which enter into it. Again, the 
same method applies with regard to ‘authority’, viz. that foundational category political 
philosophy has developed to name a particular type of cooperation, that involving 
subordination: as itself a result of an intentional response of a person to another, its 
critical meaning can be clarified by bringing to light the cognitional and moral 
operations involved in entering such relationship.3 The same method, again, is relevant 
for clarifying all other categories political philosophy has developed—e.g. freedom and 
obedience, consent and coercion, delegation, subsidiarity, legitimation, accountability, 
and so on. 
The methodological contention that political philosophy must be based on a 
theory of intelligent coming to know and responsible decision-making is not new. It has 
been advanced in different forms by some eminent sociologists and political 
philosophers alike. To take but three examples: political philosopher Jürgen Habermas 
has argued that ‘democratic procedures are meant to institutionalize the forms of 
communication necessary for rational will-formation’;4 Joshua Cohen concurred and 
specified: ‘The ideal deliberative procedure provides a [normative] model that they [i.e. 
the democratic institutions] should mirror, so far as possible’;5 sociologist Talcott 
Parsons famously and perceptively defined society as ‘one of the primary subsystems of 
the human action system’, where ‘Action consists of the structures and processes by 
which human beings form meaningful intentions and, more or less successfully, 
implement them in concrete situations.’6 
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The general cognitional theory and epistemology which will be assumed here is 
the one detailed by philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan.7 It is beyond the 
scope of this work to undertake an exposition and justification of Lonergan’s theory. 
For present purposes, its validity can be assessed a posteriori, against its explanatory 
potential in clarifying and evaluating the meaning of the central political categories. 
This chapter will exploit the explanatory potential of Lonergan’s analysis of human 
intentionality with regard to political philosophy, in a way analogous to what has 
already been successfully carried out with regard to e.g. psychology, spirituality, and 
biblical exegesis.8 
Lonergan identified to an unmatched level of detail both of the basic invariant 
dynamic pattern of related and recurrent operations which each human being performs 
in coming to know and in deciding morally (i.e. experience, understanding, factual 
verification, moral evaluation), and of the criteria for self-correction immanent to those 
operations at each cognitive level. Such thoroughness is invaluable to accurately 
uncover the cognitional and moral operations at the origin of the individual’s political 
relationships, so as to critically understand the political categories expressing them—
e.g. belief, community, delegation to authority, and subsidiarity. It is, however, 
obviously possible to accomplish the latter in a more general manner, i.e. assuming only 
some minimal facts concerning how humans come to know and decide (hence leaving 
Lonergan’s original and much more detailed picture of the workings of human 
intentionality for reference): and that is what will be done here. 
The general assumption is that any decision must have previously fulfilled four 
cognitional and moral steps: gathering data/evidence (attentively); understanding it 
(intelligently); verifying (reasonably) the factual correctness of such understanding 
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against the experienced data; and evaluating (responsibly) the moral worthiness of the 
possible course(s) of action envisaged by one’s verified insights into the data of 
experience. (The intuitive meaning of the expressions ‘attentive experience’, ‘intelligent 
understanding’, ‘reasonable factual verification’, and ‘responsible evaluation’ should 
suffice for the purposes of the present chapter: their thorough technical explanation can 
be found in Lonergan’s two main works cited above [no. 7]). The above sketch 
delineates an understanding of human knowledge as not simply a question of taking a 
good look at what is out there to be seen—contrary to a widespread misconception—but 
rather as ‘a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging’,9 and a ‘self-
correcting process of learning’10 driven by questions in interaction with answers. 
It should also be pointed out at the start that the following application of those 
insights into human intentionality to an analysis of political relationships is not 
completely original. Lonergan himself already examined the basic categories of belief,11 
community,12 authority,13 in light of those insights into human intelligent coming to 
know and responsible deciding. While retaining both Lonergan’s general methodology 
and his specific findings concerning those foundational categories, I will extend its 
analysis to encompass more specific problems of political philosophy which Lonergan 
only touched on, such as those concerning delegation, subsidiarity, and especially the 
twofold most important challenge to contemporary democratic theory: that concerning 
the accountability of expert authority, and its relationship with the non-specialised 
authority of political representatives.14 
                                                 
9
 Method in Theology, 106. 
10
 See Insight, 196–8; 311–12; 315 (on the social dimension of such self-correcting process); 728 (on 
its relationship with both immanently generated [i.e. personally discovered] knowledge and with the web 
of beliefs constituting 99% of what we know). 
11
 Lonergan treats belief systematically several times: the most accurate and lengthy discussion 
occurs in the section entitled ‘The Notion of Belief’ in Insight, 725–40. Shorter accounts can be found in 
the essay ‘Belief: Today’s Issue’ (1968), in A Second Collection. Papers by J. F. Lonergan, S. J., eds. 
William F. J. Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), 87-100; and in the 
section entitled ‘Beliefs’, in Method in Theology, 41–7. 
12
 Insight, 237–8; ‘The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World’, Collection: Papers by 
Bernard Lonergan, CWL 4 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2nd ed. 1993 [1967]), 108–13 (109); 
Method, 356–61. 
13
 See ‘Dialectic of Authority’ (1974), in A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, ed. 
F. E. Crowe (Mahwah NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 5–11. 
14
 Several scholars have already commented, clarified and at times even expanded such a framework 
on Lonergan’s seminal political insights: see for instance Giuseppe Badini Confalonieri, ‘Democracy as a 
Public Method of Searching for the Truth and the Good: The Epistemological Foundations of the 
Democratic Method’, trans. Donald E. Buzzelli, available at 
http://www.lonergan.org/dialogue_partners/badini/badini.htm, unpublished ET with modifications by the 
author of ‘La democrazia come metodo pubblico di ricerca del vero e del bene: I fondamenti 
epistemologici del metodo democratico’, in Antonio Salvatore (ed.), Europa Cristiana e Democrazie 
Liberali (Stresa: Edizioni Rosminiane, 2002), 245–70; the much lengthier essay—almost a short book in 
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Accordingly, the chapter begins by critically examining the following concepts: 
(1) community and the common meanings and values unifying its members; (2) 
authority, as that relationship of ‘vertical’ cooperation through the delegation of 
decisions, and the related notions of delegation and subsidiarity; and (3) democracy, as 
the rationalization and responsibilisation of delegation and of the relationship of 
authority. From that basis, the chapter will then turn to discuss some of the aspects of 
democracy which have provoked the most discussion: the reasonableness of the 
delegation to expert authority; the impossibility of a unique, supreme authority over all 
areas of common decision-making and action; majority rule; and the distinction 
between legitimacy and legitimation. 
5.2 Belief, Common Meaning, and Community 
One of the fundamental categories used in ecclesiology is that of community. Lonergan 
clarified its traditional definition by relating it to the conscious and intentional acts of 
the individual subject. Specifically, he did so by highlighting the role which ‘belief’ has 
in the creation of any community. ‘Belief’ is the intentional procedure by which both 
cognitional and evaluative contents discovered by separate individuals can be 
appropriated by others, and thus eventually become common. Historical development is 
assured by the creation through belief of a common fund of knowledge, to which it is 
possible to draw as well as to contribute. 
5.2.1 The Intentional Structure at the Origin of Belief 
Reflections on the general role of belief in human life are quite old, at least in the 
Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition. Already David Hume pointed out: ‘there is no 
species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than 
that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eyewitnesses and 
                                                                                                                                               
its own right—by Patrick Brennan, ‘Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject’, Boston College 
Law Review 43, no. 2 (2002), 227–349, available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol43/iss2/1/; 
Anthony J. Fejfar, ‘Insight into Lawyering: Bernard Lonergan’s Critical Realism Applied to 
Jurisprudence’, Boston College Law Review 27, no. 4 (1986), 681–719, available at 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol27/iss4/1/; John Haughey, ‘Responsibility for Human Rights: 
Contributions from Bernard Lonergan’, Theological Studies 63 (2002), 764–85; Komonchak, 
Foundations in Ecclesiology; also ‘Authority and its Exercise’, in Catholic Common Ground Initiative 
(ed.), Church Authority in American Culture: The Second Cardinal Bernardin Conference (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1999), 29–48; David A. Nordquest, ‘Lonergan’s Cognitional Theory: Toward A 
Critical Human Science’, The Review of Politics 56, no. 1 (Winter, 1994), 71–99. 
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spectators.’15 Belief is the link between individual and social knowledge. It enables both 
the formation of a social fund of knowledge from the contributions of many individuals, 
and the exploitation by each individual of such common fund.16 If only developments 
within the intentional structure of the individual subject were possible, Lonergan noted, 
every person would start over at the dawn of history. Historical development is assured 
by the implementation of a common fund of knowledge, to which it is possible to draw 
as well as to contribute. Indeed, belief is what makes for the very possibility of human 
traditions, the passing on of knowledge from one generation to another. It is, again, 
what lies behind human education, socialization and acculturation at any given time and 
place in history.17 Finally, it is central to everyday life too to a much greater extent than 
immanently generated knowledge is. ‘Ninety-eight per cent of what a genius knows, he 
believes’, as Lonergan put it.18 Nobody checks the capacity of a bridge before stepping 
onto it, nor that the food she buys is edible.19 
Believing, then, is an essential factor in that process which in its various stages 
and forms is called education, socialization, and acculturation into a given socio-cultural 
tradition. Because of its fundamental role in human development as well as in the 
development of social, cultural, and religious traditions and institutions, it is particularly 
valuable to analyse the structure of belief, in order to evaluate whether it is actually the 
reasonable and responsible action which its widespread use by humans suggest. 
According to Lonergan, that is indeed the case to the extent only that the decision to 
believe is based on two judgments.20 
The first consists in a general judgment by which one becomes convinced of the 
usefulness of the division of labour in acquiring knowledge, both diachronically (i.e. by 
means of cognitive cooperation throughout history) and synchronically (i.e. by means of 
                                                 
15
 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1977), 74. The literature on belief as cognitional procedure is huge: a 
primer is Jennifer Lackey and E. Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: OUP, 2006). A 
selective bibliography on the subject is also available in Jonathan Adler, ‘Epistemological Problems of 
Testimony’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2007 Edition), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/. 
16
 Lonergan, Insight, 725. 
17
 Lonergan, ‘Belief: Today’s Issue’, 87; also Insight, 452–3. 
18
 ‘An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan, S.J.’, ed. Philip McShane, in A Second Collection, 209–
30 (219). 
19
 Ibid., 88–9. In criticising the rejection of tradition theorized by the Enlightenment, Gadamer 
observed: ‘[E]ven in a state of perfect enlightenment we cannot ground everything we hold to be true 
through strict proof or conclusive deduction. Rather, we must permanently rely on something, and 
ultimately on someone, in whom we have trust. Our entire communicative life rests on this.’ Gadamer, 
‘Authority and Critical Freedom’, in The Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age, trans. 
Jason Gaiger and Nicholas Walker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 117–24 (121). 
20
 Method in Theology, 41–7. 
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cognitive cooperation within a society at any given point in time). Such approval, 
Lonergan noted, is far from uncritical: ‘It is fully aware of the fallibility of believing. 
But it finds it obvious that error would increase rather than diminish by a regression to 
primitivism’ caused by the rejection of cognitive cooperation.21 
Second is a particular judgment of value on the credibility of the source one is to 
believe: 
It regards the trustworthiness of a witness, a source, a report, the 
competence of an expert, the soundness of judgment of a teacher, a 
counsellor, a leader, a statesman, an authority. The point at issue in each 
case is whether one’s source was critical of his sources, whether he has 
reached cognitional self-transcendence in his judgments of fact and moral 
self-transcendence in his judgments of value, whether he was truthful and 
accurate in his statements.22 
This checking is not only direct, about the source’s credibility here and now, but 
also indirect, through the innumerable confirmations that come from others concerning 
either the object to be believed or the multiple consequences connected with it.23 
Lonergan applies in this point his original discussion on direct and indirect 
verification.24 
Finally, the decision to believe follows from considering the original judgment of 
fact or value to be true and leads to accepting the contents on which it refers with regard 
to data, insights, facts, or values. 
5.2.2 Community, Cooperation, and Power 
Belief thus conceived is analogous to the ‘trust’ sociologists envisage as central to 
social life.25 It is the instrument by which personal meanings and values can be 
appropriated by other people, and thus eventually become common. Not only does 
belief enable the constitution of a common fund of knowledge: because it allows 
knowing what other persons in principle know, evaluate, and do, belief can also enlarge 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., 45. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Cf. Lonergan’s original discussion of direct and indirect verification in Insight, 58, 114; also 
‘Natural Knowledge of God’, in A Second Collection, 117–33 (124-5). 
24
 Insight, 58, 114. 
25
 The literature on ‘trust’, as that on belief, is quite vast; see e.g. F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social 
Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995); D. Gambetta, (ed.), Trust: 
Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988); R. Hardin, Trust and 
Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); and Carolyn McLeod, ‘Trust’, in Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/trust/. 
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the possibility of cooperation, both in knowledge and in action, well beyond the 
immediate interpersonal relations. 
From this perspective, community arises precisely out of the cooperation in 
knowledge and action that emerges through the belief people grant to others. 
Individuated materially by a group of persons, a community has its own formal 
component in common meaning.26 Agreement or disagreement can occur with regard to 
experiences, insights, judgments of fact, or moral evaluations. As agreement creates the 
community, so disagreement disrupts it: 
Without a common field of experience people are out of touch. Without a 
common way of understanding, they will misunderstand one another, 
grow suspicious, distrustful, hostile, violent. Without common [factual 
and value] judgments they will live in different worlds, and without 
common aims they will work at cross-purposes.27 
In the measure in which shared knowledge extends to and includes values and 
goals, a community of knowledge can become a community of action or, differently 
put, cooperation extends from the cognitive to the practical level. Cooperation in 
knowledge can foster specialisation, while cooperation in action can nurture a division 
of labour integrating the sundry activities of the community members (see below). 
Now, the power of a given community is the product of cooperation; hence belief, 
by enabling cooperation, is also at the basis of power of a given community. Moreover, 
because it is the community which collectively possesses and passes on the 
achievements of the past through a common tradition, and because it is the community 
which organises itself to make possible cooperation in the present, the community is the 
original and primary carrier of power.28 
Cooperation has a synchronic as well as a diachronic dimension: ‘There is the 
cooperation down the ages. There is cooperation at any given place and time.’29 Without 
the former, as noted when treating of belief, we would have never developed beyond the 
primitive stage. Such cooperation in history is then complemented by the cooperation in 
the here and now. 
                                                 
26
 ‘Community is not just an aggregate of individuals within a frontier, for that overlooks its formal 
constituent, which is common meaning.’ Lonergan, Method in Theology, 356-7. 
27
 Lonergan, ‘Dialectic of Authority’, 5–6. In a similar way, Aristotle stressed the political 
importance of ὁµόνοια (‘unanimity or ‘concord’); it was for him the idem sentire or ‘political friendship’ 
constitutive of the piόλις: see the reference at no. 105 below. 
28
 Ibid., 5–6. 
29
 Ibid., 5. 
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From the subject’s point of view, such cooperation develops as a web of responses 
to the actions of others. There are two most relevant kinds of response and ways of 
cooperating. First, individuals or groups may adjust their decisions and actions to the 
actions of others, so that each focuses on what s/he can do best while leaving to others 
the fulfilment of tasks s/he either cannot or has not the time to discharge.30 In this kind 
of cooperation, the complementarity of products and actions, tasks and roles creates 
extensive webs of socio-economic relations, the greatest part of which remains 
unknown to and not controllable by the individual participant, who only knows and 
controls the very small segment directly related to him/her. Such a self-extending web is 
analogous to Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’—although it encompasses not only the 
economic, but also the social, cultural and religious systems.31 This first kind of 
response creates that ‘horizontal’ cooperation without subordination also known as 
‘division of labour’. 
5.3 Delegation and Authority 
The second type of cooperation is what is ordinarily termed subordination or authority 
proper, and originates from the individual’s free decision to accept as a directive for 
action the choice of someone else. Such decision is what is meant by delegation. 
That term underlines the passage of competence already present in believing 
(from the believer to who is being believed). Belief is at the basis of authority because 
the decision to believe someone means recognising that person as an authority, at least 
with regard to the particular assertion which is being believed. Belief in the capacity of 
someone else’s judgment can motivate the delegation of the choice. As belief with 
regard to cognitional content creates cognitional authority, so the delegation of choice 
creates social and political authority. 
However, while belief simply entails the acceptance of someone else’s judgments 
of facts or of value, delegation also involves the acceptance of directives for action. In 
actual practice, the person accepting the decisions of the authority does not ordinarily 
ask to be provided with the knowledge which had been necessary in order to make those 
choices, for that would hamstring in no small part the very purpose and usefulness of 
                                                 
30
 ‘[L]abor is not divided by simply delegating a task we could do ourselves at the cost of time, but 
rather by giving over a task to others that we could not do at all’ because of lack of technical expertise, 
James Bohman, ‘Citizenship and Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies’, 
Political Theory 27, no. 2 (1999), 176–202 (189). 
31
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Kathryn 
Sutherland (Oxford: OUP, 1999 [1776]), bk. iv, ch. II, 291–2. 
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delegation. The relationship of authority can thus occur both in the field of knowledge 
and in that of action; and because knowledge and action are interrelated, the relationship 
of authority ordinarily involves a mix of the two. In any case, the central point—
whether in the cognitive or the practical domain—is that the decision to believe/delegate 
should be responsible, following a judgment on the greater accuracy of someone else’s 
capacity for evaluation in comparison with one’s own.32 
From a cognitive viewpoint, then, belief refers to the conscious act of the subject 
who believes, delegation to the objective relation that his/her action creates vis-à-vis 
another subject, and authority to the resulting relation between the delegated subject and 
the originating believing subject. From an operative viewpoint, the originating act, 
instead of belief is usually named consent. Historically the meaning of that word has 
been much debated, but intentionality analysis suggests an unambiguous meaning, i.e. 
the result of a responsible choice. This choice is the consequence of two judgments: a 
general judgment in favour of the general opportunity to cooperate at both the cognitive 
and also the practical levels, and a specific judgment in favour of the opportunity of the 
specific delegation in favour of the subordination constitutive of authority. The crucial 
point is, then, that it is precisely such a choice and assent—however one may want to 
call it: belief, consent, or delegation—the common constitutive basis of any authority: 
for, as it has been observed, 
political authority is established in ways substantially similar to the 
authority of expertise […]. To be recognized as an authority, an 
individual must demonstrate his or her expertise or knowledge and 
subject it to the scrutiny of an audience. The authority of an expert is the 
result of the audience’s judgments about the merits of his or her 
knowledge. If individuals defer to the judgment of the authority, they do 
so because they accept that the authority has been earned and 
demonstrated. […] Thus, when authority means recognized expertise, we 
do not find that those who recognize the authority have surrendered their 
judgment; to the contrary, they have judged that the authority has a better 
grasp of the topic or good than others and, all other things being equal, 
deserves a trust and deference in his or her areas of expertise.33 
                                                 
32
 According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, the authority of persons ‘is ultimately based not on the 
subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgment and knowledge—the knowledge, 
namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment 
takes precedence—i.e., it has priority over one’s own.’ Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 2nd ed. 
1993), 281. 
33
 Mark Warren, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Authority’, The American Political Science Review 
90, no. 1 (1996), 46–60 (54); paraphrasing in turn Richard E. Flathman, The Practice of Political 
Authority (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1980), ch. 5. Warren also added few lines later: ‘Flathman 
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As belief greatly enhances the cognitive possibilities (first of the individual 
subject and then of the community), so likewise delegation greatly enhances the 
possibilities of action—initially only of the individual who delegates the choice of the 
appropriate course of action to one who is more competent, but subsequently of the 
whole community. In this light, delegation can be described as a procedure devised to 
overcome two common issues of political life: (i) the need to bring the specialised 
knowledge of experts to bear on the action of the group; and (ii) the need to act even 
when unanimity does not seem to be forthcoming. 
With regard to the first point, it should be noted that—as is particularly evident in 
the contemporary complex societies—most of the decisions concerning the common 
courses of action to be undertaken require specialized competences. Such specialized 
competences, by definition, are not and cannot be the common possession of everybody, 
but are rather scattered among the many members of the community. Delegation is 
precisely the method to exploit such scattered specialized expertise in decisions 
affecting the entire community. As the ‘Principal-Agent’ model (currently perhaps the 
most widespread theoretical frameworks for explaining delegation) puts it, one of the 
key rationales for delegation is precisely its capacity for ‘overcom[ing] information 
asymmetries in technical areas of governance (agents [i.e. delegates] are expected to 
develop and employ expertise in order to produce, or help principals [i.e. delegators] 
produce appropriate public policy).’34 Or, differently put, delegation is ‘an effective 
substitute for the acquisition of expertise’.35 
                                                                                                                                               
notes, correctly, that a strict separation between belief and (authoritative) obedience is not sociologically 
possible. The one subject to authority must decide to obey an authority if the relationship is to be one of 
authority (which requires obedience in the sense of discharging an obligation) rather than imposition or 
compulsion.’ 
34
 Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Theory and Practice of Delegation in Non-Majoritarian 
Institutions’, in Thatcher and Stone Sweet (eds.), The Politics of Delegation (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 
1–19 (3). Two additional rationales for delegation identified by the ‘Principal-Agent’ model are 
noteworthy: first, enhancing the credibility of policy-makers vis-à-vis their constituents; and second, 
‘enhanc[ing] the efficiency of rule making (agents are expected to respond to relatively specific problems 
and issues that arise, while principals set and then update the more general terms of policy)’, ibid. 
Indeed, in his sketch of the ‘Principal-Agent’ model, Fabrizio Gilardi only mentions expertise (and 
time constraints) as the primary rationale for delegation: ‘A principal wishes a given task to be executed 
but lacks the expertise or time to perform it and therefore delegates it to an agent, which gets the job done 
in exchange for some form of remuneration. This is a very general social phenomenon, which occurs 
every time we consult a doctor or ask a mechanic to repair our car. [T]he principal must solve two 
problems. First, the principal must select an agent with the appropriate expertise and preferences. [...] 
Second, once an agent has been selected the principal must make sure that it fulfils the principal’s interest 
and not its own.’ Gilardi, Delegation in the Regulatory State. Independent Regulatory Agencies in 
Western Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), 29, with good bibliography. 
35
 Arthur Lupia and Mathew W. McCubbins, ‘Who Controls? Information and the Structure of 
Legislative Decision Making’, in Kenneth A, Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (eds.), Positive Theories of 
Congressional Institutions (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan, 1995), 201–34 (203). 
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With regard to the second point, it should be observed that the institutionalization 
of delegation is what enables the group to decide something even without the unanimity 
of all the group’s members. Let us recall that for a community to act in common 
unanimity is required. It is clear that when there is unanimity there is no delegation, for 
all participate in the choice. When there is disagreement, however, and a decision 
cannot be postponed anymore without a damage greater than that which would follow 
inaction, a solution may be that of unanimously acknowledging the opportunity to 
delegate the decision-making authority to the majority, whether of the initial group or of 
representative person(s): structurally, majority rule is, in fact, a form of delegation. 
Hence, majority rule is that particular type of delegation which allows transcending the 
requirement for unanimity. 
Finally, because those who have been delegated can in turn delegate, there might 
develop a vertical ‘ladder’ of relationships of authority. However, in comparison with 
the horizontal web of cooperative relations constituting a division of labour, this vertical 
ladder of relations of authority created through successive delegations is much smaller 
and can and should be easily discernible by the community in order to be responsibly 
accepted. 
In summary, delegation is what gives rise to the type of relationship ordinarily 
referred to as ‘authority’ proper. The latter, then, is best defined as the subsidiary 
coordination of the common action of a community, where the adjective ‘subsidiary’ 
means that it should concern those actions only which lay beyond the individual’s or 
lower level’s operational range—beyond, that is, their knowledge or competence and 
capacity for independent action. 
5.4 Subsidiarity 
It is quite significant that the features of a responsible delegation yield the principle of 
subsidiarity. For to the extent that one is only justified in delegating what one deems to 
be beyond their capacity to make a responsible decision, it is irresponsible to delegate to 
others a decision that one could make by oneself, in an equally or even more 
responsible way. In agreement with this, the principle of subsidiarity suggests that, on 
the one hand, each decisional level (from the individual upward) has an inalienable 
responsibility to decide and act within its own operational range and, on the other hand, 
that only those actions which cannot be achieved by the individual or the smaller group 
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alone, can be appropriately achieved through recourse to the higher level of a structured 
community. 
But in light of the analysis of believing advanced by Lonergan it is possible to 
draw attention to a further unavoidable postulate of subsidiarity, namely that the 
division between what can be decided autonomously and what should be decided by 
delegation must be determined by the delegating individual or group and not by the 
higher levels. For it is only the former who has the responsibility to decide on the 
appropriateness and extent of the delegation.36 This (self)determination by the 
delegant(s) of both their own decisional/operational range and, consequently, also of the 
limited competence of the delegated, is an unavoidable presupposition for the 
responsibility of any delegation.37 In other words, all authorities are created and 
determined in their limits through delegation. 
This enlarged understanding of subsidiarity is implicit in, yet intrinsic and 
fundamental to, its original formulation. The healthy understanding of community 
which subsidiarity promotes must always presuppose the subsidiary role of any 
community vis-à-vis the individual, and of the higher action-levels within a complex 
community vis-à-vis the lower ones. 
Under a different name and in a slightly different form, subsidiarity has been 
acknowledged as one of the fundamental principles of and criteria for democratic 
political philosophy, as the principle of the 
final control of the agenda by the demos: The demos must have the 
exclusive opportunity to make decisions that determine what matters are 
and are not to be decided by means of procedural democracy [i.e. by 
delegation to the majority or to a higher decisional level]. […] According 
to this criterion, a political system would be procedurally democratic even 
if the demos decided that it would not make every decision on every 
                                                 
36
 ‘[T]he global community must be organized according to subsidiarity, not hierarchically, such that 
bigger institutions do not impede the development of smaller ones’, for it is up to the smaller 
communities to delegate in the measure ‘as they observe that the problems arising within them have 
grown beyond their abilities.’ Rafael Domingo, The New Global Law, ASIL Studies in International 
Legal Theory (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 180. ‘This precept [i.e. subsidiarity] holds that authority should 
reside at the lowest level commensurate with the necessary information and resources for making and 
implementing decisions, with the onus of proof on those who would move powers to a higher level. As a 
practical matter, this suggests the supremacy of the individual over all decision-making authority, only 
some of which is to be delegated upwards. The hierarchy thus runs from the bottom to the top: individual 
to community to region to province to central government to international’. Gordon Gibson, ‘The Role of 
Subsidiarity in a Democracy’, Fraser Forum (May 2000), available at 
http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/forum/2000/05/section_01.html (my emphasis). 
37
 The existence of a domain of inalienable responsibility can be inferred from Lonergan’s 
distinction between the ‘essential’ and ‘effective’ freedom of the socially and culturally located 
individual, as described in Insight, 643–7 (esp. 643). 
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matter, but instead chose to have some decisions on some matters made, 
say, in a hierarchical fashion by judges or administrators. As long as the 
demos could effectively retrieve any matter for decision by itself, the 
criterion would be met. In this respect, then, the doctrine of procedural 
democracy allows more latitude for delegation of decision-making….38 
Accordingly, as Dahl further remarked, 
the criterion of final control does not presuppose a judgment that the 
demos is qualified to decide every question requiring a binding decision. 
It does presuppose a judgment that the demos is qualified to decide (1) 
which matters do or do not require binding decisions [and thus also which 
decisions are to be delegated to the majority or to higher levels of 
authority], (2) of those that do, which matters the demos is qualified to 
decide for itself, and (3) the terms on which the demos delegates 
authority. To accept that the criterion is appropriate is therefore to imply 
that the demos is the best judge of its own competence and limits.39 
Subsidiarity, then, does not automatically entail decentralisation, as it is 
sometimes mistakenly asserted. Subsidiarity merely asserts that it is each decisional 
level’s responsibility to evaluate what it can do and what it can instead only achieve 
through delegation and cooperation with the higher levels: but ‘this principle also 
recognizes that if the decisions at issue are translocal, transnational, or transregional, 
then political associations need not only to be locally based but also to have a wider 
scope and framework of operation’.40 That is perfectly compatible with the eventuality 
of an extraordinary situation where the normal functioning (i.e. decision-making and 
acting capacities) of the lower decisional levels is, for whatever reason, compromised: 
in such situation the lower levels may well decide both intelligently and responsibly to 
delegate emergency decisional powers to higher levels, and perhaps even agree on a 
single leader. As often noted, as long as the delegation has been freely and responsibly 
agreed on by the lower levels, the resulting governmental form, even when monarchical 
in outlook, would not be thereby undemocratic. 
Finally, it should be noted that, in this perspective, subsidiarity is but the technical 
expression of what is meant by authority as a ‘service’:41 for the raison d’être of 
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 Dahl, ‘Procedural Democracy’, in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 109–27 (114). 
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 Ibid., 115. 
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 David Held, ‘Principles of Cosmopolitan Order’, in Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (eds.), The 
Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 10–27 (14). 
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authority is precisely that of empowering the possibility of action of individual persons 
and lower/intermediate groups.42 Hence, authority can be understood as the service of 
subsidiary coordination of the common action of a community.43 
5.5 Authority and Office 
It can be helpful to notice how the understanding of authority expounded so far 
(sections 5.2–5.4) relates to and differs from some common assumptions on or 
descriptions of authority made by contemporary political philosophers. 
Max Weber’s systematisation outlined three forms of authority: tradition, personal 
charisma, and institutionalised office. In his wake, political philosophers and even 
ecclesiologists have often implicitly or explicitly envisaged authority as coming from 
disparate and apparently irreconcilable sources, simply juxtaposed one to the other: 
consent, expertise, trustworthiness, and/or office. Often, when proponents of similar 
views attempt to overcome the inconsistency latent in postulating several potentially 
overlapping and thus conflictual sources of authority, they tend to reduce them to a single 
one, viz. consent. 
This process is evident in a recent specimen of such an approach. Apparently 
espousing a multiple-sources view of authority in his treatment of the concept of 
representation, Mark B. Brown affirms that ‘In addition to the public authority […] 
delegated through appointment’ by election, there exists a second manner of public 
authorization, namely, through one’s competence. Significantly, however, Brown added 
immediately that such authorization is warranted by means of ‘licensing or certification 
by a professional association according to publicized criteria’,44 that is, in other words, 
on publicly agreed on standards of both education and licensing/certification. This 
suggests the problematicity of understanding authority as constituted not only by the 
consent of those subject to it but also by intellectual or moral competence. To the 
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contrary, it is only the attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible free consent of 
the delegants to constitute authority.45 Hence, ‘only because authorities are scrutinized 
critically do they come to possess authority.’46 This is so much so, that if one has doubts 
as to the quality or correctness of a given official certificate of special expertise for 
whatever reason (poor quality of the educational institution which granted it, de facto if 
not de iure below the agreed on educational standards; suspicions of bribes in obtaining 
the certificate, or what have you), then it will see no reason to delegate her choices to that 
particular certificate-holder, and will accordingly look for another person which she 
deems better qualified.47 Of course, the current pattern of institutional legitimation is 
initially accepted—along with the whole of the cultural tradition (the common fund of 
beliefs) of one’s community—quite uncritically by the individual educated, socialised, 
and acculturated in it, but may subsequently be subject to criticism if it conflicts with the 
individual’s developing worldview. 
The point is, however, that by highlighting the structure of belief, intentionality 
analysis shows the distinction between the authority coming from responsible consent 
and that inherent to an office to be fictitious. With Gadamer: 
Authority does not consist in the superiority of a power that promotes 
blind obedience and forbids thinking. The true essence of authority is 
based much more on the claim that it is not unreasonable, indeed, that it 
can be a command of reason itself, to assume that the insight of others 
who are superior in other matters exceeds your own judgment. To obey 
authority means to have insight that the other—and so also the other 
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voices that resound from tradition and the past—can see something better 
than oneself.48 
Intentionality analysis thus provides a philosophical basis to the traditional view 
that authority—whether institutionalized in an office or merely contingent on an issue—
has its basis on the responsible consent of those subject to it. 
5.6 Expert Authority and the Risk of Guardianship 
The establishment of specialised authorities has followed the gradual process of what 
has been called the ever increasing ‘epistemic division of labour’ distinctive of modern 
highly differentiated societies. Such process of specialisation, where 
everyone is an expert in some area or another, economizes on the 
cognitive resources of a community or group while idealizing their social 
interdependence. If each of the members has to know everything that the 
group as a whole knows and thus become the ‘omnicompetent 
individuals’ criticized by Lippmann, then they all know less than a group 
characterized by the epistemic division of labor [...]. The division of labor 
recognizes these cognitive limitations of individual agents and provides a 
way to overcome them to a certain degree by specialization that reduces 
costs of acquiring information for the whole.49 
But specialisation raises problems of its own: to the extent that laypersons or even 
experts may not be in a position to evaluate the soundness of specialised knowledge 
outside their own limited domains of competence, delegation to experts renders more 
difficult the accountability of authority.50 The problem is being felt so forcefully as to 
have been pinpointed as one of the most central to contemporary (democratic) political 
philosophy: 
the familiar ‘interests’ conception of politics that made sense of 
nineteenth century liberalism is now outdated. ‘[T]he new politics of 
expertise’ is a politics in which expertise itself is at stake and in which the 
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establishment of expertise, the judging of expertise, the assertion of bias, 
and the problems and conflicts of interests, are central.51 
From such observations, the conclusion is often advanced that delegation to expert 
authority is undemocratic because, in highly differentiated societies, laypeople cannot 
directly evaluate the competence of individual experts as well as of the specialised 
institutions.52 The most they can do is to rely on indirect means of verifications, e.g. by 
setting up publicly agreed standards of expertise (e.g. establishing professional 
certificates such as university-level diplomas) and peer-review—which means that 
ultimately an expert’s competence can only be assessed by ‘cognitive authorities’ in 
his/her same specialised area.53 
The objection is correct in pointing that for most people expert authority is 
accepted by ‘belief’ or trust.54 However, that does not mean that expert authority is 
accepted always or necessarily irrationally: rather, the decision to believe can be an 
open-eyed, critical, intelligent, and responsible choice, as the earlier analysis of its 
intentional structure suggests (5.2.1). 
The danger of rule by experts is tempered first of all by the fact that, according to 
subsidiarity, in the very act of recognizing and then instituting—through delegation—
expert authority, delegants fix the area, scope, and limits of such delegation. Expert 
authorities would enjoy autonomous and supreme decision-making power but only, of 
course, in that particular field in which they are recognized and trusted as authorities by 
the delegants. Expertise can then be described as ‘a form of delegated authority, similar 
to the delegations that legislatures make to administrative agencies’55 and which, as 
every form of authority based on free recognition and consent, must be continually 
assessed by those delegating: 
                                                 
51
 Stephen P. Turner, Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2003), 4–5. 
52
 Ibid., 4–5, 12, 25, 29, 36 and passim. Turner’s book is one of the most comprehensive recent 
monographs on the problem of the relationship between political and expert authorities in contemporary 
liberal democracies. 
53
 The problem exists, of course, in the Christian church too: as theologian Charles Curran remarked: 
‘Only academic peers—not outside authorities of either church or state—can make judgments about the 
competence of a scholar to teach in the academy. Church authority cannot interfere in the hiring, 
promotion, or firing of faculty.’ Loyal Dissent: Memoir of a Catholic Theologian (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University, 2006), 133. 
54
 ‘The client is not a true judge of the value of the service he receives [...]. A central feature, then, of 
all professions is the motto [...] credat emptor. [...] The client is to trust the professional [...]. Only the 
professional can say when his colleague makes a mistake.’ Hughes, ‘Professions’, 656–7. 
55
 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘(No?) Accounting for Expertise’, Science and Public Policy 30, no. 3 (2003), 
157–62 (158). That issue of Science and Public Policy is entirely dedicated to the theme of 
‘Democratising science expertise’. 
  161 
By allowing experts to act on their behalf, democratic publics do not give 
up the right to participate in decisions with a pronounced technical 
dimension: they only grant to experts a carefully circumscribed power to 
speak for them on matters requiring specialized judgement. 
Among the rights the public does not give up under this theory is the 
right to ensure that experts are acting within the scope of their delegation. 
Whether through direct participation or through organized questioning, 
the public has both a right and a duty to ask experts and their 
governmental sponsors whether appropriate knowledge is being deployed 
in the service of desired ends.56 
That alone, however, is insufficient for the task of allowing non-experts to keep 
specialised authorities accountable. It should be complemented by some additional 
measures. One may consist in implementing both a posteriori and indirect tests of 
expert knowledge. The former kind is an assessment of expert knowledge on the basis 
of its fruits and efficaciousness in solving technical issues. The latter check is more pro-
active and is accomplished, as touched on above, by requiring standards of peer-review 
with regard to expert education, training, and research. What is relevant is that the 
recognition and legitimation of expert authority—just as for any other authority—must 
be dependent on the consent of its audience, and that makes it democratic, in principle at 
least: 
Expertise is a kind of possession, certified or uncertified, of knowledge 
that is testified to be efficacious and in which this testimony is widely 
accepted by the relevant audience. [...] Authority conceived of as resting 
in some sense on widely accepted, at least within the relevant audience, 
testimony to the efficacy of the knowledge that experts correctly claim to 
possess is itself a kind of democratic authority, for this acceptance is a 
kind of democratic legitimation.57 
The third and arguably most important factor tempering the danger of rule by 
experts is that the use of expert knowledge and findings, necessary for policy-making in 
differentiated societies, is always shaped by and subject to the shared values and 
priorities of the (majority of) the community. It is, it will be argued, the distinctive task 
of the political authority to represent such values and priorities, and to utilize 
accordingly the technical or specialised knowledge relevant to policy-making. 
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A general trust in expert authority remains necessary, and is simply an instance of 
the believing so necessary and pervasive in our communal lives. It is true, however, as it 
has been noted, that trust in and consent to expert authority is only responsible if the 
possibility is there of testing the epistemic value of expert authority in the public sphere. 
This points to the twofold difficulty presented by ‘creating communication across 
divergent frameworks and interests among experts and the lay public’:58 the translation 
of scientific knowledge so as to make it publicly accessible and, conversely, the 
translation of ‘practical questions and public problems back into the framework of 
expert discourses’.59 The responsibility of delegation to expert authority is inversely 
proportional to the communicative gap between experts and laypeople: conversely, the 
smaller the gap, the more expert policy analyses and advice can be publicly discussed 
and even criticised in light of the community’s shared interests and values.60 
5.7 Historical Development away from the Classical Understanding of 
Authority as Necessarily Unique, Supreme, and Omnicompetent 
It has been observed that the decision to delegate authority to someone else on a 
(generally limited) issue is only justified against a previous judgment concerning the 
greater knowledge or expertise of the delegate with regard to the specific area being 
delegated. Conversely, it would be ordinarily irresponsible, immoral, indeed inhuman, 
for an individual to delegate decisions on matters which are deemed to fall within one’s 
possibilities, or which the delegate is no better placed to address than the one 
delegating. 
There follows that a responsible delegation is ordinarily never omni-
comprehensive, and always rather specific: limited both to what the delegant does not 
yet need to know in order to decide responsibly, and to what the delegate is being 
recognized as competent. Differently put, authorities are such in the specific domain in 
which they are recognized as being competent, and an omnicompetent authority is only 
possible to the extent only that a single person or body can be recognized as 
omnicompetent. The logical consequence is that none of the specialised authorities 
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present in a community can be hierarchically subject to the others, because the latter, by 
definition, do not have competence outside their particular domain. 
That does not mean that it is impossible for a community to responsibly delegate a 
certain authority to a single representative. As already Wilhelm von Humboldt observed 
at the end of the eighteenth century, in the past the monarchical form of government—
whether in a village, tribe, city- or nation- state—was justified and indeed appropriate 
because of the very limited function which monarchical rulers had, as ‘nothing more 
than leaders in war, and judges in peace’: and, as he noted, ‘to have one general or 
umpire is unquestionably the happiest provision for such a necessity’.61 It has already 
been suggested (2.5) how the monarchical cosmology of neo-Platonic and pseudo-
Dionysian origins has hardly ever been the unique basis for the monarchical 
organization of society under a unique, omnicompetent, and hierarchically supreme 
authority. Instead, that might have been but the loftier justification for rather more 
pragmatic, functionalist considerations based on the experience that, in actual fact, the 
limited military and administrative goals characterizing authority up to roughly the 
modern age could best be pursued through a monarchical hierarchy of command. 
In other words, a general delegation to a supreme leader might have been 
reasonable in communities which are differentiated in a merely embryonic or incipient 
manner, where real distinctions of competences did not exist, and the choices do not 
require specialised knowledge but are a matter of common sense. Yet political 
anthropology suggests that very early on the recognition of the existence of several 
fields of relatively specialised competence resulted in the development of distinct 
institutions and authorities. One of the earliest differentiations has been the one between 
religious and temporal authorities, which have often grown into parallel hierarchies with 
varying degrees of influence and authority over society at large. The best known 
instance of this phenomenon is arguably the medieval struggle between papacy and 
empire. Their respective claims to hegemony made large use of the traditional argument 
that authority had to be one and supreme—and thus necessarily omnicompetent—in 
order for any society to survive. Such argument became very widespread in both 
political philosophy and ecclesiology.62 It forms the core of what has been called the 
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‘classical conception of sovereignty’ which, to the basic conception of sovereignty as 
‘the highest, final, and supreme political and legal authority and power within the 
territorially defined domain of a system of direct rule’, adds three features: 
absoluteness [i.e. it is unconstrained], inalienability [i.e. it cannot be 
delegated], and indivisibility [i.e. it is unique and cannot be divided]. [...] 
[T]he sovereign is the ultimate source of absolute, inalienable, indivisible 
political authority within a realm.63 
Yet the increasing recognition that papal and royal or imperial authorities dealt 
with related but distinct domains of competence, each with its proper autonomy and 
independence, led to the eventual defeat of both papal claims over temporal authority, 
and imperial/royal claims over spiritual authority. The official recognition of that basic 
differentiation was soon to be followed by several others. The emergence of the 
centralized states in early modern Europe has meant that the political authority 
gradually developed from a relatively weak institution with very limited administrative 
ends to becoming the all-encompassing institution of contemporary Western 
democracies, whose influence extends massively to such fundamental areas as 
economy, education, welfare, social security, health care, cultural and religious 
development, and so on. The increased diversification of state authority generated an 
even more explicit rebuttal of the traditional ideal that only a unique, indivisible, and 
supreme authority could exist to govern all domains of the political life of a community: 
for it prompted the explicit theorization of the need for the separation of the various 
powers of the state: each power is in its field, viz. in the fulfilment of its proper task, 
supreme and autonomous. 
The development of a pluralism of specialized authorities in the various areas of 
state action sounded the death-bell for the traditional conception understanding society 
as best being governed by an authority which, being unique and hierarchically supreme, 
was also thereby omnicompetent. When a rather undifferentiated political authority only 
exercised little more than the function of defence, a single authority could and in fact 
had been possible. But when the state started to expand its action at first in the 
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economic domain, then in the social domain, and finally in the cultural domain, a single 
authority did not suffice anymore. Indeed, a single authority, in contemporary 
differentiated societies, would mean the reign of incompetence. Conversely, because in 
present-day highly specialised societies nobody can be omnicompetent and the common 
sense of normal people is incapable of coping with the highly technical issues facing 
civil society, a general delegation of decisions over all domains would be morally 
impossible. As it has been remarked, the classical understanding of authority as unique, 
supreme, and omnicompetent 
no longer is as popular as it once was. It is now widely thought that 
sovereignty can and should be limited. It is often thought as well that one 
of the most effective institutional means of limiting the authority and 
power of states is to divide sovereignty among a plurality of agents or 
institutions; there need be no single authority.64 
The high complexity and specialisation of the modern world and of the issues the 
political authority must routinely deal with have resulted in the abandonment of the 
ideal of a supreme (or sovereign) and indivisible authority over all domains of common 
action, in favour of the practical recognition that each specialised domain of human 
knowledge and endeavour has its own authorities, as recognized on the basis of relevant 
expertise and competence. Delegation is motivated by knowledge unavailable to the 
delegants which means that, in contemporary highly differentiated societies, delegation 
occurs primarily to expert knowledge. It follows that the resulting authority of the 
delegate(s) is always limited to the particular specialised domain(s) in which they are 
recognised as competent and for which their knowledge is being sought. In every 
differentiated society, then, the variety of specialised competencies has developed into a 
corresponding pluralism of specialised authorities. 
Specialised knowledge can be the motivation of the institutionalization of such a 
delegation even to the point of granting some expert bodies or categories an official role 
in policy-making on the relevant technical issues. The phenomenon has been described 
in Everett C. Hughes’ seminal sociological reflections on experts: 
Every profession considers itself the proper body to set the terms in which 
some aspect of society, life or nature is to be thought of, and to define the 
general lines, or even the details, of public policy concerning it. The 
mandate to do so is granted more fully to some professions than to others; 
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in time of crisis it may be questioned even with regard to the most 
respected and powerful professions.65 
In summary, contemporary complex societies encompass a web of specialised 
authorities. 
5.7.1 The Criticism of the Classical Conception of Authority 
The historical development briefly sketched above is related to a major theoretical 
maturation with regard to the concept of (political) authority. Up to and including the 
early modern period, it was most often advanced that, in order for any society to 
survive, political authority had to be one, indivisible, supreme, and thus necessarily 
omnicompetent. Significantly for present purposes, this was believed to be the case with 
regard to both the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities, and generally endorsed by the 
imperial/royal and papal establishments. But while in political philosophy such a 
conception has since undergone a critique and has been largely abandoned, Roman 
Catholic ecclesiology still assumes its basic correctness. Hence the importance of 
analysing the arguments which brought political philosophy to the correction of the 
traditional understanding of authority. 
The most comprehensive defence of the traditional understanding of authority as 
one, indivisible, supreme, final, and absolute has been advanced by Hobbes. M. M. 
Goldsmith isolated the three essential insights constitutive of such a notion: ‘hierarchy’, 
‘closure’, and ‘indivisibility’.66 
‘Hierarchy’ means ‘a chain of norms or authorities, each subordinate to the next 
higher link and superior to those below it.’67 This minimal understanding of hierarchy is 
relatively uncontroversial, and has been retained by contemporary sociology and 
political philosophy. But ‘hierarchy’ can also be a synonym for a top-down 
understanding of authority, where ‘each subordinate rule or authority owes its validity 
to, is derived from, a superior authority.’68 Such, as noted elsewhere (2.5), was the 
essence of the neo-Platonist cosmology and political philosophy which constituted one 
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of the justifications undergirding many papalist and royalist theories.69 Despite its past 
diffusion, the top-down understanding of authority is now largely abandoned. 
The alternative which consistently opposed it, and eventually won the day, has 
been the ‘below-upwards’ one which identified the origin of authority in (attentive, 
intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and free) consent. The parting issue has also a 
methodological component—which may be called the ‘turn to the subject’—analogous 
to what Lonergan described with regard to cognitional theory. It was Lonergan’s 
contention that much of the past and contemporary epistemological discussions were 
prevented from achieving the right answers to questions about the nature of knowledge 
by most often describing it simply on the most immediate and apparently persuasive 
analogy, viz. ocular vision. Our eyes see, and seeing is an operation in which the 
subject-object relationship is both immediate and indisputable. Hence, knowledge has 
often been conceived on the analogy of seeing. Ocular accounts of knowledge consider 
objectivity to be a matter of fulfilling a unique condition: the ‘givenness’ of data, or the 
‘out, there, now’ associated with visual or spatio-temporal presence.70 
Just as an all too common approach to defining knowledge was, and sometimes 
still is, to understand it as something ‘out-there-now’, so too an all too common 
approach in political philosophy was and still is to understand authority as an already 
existent and quite evident reality, a given, the problem being merely that of determining 
the limits of the obedience which the individual subject must necessarily give to such an 
entity. Of course, just as has been the case with the ocular epistemological paradigm, 
such a political stance is understandable to the extent that authority is indeed at first 
sight an evident reality. Paradigmatic here—and in a way which also underscores the 
relationship between the problems of understanding knowledge and authority—is the 
French counter-revolutionary philosopher Louis de Bonald (1754–1840), according to 
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whom one should substitute ‘the evidence of authority’ to the ‘authority of evidence’ 
(‘l’autorité de l’évidence [à] l’évidence de l’autorité’)’.71 Authority is a given, out-there-
now, you do not have to ask why or whence or what are its grounds: you simply have to 
acknowledge its existence, and work out how best to cope with it. 
But an alternative and more correct understanding of authority is reached by 
resolving the human phenomenon under scrutiny into the intentional operations 
constitutive of it, as all those who identified (attentive, intelligent, reasonable, 
responsible, and free) consent as the basis of authority have done, with greater or lesser 
detail. Among them, Lonergan deserves mention for the thoroughness with which he 
tracked down and laid out the intentional operations by which the individual believes, 
delegates, and thus creates authority—in a way which has been summarised in the 
preceding paragraphs (5.2–5.4). 
In contrast, when authority’s origin in and dependence on human intentionality is 
overlooked, then authority does appear somewhat self-existent and without (human) 
origins. Then the way is open for every sort of speculations to be suggested to explain 
such an evident yet unaccounted for given: for instance, by referring to the top-down 
hierarchical manner the cosmos is organised (as those subscribing a Neo-Platonist, 
pseudo-Dionysian cosmology believed). Therefore, often enough throughout history the 
manifest fact of authority has been explained by positing a top-down causal chain in the 
above mentioned sense, i.e. one where ‘each subordinate rule or authority owes its 
validity to, is derived from, a superior authority.’ 
It is, on the contrary, well-nigh impossible to reach such a conclusion from even a 
minimal recognition and/or incomplete understanding of authority’s origins in human 
intentionality. Hobbes is paradigmatic in this regard: for him, sovereign authority was 
the result of a free and responsible social contract whereby humans decided in favour of 
subjection to a sovereign as preferable to the only alternative of insecurity and civil 
strife.72 The resulting conception of authority may be absolutist, but cannot strictly 
speaking be said to be top-down: for authority originates, in that view, in a free and 
responsible consent and delegation of human beings.73 
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This last passage, however, has not always been sufficiently recognized or 
stressed by the contractarian view, still relatively common also among contemporary 
political philosophers. For, according to the view expounded previously (5.2–5.4), 
authority is constituted through (intelligent and responsible) delegation, and the latter is 
the result of a precise decision and not, strictly speaking, of a compact or a contract, and 
much less of a mere logical deduction. A pact, and even more so a contract, imply the 
assumption of a precise obligation towards another person or persons; on the other 
hand, the trust grounding authority is a personal, revisable judgment, that can change 
with the subject and her judgments of fact and value, and thus with no obligations 
toward others. Pace Hobbes, Rousseau, and their followers, this is true even if 
concretely the act of delegation may be legally institutionalised and thus display the 
reciprocal expectations of the compact or the binding agreements of the contract, and 
even if it should always respect a strict logic, viz. that of considering the concrete 
situation in which the delegation is being made. Differently put, the consensual 
delegation which founds authority can also take the form of a written agreement, 
compact or contract; the latter, however, is itself always based on the personal decision 
of the delegants who in fact establish the terms of the delegation: hence, it is not the 
contract or compact the foundation of authority, but rather the free consent and 
subsequent decision of the delegants, a decision which, as it will be noted, must be as 
attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible as possible. 
The same answer can be given to the issues revolving around the second 
characteristic of authority, namely ‘closure’. Closure means that 
the chain [of authorities] does not extend infinitely upward and that the 
system is independent, i.e., not subordinate to another system of 
authorities or norms. This implies that there is no appeal outside the 
system, or, to put it another way, other systems or authorities are external 
to it.74 
Some papalists and royalists might have understood that as necessitating a 
monarchical authority. But many of them—and Hobbes for one—were aware that the 
necessity for an independent system of authority to be closed did not logically entail the 
necessity for it to be monarchical. Indeed, as it has been remarked, 
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Modern constitutionalism is determined by the same logic [of ‘closure’]. 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm and Hart’s secondary rule of recognition are 
ultimate rules that cancel the possibility of an infinite regress. By standing 
at the top of a hierarchical order of subordinate rules, the sovereignty of 
the constitution validates the whole legal system (see Wilks, 1969, 
201-2).75 
Just as hierarchy entails an ordered chain of norms or authorities each subordinate 
to the next higher link and superior to those below it, but does not entail that authority 
flows from the top down, so closure means that an independent system must have a 
final authority, but does not entail that the latter be monarchical. So the search for 
something or someone in the community with the attributes of sovereignty or final 
authority has been going on since, with different subjects being pinpointed: an original 
contract, a divinely-established absolute sovereign, a legislative body, a fundamental set 
of constitutional laws, a supreme (constitutional) court. But according to the consensual 
understanding of authority, the final authority which closes the regress is the same as its 
original source: the self-determining individual and, by extension, the self-determining 
community. Human intentionality itself is both the source and the ultimate, final appeal 
of authority, as suggested by its role in cooperation and subordination as well as in 
devising, evaluating, modifying, and accepting institutions/authorities to implement 
those actions. Such understanding is the opposite of the old top-down conception of 
authority, such as that of divine-right theorists, whether royalists or papalists. 
That authority must be indivisible has been thought to follow logically from 
closure. Yet this assumption too is mistaken: 
to be an independent, closed, complete and conclusive system merely 
requires that there should be a final decider [...] in any sphere, for any 
issue or controversy that may arise; what Hobbes asserts is that there must 
be the same final decider for everything. This latter assertion goes beyond 
what is logically necessary. The necessity of there being the same final 
authority in every matter is ‘necessary’ only in the sense that it eliminates 
the possibility that there may be conflicting decisions on the same matter 
by different authorities within the system. Such conflicts might arise if the 
constitution provided for jurisdictions which were not mutually exclusive 
or if, as is also likely, issues could be interpreted as falling within the 
jurisdiction of several authorities.76 
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For Hobbes, however, ‘whenever such a disagreement was possible, the state of 
war of all against all was endemic and so a commonwealth not established.’77 The only 
solution to conflicting decisions by overlapping jurisdictions is to posit a single, 
indivisible, and supreme authority over all areas. For this reason, Hobbes insisted 
forcefully that the temporal sovereign was the supreme authority also in the spiritual 
(just as in every other) domain: for him, ‘the attempt to establish separate civil and 
ecclesiastical jurisdictions was to establish two states rather than one.’78 For the same 
reason, Hobbes and more generally the classical conception of authority would have 
regarded as deeply flawed the institution of three supreme independent authorities, one 
each for the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the state.79 
5.7.2 The Pluralism of (Specialised) Authorities in Differentiated 
Societies 
Indeed, as I have noted, the latter historical development, together with the one 
consisting in the eventual recognition that ecclesiastical and civil authorities had distinct 
spheres of action and so parallel jurisdictions, have been among the factors which led to 
the gradual abandonment of the widely held conviction concerning the necessity of a 
unique, supreme, and undivided authority for society to exist, be stable, or thrive. The 
ever increasing specialisation and technical differentiation of modern societies has 
suggested that social cooperation is the result not, simplistically, of a single top-down 
hierarchy of command but rather, as it will be suggested, of the interaction of a web of 
mutually dependent yet autonomous (specialised) authorities. 
This is perhaps best represented by one of the most significant developments in 
democratic practice in the Western world, namely the establishment by political 
governments of regulatory agencies with substantial policy-making power over 
specialised issues, which are largely autonomous and independent from the central 
government itself.80 The interesting point in this development is that the political 
authority has delegated substantive policy-making powers to expert agencies which are 
independent from it. Vital domains of social life are supervised in important respects by 
specialised authorities largely autonomous and independent from the central political 
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authority. In the regulatory state, the latter still governs and makes substantive policy, 
but does so by cooperating in different ways with independent and autonomous 
regulatory agencies. Independent regulatory agencies ‘are at the core of the rise of 
regulation as a key tool for policy makers, and they constitute a new form of market 
governance’.81 From the viewpoint of economics, that has been defined as a shift from a 
centralised state as a direct economic actor deeply involved in the production of goods 
and services to a decentralisation of those activities to private enterprise, with the 
central political authority only retaining regulatory power of the markets. But from the 
viewpoint of political philosophy, the above can be interpreted as a shift from the 
classic conception of authority as one, indivisible, and omnicompetent, to one where the 
political authority is but one of a differentiated community’s many mutually dependent 
yet autonomous specialised authorities, whose chief distinctive function is to coordinate 
and regulate the others according to the scale of values and priorities of the (majority of) 
the community. 
5.8 The Relationship between Specialised Authorities and the Political 
Authority 
Three are the fundamental affirmations which have been made: (1) delegation is only 
responsible because the delegate is deemed to possess relevant knowledge which those 
delegating need; (2) in contemporary differentiated and complex societies specialised 
knowledge is ordinarily always needed in policy-making in order to responsibly discern 
courses of common action; finally, (3) such specialised knowledge is scattered in 
contemporary societies. 
Those three points highlight a central issue of political philosophy, namely, 
whether and on what conditions it would be responsible to establish a central political 
authority above the specialised authorities. And if such a higher political government is 
indeed desirable, the further question arises as to what its role would be: an extended 
one of policy-making over all areas of common action, or a more limited coordinative 
one? If the former, a final problem should then be addressed. For political 
representatives generally lack deep specific expertise. Yet this is ‘a time when virtually 
every governmental action demands extensive expert inputs’.82 How can the condition 
that relevant competence be required of those with decisional power be fulfilled in case 
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of the political authorities? How, in other words, can the latter make use of the 
community’s relevant yet scattered specialised knowledge when making political 
decisions? 
In his book Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electoral Politics,83 John 
Burnheim offered a nuanced argument against the desirability of a central political 
authority. He contended that, due to the complexity of matters of public and common 
concern in today’s highly differentiated societies, people and their political 
representatives alike ‘can[not] know enough to make rational decisions on the very 
large of issues that have to be faced’.84 That, he noted, bides strongly ‘against all 
centralization of decision-making power whether in an individual, a small group or a 
mass assembly’, and favours instead the establishment of ‘autonomous specialized 
agencies that are co-ordinated by negotiation among themselves or, if that fails, by 
quasi-judicial arbitration, rather than by direction from a controlling body’.85 As he 
insisted, ‘an appropriate form of decentralization would concentrate on functions, rather 
than localities. The organizations that supply various community needs should be 
independent of each other. Their geographical extent should vary according to the 
technical and social exigencies of their carrying out those functions’.86 Burnheim’s 
vision has been summarized as follows: 
Instead of a pyramid or a set of loosely-coordinated communities and 
enterprises, both of which would have to cover a wide range of functions, 
the functional decentralist advocates a variety of autonomous, specialized 
agencies, each performing one specific function, and coordinated by 
negotiation among themselves or by quasi-judicial arbitration. [...] 
Agencies would be constitutionally required to coordinate, cooperate, and 
negotiate on any policies that affect the interests represented by more than 
one agency. [...] Each agency, whether it deals with finance, real estate, 
fuel, consumer goods, education, health, or transport, would be staffed by 
people of attested competence whose expert advice would have to be 
taken into account by the lay trustees in the formulation of policy, and 
who would execute that policy.87 
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Higher bodies with a function of ‘setting up the various functional bodies, hearing 
appeals about their structure, restructuring them to meet changed circumstances, 
adjudicating their disagreements and dividing up resources between them’88 would still 
be needed. However, such coordinating authorities ‘would not be empowered to initiate 
policy, much less to dictate to various functional bodies, but to provide a legal 
framework within which productive bodies operate’.89 
What is most relevant in the foregoing analysis lies in the core insight 
undergirding it, namely, that civil society is essentially constituted by a web of 
interconnected but autonomous and independent specialised authorities. Each provides 
for some specific need or desire of the community, and can in theory cover all aspects 
of such enterprise: planning and deciding courses of action, gathering of the necessary 
resources, implementing and coordinating common action, and even codifying a 
preferred pattern of cooperation for future reference. As already Hughes had noted, each 
of the many specialised professional bodies in civil society naturally tends to ‘consider 
itself the proper body to set the terms in which some aspect of society, life or nature is 
to be thought of, and to define the general lines, or even the details, of public policy 
concerning it.’ 
Burnheim’s main insight to be retained, then, is that each of the many specific 
domains of common action should be governed by a specialised authority, established 
as such by being consensually recognized as possessing the relevant expertise. I would 
add that, as suggested by the earlier analysis of belief and delegation, the various 
specialised authorities present in any differentiated society cannot be hierarchically 
subject to each other, because each of them, by definition, does not have competence 
outside their specialised domain: each is, accordingly, supreme, autonomous and 
independent in its own limited area of competence. Burnheim’s second noteworthy 
conclusion is that a political authority should not have powers to ‘dictate’ policy in (as 
distinct from merely coordinating and adjudicating) specialised areas, because 
specialised authorities are autonomous and supreme with regard to what is—according 
to their judgment—within the reach of their specialised knowledge. 
However, Burnheim’s ideas need to be examined more carefully. That the central 
political authority be given an adjudicatory and judicial role is relatively 
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uncontroversial, for that would be limited to providing a judicial service whenever 
freely requested by the specialised authorities. Such a service could hardly be construed 
as evidence of the latter’s subordination to the political authority. However, the exact 
nature should be analysed in much more details of the powers of ‘coordination’ and 
regulation which the political authority would exercise over the specialised authorities. 
Specialised authorities can provide the political authority with the knowledge and 
research it needs to adequately fulfil its function of policy-making for guiding common 
action. The distinctive role of the political authority consists in pooling together the 
specialised authorities according to the function they fulfil with the goal of planning, 
evaluating, and deciding in favour of common courses of action. The resulting unity 
which the political authority brings about from a plurality of autonomous specialized 
authorities is, however, not hierarchical but functional—hence the name ‘functional 
coordination’—and has the system of delegation (its desires, priorities, needs, values, 
and goals) as its ultimate referent. In other words, and most significantly for present 
purposes, the functional coordination of specialised authorities by the political authority 
must occur—and the point is crucial—according to the delegants’ scales of values and 
priorities. For the delegations are made on the basis of the needs of the delegant(s), and 
the latter can accordingly decide to establish both a hierarchical ranking of priorities 
among the various delegated specialised authorities, and an authority coordinating the 
latter according to their own needs and scale of preferences. 
To clarify further: on the one hand, the coordinating, supervisory, and regulatory 
functions of the political authority with regard to the specialised authorities does not 
entail the authority to adjudicate between or criticise the latter’s purely technical results 
where no values are involved—which is arguably what Burnheim meant by debarring 
any political authority from ‘dictating’ policies in the specialised fields of expert 
authorities. That means that, according to subsidiarity, with regard to purely technical 
issues expert authorities should have complete independence to determine, according to 
their judgment, not only the limits of their field of competence and their research 
methods—the two things are interrelated, because the field of any science or discipline 
tends to be coextensive with every area to which the same method has been successfully 
applied90—but also what to inquire. 
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Granted that the role of political authority is not that of micromanaging a 
community’s specialised authorities but rather that of supporting them and garnering 
their expertise when relevant for the task of discerning courses of common action, there 
still remains the problem of avoiding the two opposite dangers of, on one extreme, 
technocracy, and on the other, commonsense incompetence. For political representatives 
generally lack deep specific expertise. Yet this is ‘a time when virtually every 
governmental action demands extensive expert inputs’.91 How can the condition that 
relevant competence be required of those with decisional power be fulfilled in case of 
the political authorities? How, in other words, can the latter make use of the 
community’s relevant yet scattered specialised knowledge when making political 
decisions? Given the thorough specialisation of knowledge in contemporary societies, 
and the unavoidable need for technical expertise in order to address the complex issues 
constantly facing them, the conditions must be investigated that can effectively avoid 
the danger of an untrammelled rule of experts whilst, on the other hand, utilising their 
specialised knowledge in making political decisions. 
The first clue to the solution of the alternative between technocracy and 
government by an incompetent majority can be found in remarks on representation by 
Nadia Urbinati: 
When I go to vote, I really do two things: I select somebody to sit in the 
assembly but I also want somebody who is close to my ideas or represents 
them as much as possible. I don’t choose a competent bureaucrat or an 
expert, because the job of the lawmaker is not like that of a bureaucrat or 
a magistrate (who are not supposed to express their ideas when do their 
job or even act according to their own ideas). [Political 
representativeness] is a sort of vicinity in ideas and ideology between the 
candidates (and then elected) and the electors.92 
Political representatives are not a body of polymaths, and even if they were, no 
such limited body could carry out the amount of research and analysis needed to discern 
and implement sound public policies. As noted above, the purpose of political authority 
is not that of being an omnicompetent authority micro-managing and carrying out the 
tasks distinctive of a community’s specialized structures of knowledge and evaluation. 
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Rather, it is primarily that of making decisions that determine the general direction of 
common action. 
Such decisions are primarily in the future and thus are necessarily based on 
findings, judgments, and evaluations that cannot be made at election time. For this 
reason—and the point is crucial—political delegation is based not primarily on 
technical competence, but on the scale of values of the delegants: 
The group allowed to perform a medical consultation is selected, for the 
most part, on the basis of specific competence in medicine, but in a direct 
political democracy those who participate in voting are not chosen for 
their specific competence, but for their involvement in the action of the 
group. In a representative democracy they are chosen for their fitness to 
represent the interests and values of those who will be involved in the 
group’s action.93 
And, of course, ‘being involved in some project or being ideologically allied to 
someone who is involved is not the same as being competent in all the technical, 
economic, and moral problems connected with that project.’94 
One solution to the problem of requiring the exploitation of the relevant expertise 
by the political authorities has been to advocate a division of labour whereby ‘citizens 
ought to choose the overall aims of society while legislators and administrators ought to 
be concerned with figuring out how to pursue those aims.’95 This would only be 
possible, however, if ‘the means and strategies [were] separable from the aims’96—
which is far from being always the case: ‘If aims and means are not developed in 
conjunction with each other, the aims are likely to be either utopian or mundane, and the 
means counterproductive.’97 The alternative solution is to stress the importance that 
political delegation focus on the delegants’ scales of values, for the latter are the only 
criteria for determining the general priorities and orientation of future choices, 
necessarily based on data, factual judgments, and evaluations not available at the 
moment of the delegation. So the position here is similar to Christiano’s own, yet with 
the significant difference that what citizens determine are not simply the ends but, more 
                                                 
93
 Giuseppe Badini Confalonieri, ‘Democracy’, 265. 
94
 Ibid. 
95
 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits (Oxford: 
OUP, 2008), p. 146 no. 14. ‘This’, he added, ‘is the only way to reconcile the ideals of democracy with 
the need for a division of labor in a modern democratic state.’ Ibid. His lengthier argument can be found 
in Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democractic Theory (Oxford: Westview, 
1996), 169–178. 
96
 Christiano, Rule of the Many, 175. 
97
 Mark B. Brown, Science in Democracy. Expertise, Institutions and Representation (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT, 2009), 86. 
  178 
fundamentally, the scale of values that determines both which ends will be chosen and 
their relative priority. For their part, political representatives determine, in light of both 
the delegants’ scale of values and of the relevant (often specialised) knowledge 
available in the community, the means and strategies to achieve them. This last point is 
fundamental: political representatives have a moral obligation, like everybody else, to 
defer to the specialized authorities relevant for dealing with a given issue. Thus, only 
after having properly taken into account the analyses and reports the specialized 
authorities provide can the representatives evaluate what the alternative courses of 
actions are and choose the one in accordance with the technical indications offered and 
most consonant with the values shared by the (majority of the) delegating community. 
The moral duty of seeking advice when in doubt is an important principle of 
Christian moral theology.98 However, inasmuch as—unlike everybody else—if the 
political authority disallows that moral precept, it is the whole community which will 
suffer from misguided policies, the fulfilment of that moral duty should not be left to 
their conscience alone but should also, ordinarily, be warranted legally. Accordingly a 
first, general solution to the requirement that relevant specialised competence be 
exploited by the political authority during the agenda-setting99 and policy-making 
process can be found in the institutionalization of binding forms of collaboration (either 
by consultation or by delegation) of political representatives with the community’s 
specialised structures of knowledge and evaluation—universities, think tanks, and so 
on. 
In a representative form of government, legal institutionalization must mean that 
the fact of taking into account specialized knowledge is to be understood as a duty—
legally binding if needs be—of the political representatives: whilst it does not belong to 
such specialised bodies to make the ultimate choice, attending to their responses should 
be a non-negotiable step towards an informed decision. The representatives will then 
have the task of evaluating the possibility of acting in accordance with the technical 
indications offered if consonant with the political principles they represent. For 
example, in order to know whether or not it is socially, economically, and 
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environmentally convenient to build a highway instead of a fast train line, I need first to 
consult the appropriate technical bodies which will be able to analyse the social, 
monetary, and environmental costs. Only then I will be able to choose among different 
alternatives the one I deem to be most in agreement with my values and goals. 
Differently put, the delegation to non-specialist political representatives of decisions 
requiring specialised knowledge is only responsible if the representatives’ moral 
obligation to consult and to treat with due seriousness specialist analyses is 
institutionalised and made legally binding. It will then be the representatives’ distinctive 
duty to consider such technical reports within the broader framework of their values and 
interests (which should reflect those of the community which delegated them), when 
attempting to judge what the best course of action should be. 
Finally, some prudential solutions to the ever-present problem of making 
transparent and democratic the assessment of the expert knowledge necessary to the 
policy-making process, so as to minimize the danger that the latter be steered by 
politicised experts, have already been advanced when examining delegation to expert 
authority (5.6). They can include publicly selected official standards for the recognition 
of expertise, peer-review procedures, and, to the extent possible, the translation of the 
specialised problems and findings relevant to policy making so as to make them 
available for free and public discussion. 
In summary, in addition to the general limitation required by subsidiarity, highly 
specialised and differentiated societies where no one can be omnicompetent require 
further limiting conditions for delegation to be responsible. Either (1) the representative 
is given a specific mandate in virtue of her specialised competence; or when, (2) within 
a generic mandate—as in the case of political representatives—the one delegating is 
reasonably sure the representative will use criteria for factual and value judgments 
similar to those she would have used. In the case of political representation the delegate 
is given a mandate not to supersede but rather to (pre)serve the specialised authorities, 
each of which is autonomous and independent in its own limited field, even while 
coordinating and regulating them according to the scale of values of the (majority of) 
the community. The extent of this service must, again according to subsidiarity, be 
decided by those who will delegate authority to it: it will result in either more or less 
power of coordination, policy-making, adjudication, and resource allocation. In other 
words, it is fundamental that such a greater or lesser centralization be freely and 
responsibly chosen from below upwards, from the individual to each successive higher 
decision-making level. 
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A final note regards the notion of accountability intrinsic to the analysis of 
authority made so far. Inasmuch as delegation—as the institutional embodiment of 
belief—is what constitutes authority as subsidiary coordination of the common action of 
a community, violation of the terms fixed by the ones delegating is an abuse of 
authority and thus it is that against which the notion of accountability must be assessed: 
The act of delegation is what distinguishes authority from raw power. 
Nobody can claim authority over another on the basis of personal 
privilege, wealth, hereditary right, or superior force. Those in power hold 
offices with specified duties so that power is not personal but, instead, is 
associated with the authority of office. The central principle of 
accountability […] is that people with power ought to be accountable to 
those who have entrusted them with it. And the standard for recognizing 
abuses of power will be violations of that trust: acting beyond the 
authority of the office or in violation of its purposes.100 
From the perspective of delegation, then, 
power is legitimate only when it is authorized by the legitimating consent 
of those who delegate it. And since power is always delegated for a 
reason, it is legitimate only so long as it serves its original purposes…101 
This confirms what has been said previously, namely, that all characteristics of 
delegated authority—i.e. its area of competence, scope, length, and so on—should be 
determined by the delegating individuals (as already noted in the discussion of 
subsidiarity, 5.4 above) and thus with the latter’s consent. 
5.9 Unanimity and Majority 
It has been previously said (5.2.2) that the smaller the number of the experiences, 
insights, judgments of fact, values and goals which are actually shared in a society, the 
more people will work at cross purposes, cooperation will be improbable, and social 
cohesion will deteriorate.102 As Lonergan put it, ‘society does not survive without a 
large measure of community’, understood precisely as a group sharing meanings, 
values, and goals.103 Nor does the pluralism of present-day Western societies invalidate 
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that point: for even such pluralism does not ordinarily exclude, but rather stems from, 
an agreement on a nucleus of common values (without which, properly speaking, there 
would be no ‘community’ whatsoever).104 
Unanimity is also the pre-condition for common action to occur (5.3). Indeed, ‘the 
need for authority is, precisely, to substitute for unanimity in determining the solution of 
practical co-ordination problems which involve or concern everyone in the 
community’.105 It is of course because of the perceived importance of unanimity that 
many contractarians actually construed their hypothetical social compact—through 
which a people would bestow political authority to their ruler(s)—as a unanimous 
decision.106 
Because, then, of the inevitable pluralism within any community or society, 
solutions have been devised since the earliest times to allow a community to act also 
when unanimity is lacking. All those solutions require the delegation of choice: to a 
single ruler, to the majority of the original group, or to the smaller majority of a group 
of delegates/representatives (see 5.3 above). Hence, as Rousseau put it: ‘The law of 
majority voting is itself something established by convention, and presupposes 
unanimity, on one occasion at least.’107 Notably, agreement on a political decision-
making procedure in case of disagreement is the only point where unanimity is required. 
This suggests that it is misleading to picture the majority as acting completely 
without any consent of the minority: in fact, a previous consent of the minority is 
present in that everybody, before knowing whether they will be in the majority or in the 
minority, have agreed to delegate to the majority the decisional power because they 
understood that to have someone decide—perhaps even a majority of which they are not 
a part—would be better than not to decide at all. To accept the principle of deliberation 
by majority, then, is to accept in advance what will be decided by the majority on a 
given issue. This prior acceptance is, structurally, a form of delegation. 
Majority rule enjoys a status as the default decision-making procedure in many 
cultures from the most ancient times.108 If that may empirically suggest its 
reasonableness, still two main theoretical objections have been advanced against 
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majority rule. The first, widespread particularly in RC circles, is that such a procedure is 
not functional to the search for the truth, and that it is indeed in constant danger of being 
construed as an alternative to finding the truth. Majority then becomes what determines 
truth not in the positive sense of being instrumental, within a larger deliberative system, 
to searching and discerning it, but in the negative one of legitimating as true whatever 
the majority decides in a procedurally correct manner, even when objectively wrong. 
The second objection is likewise often voiced by members of the RC hierarchy, is also 
significant among political philosophers, stressing the danger of the dictatorship of the 
majority trumping the minority’s conscience. 
If it were true that democracy in general and majority rule in particular have no 
procedural link with the discovery of what is true and what is good, it would be lethal 
for both. Hence the need for examining it. 
5.10 The Danger of the Dictatorship of the Majority, or How to Safeguard 
the Minority’s Freedom of Conscience? 
‘In matters of faith and morals, no one can be bound by majority decisions. [...] To bind 
conscience by majority decision is impossible, both anthropologically and 
theologically.’109 Thus then Cardinal Ratzinger, who also explicitly acknowledged that 
argument as the only theoretical rationale behind the current Vatican legislation denying 
any decision-making authority in either doctrinal or disciplinary matter to all episcopal 
conferences and synods—bodies which, in effect, operate by majority-voting.110 
Delegating the decision to the majority seems then to raise a most important objection: 
how can one responsibly agree to accept the majority’s choice in the eventuality of 
being in the minority, if such choice runs counter to one’s wishes, perspectives, or 
principles? 
There are moral limits to cooperating in actions one deems misguided and/or 
immoral—moral limits which, of course, are fixed by the delegant. Specifically, 
delegation to the majority always includes the tacit assumption that the majority must 
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never make the individual do something she considers immoral.111 Subsidiarity sets 
binding limits on the majority so that it cannot make decisions contrasting with the 
minority’s indefeasible beliefs and rights without allowing for the possibility of 
reasonable conscientious objection for dissenters. 
The fundamental point here is the distinction between permitting/tolerating, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, collaborating. When it is impossible to obtain a better 
result, it is morally acceptable to permit something that one considers an evil (the 
principle of the lesser evil). Yet nobody can responsibly agree to participate in a 
decisional process with the expectation that she will have to act against her conscience, 
even if only in collaboration with others. Delegation to the majority—as any other 
delegation—is only justifiable with the proviso that it may never go against one’s most 
strongly held, absolutely non-negotiable principles and values: for that would of course 
be judged by the delegants as a much greater evil than the breakdown of cooperation. In 
such an eventuality, if the possibility of reasonable conscientious objection in those 
areas is not provided for, the delegation would be immoral, and the danger will thus 
increase of rebellion or even schism by the minority, if requests of legitimate autonomy 
and self-determination in those areas are not granted.112 Hence the possibility of 
conscientious objection is implicit in any responsible delegation of a decision. 
Conscientious objection and, more generally, all choices in favour of the breakdown of 
cooperation in a greater or lesser area of one’s political life are radical measures 
ordinarily resorted to by the individual only when s/he deems that some of his/her non-
negotiable values are at stake, whose abandonment is judged a greater evil than that 
resulting from the breakdown of cooperation. As touched on above, that also occurred 
repeatedly within the Christian church, most notably during the Reformation. 
It is noteworthy that, with the above provisos, delegation to the majority can be a 
responsible choice with regard to all kinds of decisions, both those establishing concrete 
courses of common actions and those establishing orthodox beliefs (facts) and values, 
whether in philosophical or theological matters. It is not only the Christian church (and 
most other religious communities) which has deliberated on matters of orthodox 
(theological) beliefs by majority voting, e.g. in ecclesiastical councils and synods: the 
legislation of every political society is replete with factual as well as value judgments 
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considered normative and binding, whose infringement may constitute a punishable 
offense. So much so, that political representation, as noted, focuses precisely on finding 
a representative whose beliefs and scale of values are closest to those the delegant 
deems orthodox. Moreover, in both the church and the state, policies concerning the 
common life embody judgments of fact and of value. Accordingly, in both institutions 
there is the danger that (majority) decisions authorizing a common policy, as well as 
those endorsing certain beliefs, run contrary to one’s deeply held ideas concerning 
matters of fact and/or of value. It is therefore mistaken to suggest that the reason why 
majority rule can only apply to civil society but not to the church is that in the latter it is 
a question of factual or moral judgments (embodied in officially formulated doctrines), 
viz. the kind about which conscience should be left free and not be compelled to 
believe, for the same is true in civil society as well. Economic, social, and cultural 
policies are always the expression of factual and moral assumptions and so might run 
counter the conscience of the individual citizen just as theological or moral directives 
can run counter the conscience of the individual Christian. For the same reason, the 
statement that majority decisions about faith and morals cannot bind conscience is both 
a truism—freedom of conscience means precisely that—and misleading, to the extent 
that church councils throughout history have indeed made foundational doctrinal 
decisions by majority and, while their enforcement often enough did not respect 
freedom of conscience, still sometimes it did, and the minority could either come to 
receive them or, if agreement continued to be regarded as impossible and the matter was 
serious enough, opt for a ‘schism’ and decide to become autonomous. It follows that the 
above solution to the question whether it can ever be responsible to delegate the choice 
to the majority will apply equally to the church and civil society. 
5.11 Majority and Relativism 
A common opinion among political philosophers suggests that democracy in general 
and majority rule in particular is intrinsically linked to relativism, inasmuch as it affirms 
the impossibility of attaining objective cognitive and moral knowledge.113 This is why it 
settles for simply envisaging (the outcomes of) a certain ideal procedure (e.g. majority 
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rule) as objectively (if contradictorily) better than others in some ways, and, most 
significantly for present purposes, as the best substitute for an unverifiable epistemic 
and moral correctness (see discussion in section 5.12 below on ‘Legitimation and 
Legitimacy’). 
Such an understanding of majority rule as having no apparent link with the search 
for truth in politics has been accepted in several official pronouncements of the RC 
episcopal magisterium.114 On the one hand, the tendency is condemned to regard the 
wish of the majority as always binding and true, in a manner resonating with Richard 
Rorty’s tribal view of truth as localized consensus or ‘that which is deemed good in 
these parts’.115 On the other, there is a parallel insistence that ‘truth cannot be created by 
the majority; it can only be found’.116 Indeed, democracy or majority rule in the church 
would be an alternative to fidelity to the Truth.117 
Such a position has been pinpointed as one of the central ecclesiological 
misunderstandings.118 In effect, the mere fact that the majority can err is not a sufficient 
reason to give a positive answer. Christian theology does regard human reason (as well 
as human conscience) as fallible, and indeed as often mistaken, but it does not conclude 
from this to denying reason an intrinsic bond with the truth, and conscience an inner 
bond with the good. In a similar way, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
recently reaffirmed that even reason especially helped by the Spirit—as in the case of 
the Magisterium in its ordinary, prudential and ‘non-definitive’ pronouncements—can 
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sometimes be mistaken, whilst immediately adding that it does not follow thereby that 
such an official teaching authority has no intrinsic bond with truth.119 
The responsible character of the choice to delegate to the majority is already 
suggested by its extraordinary historical and trans-cultural diffusion. Far from being 
dictated by relativism, such choice is ordinarily justified because of one of the following 
circumstances. The first is simply a situation of doubt as to the best course of action 
among those proposed. In such a case of ‘doubtful conscience’, the choice to delegate to 
the majority is the result of a judgment that, on the presumption of a roughly equal 
competence of those going to deliberate, the more numerous the deliberating heads, the 
greater the probabilities for a more attentive, intelligent, correct, responsible 
deliberation. The decision of the majority is therefore in principle preferable to that of 
the minority, granted, of course, a statistical equivalence among the competence of the 
voters. In such case, to opt for majority voting is not relativism, but a prudential 
principle of choice by a doubtful conscience in a situation where a decision cannot be 
postponed anymore. 
The second circumstance which makes delegation to the majority both reasonable 
and responsible is when, among the courses of action envisaged, some are in fact 
deemed objectively better than others, and yet all of them are considered acceptable, if 
to different degrees. In such a situation, the worst scenario would be when one or more 
of the courses of action envisaged are deemed to a certain degree immoral, but tolerable 
(as opposed to intolerable or completely unacceptable). Even in this case, however, 
delegation to the majority could still be justified by means of the principle of the lesser 
(or, more accurately, least) evil.120 Such delegation would responsibly follow a concrete 
judgment that, despite all, common action would produce a lesser evil than what would 
ensue from inaction. In such a case, the minority is not forced to regard the majority’s 
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resolutions as true or good: indeed it will continue to regard them as mistaken or 
immoral, but will nevertheless tolerate them for the sake of continuing cooperation, 
granted the limits and conditions to the action of the majority outlined above. In such a 
situation such a justification of the delegation to the majority is based on the above 
mentioned distinction between permitting/tolerating, and, on the other hand, 
collaborating: when it is impossible to obtain a better result, it can be ‘lawful to tolerate 
a lesser evil [which one considers acceptable] in order to avoid a greater evil’.121 
(‘Acceptable’ here means that the evil in question is not considered to be such 
‘intrinsically’, i.e. ‘regardless of the circumstances and independently of the 
consequences’122). 
All the above, of course, only applies to a responsible delegation to the majority, 
viz. one in which the previously mentioned conditions are realized: necessity to decide; 
relevant and roughly equal competence of the voters of the group to whose majority 
decision-making authority will be delegated; the right to conscientious objection on 
matters which impinge on the absolute principles of the delegants, as mandated by 
subsidiarity. 
To sum up, one can answer to the objections against majority rule by saying: 
firstly, that democratic rules aim to ensure that majority rule is a prudential and thus 
responsible procedure functional to the pursuit of the best choice available; secondly 
that, in a democratic system, the conditions for delegation to be responsible, and 
specifically the principle of subsidiarity, do not permit majority decisions to become 
majority dictatorship. If the above analysis is correct, it proves mistaken the two 
remaining RC magisterial arguments—after an anti-historical interpretation of divine-
right ecclesial structure and the appeal to the church being a mystery have been 
discarded as lacking any positive scriptural or traditional foundation—justifying the 
rejection of majority rule (and, by extension, democracy123) in the church: namely, that 
such procedure has no link with the discovery of what is true and what is good, and 
worse, that it is potentially totalitarian in the sense of contrary to freedom of conscience. 
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5.12 Legitimation and Legitimacy of Authority 
As noted, it is the community, as the living depositary of a common tradition of 
meanings and values, which is the carrier of power; and it is always the community’s 
consent which is the origin of authority, both of the authority of tradition, by 
consensually receiving the common fund of meanings and values, and of the authority 
of institutional authorities, through delegating decision-making power to certain 
individuals and/or groups (i.e. the authorities) in order to maximise the exploitation of 
that traditional fund of meanings and values. 
Now, there might at times be a contradiction and even conflict between some of 
the meanings and values embedded in, respectively, the tradition, official authorities, 
and the current existing consent of the members of a community. For, although 
tradition, official authorities, and the current existing consent only have authority 
because they have been and are accepted by the community’s members, still that does 
not exclude that, in periods of cultural development, some of the meanings and values 
embedded in tradition (customs and norms) or in institutions (all societal structures, 
from the family upward, as well as laws and the legal system) do not anymore resonate 
with the latter’s shifting cultural outlook, and may therefore be abandoned and even 
rejected. Alternatively stated, changing situations require fresh and often creatively 
original answers at the societal as well as cultural levels. Cultural development may 
prompt and even require the revision of traditional understandings of some institutions 
(from the family up to the state). 
It should be noted that the problem of the three potentially conflicting loci of 
authority in the community is the same underlying the issue of reconciling popular 
sovereignty with a fundamental set of constitutional laws and/or human rights. The 
problem arises because the framework provided by the latter provides values and norms 
which—however enabling of the democratic process—functions as constraints for the 
exercise of the former.124 Again, it has also been articulated as the problem of 
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reconciling ‘procedural’ democracy with a ‘substantive’ set of basic rights.125 Finally, as 
noted earlier (5.7.1), the problem has also been construed as the one of determining 
whether ultimate authority belongs to a supreme monarch or a set of constitutional laws. 
The already mentioned answer to this last point applies to the more general 
problem underlying the other dilemmas as well: namely, ultimate political authority in a 
community should not be identified simply with the established political pattern—and 
so with whatever it recognizes as a supreme authority be that a sovereign monarch, a 
prime minister, a set of constitutional laws, a set of universal rights, and so on—but 
rather should be understood as based on the evolving, historically shifting consent of its 
members. 
It is true, however, that the potential inconsistency or even conflict between a 
community’s tradition, institutional authorities, and the current existing consent of its 
members requires the possibility of evaluating the epistemic and moral soundness (or 
‘authenticity’) of their factual and value judgments, and therefore presupposes a 
cognitional and moral theory.126 Authenticity just as inauthenticity are present on many 
levels (individual, social, cultural) of the community: (i) in (the beliefs constituting) the 
tradition or common fund of knowledge which, precisely through the procedure above 
labelled as belief, is formally constitutive of the community as a group sharing common 
meanings, (ii) in the community’s (institutionalised) authorities (i.e. the people to whom 
political power has been delegated), and (iii) in the individuals themselves that are 
subject to the authorities and shaped by their tradition. 
Hence the need for the crucial distinction between the authenticity (i.e. cognitive 
and moral correctness) that gives authority its legitimacy, and the assertion or 
acknowledgment of such legitimacy, that is, the legitimation of authority. Authority—
whether of a community’s received traditional norms; socially accepted practices; or 
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creative legislative process—is legitimate (as distinct from legitimated) only if it is 
‘authentic’: namely, if it embodies objectively correct factual and value judgments. 
Legitimation is necessary for the institutionalisation of the relationship of authority: ‘If 
there are to be authorities, then over and above their authenticity there is needed some 
external criterion by which their position can be publicly recognized.’127 Such external 
criteria—which constitute institutional legitimation—are, in today’s Western societies, 
those norms and laws, constitutional or otherwise, which regulate the delegation of 
power and authority (e.g. its scope, duration, and mechanisms of accountability). 
The problem arises, however, that inasmuch as inauthenticity is pervasive at the 
individual, social, political (procedural) and cultural levels, there is no necessary link 
between the legitimation of authority and its legitimacy. Just as the implementation of a 
decisional procedure correctly embodying the normative epistemic and moral 
requirements of human intelligent understanding and responsible deciding is a 
guarantee not of infallibility, but simply of the fact that everything has been done to 
search for the correct solution, so analogously an authority legitimated in accordance 
with a society’s well-devised legitimation procedures is not thereby automatically a 
legitimate (i.e. authentic) authority: institutional procedures may be in place facilitating 
the fulfilment of the cognitive and moral requirements in the selection of authorities, but 
they may be (mis)used by biased people and result in a biased outcome. Thus, a 
society’s external criteria for legitimation are a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the legitimacy of authority. The sufficient condition, Lonergan noted, must be 
authenticity: legitimation, on the other hand, albeit ideally coupled with authenticity, 
need not be accompanied by it.128 
Legitimation will tend to approximate—whilst of course never being able to 
absolutely guarantee—legitimacy the more the institutional procedures it makes use of 
are in agreement with, and efficaciously implement, the intentional procedure for 
intelligent coming to know and responsible decision-making. Thus, a (democratic) 
procedure of legitimation which puts the structures in place for maximising the critical 
exploitation of the community’s fund of cognitive knowledge and moral wisdom will be 
more likely to select and legitimatise authentic leaders than a procedure which does not 
make use of such wisdom and is therefore more likely to choose biased and thus 
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inauthentic authorities. It is also, as noted, the requirement for (the consent to) 
delegation to be responsible. 
Of course, it remains true, as noted, that a community of largely biased people 
informed by a largely inauthentic culture will most likely choose for itself inauthentic 
authorities even were they to use sound (democratic) procedures for institutional 
legitimation. As it has been observed: 
Decisions are made by people. Good people may arrive at good decisions 
in spite of poor institutionalized procedures, when they are not wholly 
constrained by those procedures. Conversely, the best procedures in the 
world can be misused by people who are determined to do so. But the 
more complex the society and the longer our time-span the less likely it is 
that these divergences from the norm will be significant. This is not just a 
matter of probabilities sorting themselves out in the long term. Procedures 
have a constraining effect on what is registered and what is made of it, 
and the constraints tend to grow tighter the more deeply entrenched the 
procedures become.129 
What an intelligent and responsible democratic institutional procedure for 
legitimation does, it must be reiterated, is not to guarantee always perfect results, but 
simply to heighten the probability of them occurring by maximising the critical 
exploitation of the community’s common fund of knowledge (and thus its exercise of 
intelligence) and values (and thus its exercise of responsibility), where cognitive and 
moral biases are most easily detected through processes of free and public discussion. 
5.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to offer an initial examination of the socio-political 
categories most relevant to ecclesiology. The two main relationships of any 
collaborative enterprise, and thus also of any political community, are primarily 
(horizontal) cooperation and, in order to maximise its efficiency, subordination. 
Delegation has been seen as the intelligent and responsible decision which enables both 
horizontal cooperation through the delegation of non-specialised tasks (viz. 
complementarity, and division of labour), and vertical cooperation through the 
delegation of decisions and actions which cannot be taken at the local level but require 
the greater resources of a higher level within the community (viz. subsidiarity and 
authority). 
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A further interesting result following from this has been that of clarifying the 
normative conditions for any delegation to be responsible and not, on the contrary, a 
desertion of responsibility. A first general limiting condition is the one envisaged by 
subsidiarity, namely, that the delegate can only decide within the limits set by those 
delegating, and in any case can never make decisions which lie within the decisional 
and operational range of lower levels and/or of the individuals. It was further argued 
that other limiting conditions must obtain for a delegation to be responsible in highly 
specialised and differentiated societies where no one can be omnicompetent. Either (1) 
the representative is given a specific mandate in virtue of specialised competence; or 
when, (2) within a generic mandate, (i) the one delegating is reasonably sure the 
representative will use criteria for factual and value judgments similar to those she 
would have used; (ii) the delegate is only given a coordinative and supervisory role, viz. 
one which does not involve micro-managing a community’s specialised authorities by 
dictating their policies, but rather is limited to a regulatory activity, which may include 
overseeing the selection as well as performance of all a community’s authorities—
whether experts or bureaucrats—and assessing (and when necessary limit it) against 
standards in agreement with the scale of values of (the majority of) the community; and 
(iii) the delegate is made legally bound to act in accordance with the technical reports 
worked out by the relevant specialised person(s) or commission(s), which have in turn 
been democratically assessed, selected and delegated to deal with issues in their field of 
competence. Finally, majority rule is also a responsible kind of delegation and a 
prudential means for the discernment of the true and the good. 
Those are normative requirements. Any political organizational pattern should 
therefore abide by and embody them. To the extent that it does, it can properly be called 
a democracy. To the extent that it does not, it is something less than a democracy. But it 
is important not to remain fixated on words. This understanding of democracy differs 
somewhat from most if not all the contemporary ones. It might well be called 
differently: ‘polyarchy’,130 ‘demarchy’,131 ‘κοινωνία’, ‘διακονία’, ‘authority-as-service’, 
or what have you. The crucial point is that, however one labels it, any political 
organizational pattern is a responsible and thus moral one to the extent that it is 
structured around such normative elements of social ethics (from respecting the 
inalienable operational range of lower levels to fostering informed and responsible 
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delegation and delimitation of the competences of authority by the delegants); 
conversely, it is an immoral one to the extent that it does not. 
The result is an understanding of democracy as defined by its capacity for 
enabling the rationality and responsibility of the delegation to authority, rather than 
exclusively or even primarily on the number of people to whom ultimate decisional 
power has been freely, intelligently, and responsibly delegated.132 Put differently, in 
order to establish whether or not a regime governed by an individual alone is 
democratic, one must inquire about whether the conditions of the initial choice as well 
as the permanence (accountability) of the authorities can be responsibly accepted. 
From this perspective, free and public discussion is a necessary feature for the 
very continuation of any community, if not for its establishment (fuller treatment at 
6.7). It is, in effect, the only means whereby the common fund of experiences, insights, 
judgments of fact, and values is exploited. Besides bringing to the surface all the 
available knowledge and wisdom of the community, it also filters biased counter-
positions, so that it is necessary for an informed assessment and selection of potential 
authorities and thus for a responsible delegation. The same rationale is behind allowing 
the (s)election—direct or representative—of officials by all those concerned. 
This, it has been noted, is far from conceding a facile optimism whereby 
democracy and/or majority rule would be the infallible panacea for arriving at 
objectively correct decisions. It does affirm, however, that the authentic legitimacy (i.e. 
objective cognitional and moral correctness) of decisions concerning both the selection 
of authorities and common policies is more easily approximated by an institutional 
legitimation through a political arrangement which would put the structures in place for 
respecting the conditions of responsible delegation and enabling free and public 
discussion. 
In light of the analysis advanced in this chapter, it follows that the true meaning 
and value of ‘democracy’ is that it is the method for, on the one hand, making 
responsible the collaboration of the individual with others whilst preserving her full 
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freedom to act within her decisional and operational range and, on the other, 
maximising the intelligence and responsibility brought to bear in planning the common 
action of the group. 
Finally, as it has been argued in the previous chapters, those insights from 
political philosophy and moral theory—themselves devised and assessed against a view 
(Lonergan’s) of human intentional coming to know and deciding—should be taken as 
normative within the Christian community as well. If one’s view of human being’s 
cognitive and moral capacities can be quite influential on one’s ecclesiology—as is 
most evident in the different ecclesiologies stemming from Augustinian and Thomist 
anthropologies respectively—it should not come as a surprise that one’s (often implicit) 
view of human intentionality, as to how human beings come to know, decide and act, 
can be equally momentous. Just as the categories exploited by traditional systematic 
theology for the metaphysical and ethical study of the individual were built on the 
analogy of the supernatural dimension with the natural one, so too, likewise, the 
systematic categories of ecclesiology should be grounded on an analogy with those of 
socio-political studies. This is because the operative moral norms governing individual 
as well as public ethics and choices are universal, viz. do not vary for the Christian and 
the non-Christian. 
Accordingly, the next chapter will offer, in light of what has been said so far, 
some critical reflections on the political organization of the Christian community, 
focusing in particular on some ecclesiological issues within Roman Catholicism. 
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6 A DEMOCRATIC ECCLESIOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction 
‘Within the church [...] power—if by power we intend the ultimate responsibility [...] of 
bishops vis-à-vis the life of the church—is not divisible’. ‘[T]he bishop, being the 
foundation of the unity of his church, cannot delegate such responsibility of his to 
anybody, not even to a majority’. Indeed, the common judgment within a particular 
church ‘is not measurable with mathematical criteria of majority. Rather, common 
judgment is not established as such until authority has spoken its last word’.1 In what is 
arguably a direct deduction from such axioms, the late Pope John Paul II consistently 
reiterated that 
Dissent, in the form of carefully orchestrated protests and polemics 
carried on in the media, is opposed to ecclesial communion and to a 
correct understanding of the hierarchical constitution of the People of 
God. Opposition to the teaching of the Church’s Pastors cannot be seen as 
a legitimate expression either of Christian freedom or of the diversity of 
the Spirit’s gifts. When this happens, the Church’s Pastors have the duty 
to act in conformity with their apostolic mission, insisting that the right of 
the faithful to receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity must 
always be respected.2 
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 All three extracts are from Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, ‘Chiesa e democrazia: analogie e differenze’, 
(4th December 2008), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/card-
bertone/2008/documents/rc_seg-st_20081204_lectio-magistralis_it.html, my translations. Cardinal 
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magistrales at the faculties of canon law and theology of Venice, Italy and, Wroclaw, Poland in 2008 and 
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 ‘Veritatis splendor. Encyclical Letter on the Church’s Moral Teaching’, (6th August 1993) §113 
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http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-
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Vocation of the Theologian’ (24th May 1990), §§21-41, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_theolo
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even only against its own non-irreformable teachings, see esp. ibid., §§30-1. One of the most famous 
implementation of that stance occurred with the condemnation by the CDF of distinguished moral 
theologian Charles Curran: one of the primary motivations for that sentence was precisely his public 
dissent towards some magisterial teachings on ethical matters, see Charles Curran, Loyal Dissent: Memoir 
of a Catholic Theologian (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 2006), 107, 124. Moreover, the new 
1983 CIC introduced a completely new canon, can. 1371, further modified in 1998 (by means of Pope 
John Paul II’s motu proprio ‘Ad tuendam fidem’ available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/motu_proprio/documents/hf_jp-ii_motu-
proprio_30061998_ad-tuendam-fidem_en.html), stating that those who dissent after a warning even from 
non-irreformable teaching must be punished with a just penalty: see the commentary in Canon Law 
Society of America, New Commentary of the Code of Canon Law, eds. John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, 
Thomas J. Green (Mahwah NJ: Paulist Press, 2000), 21–2, 275–6, 917; 1582–3. 
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All of those points, but the one on dissent, have been concisely re-stated more recently 
by Pope Benedict XVI in that crucial sentence of his letter expounding the official 
understanding of RC ecclesiology to the Chinese Catholics: ‘The principles of 
independence and autonomy, self-management and democratic administration of the 
Church [are] incompatible with Catholic doctrine’.3 
While the anti-democratic and authoritarian character of the RC Church which 
such quotations delineate might perplex an external observer unfamiliar with the history 
of Catholicism since the French Revolution, or indeed since the Reformation, it does not 
startle those who are acquainted with those recent chapters of the history of Christianity. 
Already before the Reformation the sharp rejection of the novel absolutist claims of 
such Popes as Boniface VIII and Innocent III made for an increased intransigence in 
proffering them. But it has been only with the events triggered by Luther that the 
widespread extent of the radical disagreements many Christians had with them 
eventually broke out concerning, among other things, several aspects of that 
centralization of power which the papacy had been building for itself. The unique scale 
and concrete consequences of the Reformers’ rejection of papal authority has been such 
a shock for the papacy, that the latter has since clung to a very strong conception of its 
own authority, going as far as viewing it as the primary mediation and highest human 
source of all other authorities in the church, often enough claiming superiority to and 
thus obedience from even the secular authority of Christian rulers. That period also saw 
the almost complete abandonment of the ancient practice of democratic election of 
bishops by the entire local church (clergy as well as laity). Consequently, bishops 
became increasingly unrepresentative of, and so unaccountable to, their dioceses. 
Authority on and responsibility for the church became conceived as completely 
independent from the laity: instead, they became understood as the exclusive possession 
of the episcopal hierarchy, in virtue of an immediate empowerment from Christ, or at 
least from Christ through the pope, but in any case to the exclusion of the Christian 
people. The foundations were thus firmly in place for an understanding of the church as 
constituted primarily if not essentially by the clerical hierarchy, and only secondarily by 
the ‘non-ordained’, or laity. The laity merely provided a subsidiary cooperation, as part-
time helpers, to the mission and apostolate of the church proper, i.e. the hierarchy—a 
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Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China’, (27th May 2007), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/letters/2007/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_let_20070527_china_en.html. The target of such a statement is the understanding of RC ecclesiology 
advanced by the Chinese government. 
  198 
cooperation, moreover, always subject to the latter’s control.4 This was to be concisely 
stated by Pope Pius X: 
[T]he Church is essentially an unequal society, that is, a society 
comprising two categories of persons, the Pastors and the flock […]. So 
distinct are these categories that with the pastoral body only rests the 
necessary right and authority for promoting the end of the society and 
directing all its members towards that end; the one duty of the multitude 
is to allow themselves to be led, and, like a docile flock, to follow the 
Pastors….5 
It is important to recall such traditional views, so dominant and widespread until 
relatively recently, because they render less eccentric and more understandable to the 
outsider today’s statements from the contemporary RC ecclesiastical establishment. 
Their common fundamental insight is that the responsibility for the common action and 
mission of the church resides entirely with the clerical hierarchy to the exclusion of the 
laity. The latter do not have any responsibility in determining the action of the church; 
their cooperation in it is apparently a matter of passive obedience, which does not 
require an assessment either of the intelligence and morality of the policy decisions 
taken by the church authority, or of the morality of cooperating with them, and certainly 
does not envisage any kind of public dissent from them. In the current intra-ecclesial 
discussion this is expressed by affirming that the laity cannot ‘participate’ in the power 
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of governance of the clergy: the most they can do is to ‘cooperate’ with it, in a 
consultative way only and at the exclusive discretion of the hierarchy.6 
At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the principles proffered in the 
above citations are far from being the common stance of Christians—or indeed of 
Catholics—vis-à-vis church government. They represent, nevertheless, the position 
currently endorsed by the current Roman Catholic establishment, and thus presented as 
the standard, official one of Roman Catholics worldwide. 
That such illiberal views on church government are widespread among the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy is suggested by a simple fact. Any well-known, top political figure in 
a Western democracy who would publicly affirm the principles that political power is 
indivisible; that only and exclusively the mayor of a city or the prime minister of a 
country—and not any majority, whether a direct or representative one—have the non-
delegable responsibility of exercising such indivisible, all-encompassing power; that 
dissent cannot be seen as a legitimate expression of freedom, and that due precautions 
should be taken so as to insure that citizens get the ‘sound’ philosophy and morality in 
their purity and integrity—‘sound’ as determined, of course, by the political 
establishment itself—would trigger in the political establishment of that country, never 
mind in its public opinion, sharp criticisms as well as calls for resignation, and the 
unfortunate politician would quickly find him- or herself isolated and disgraced. 
In contrast, the frequent reiteration of such principles by top Roman Catholic 
officials since Vatican II has hardly ever produced any public reaction, much less 
criticism, among the hierarchy. Given, on the one hand, the foundational character and 
momentous importance of the principles at stake for the very constitution as well as 
responsible development of any community and, on the other hand, the frequency with 
which the above statements have been publicly made, it cannot easily be argued that 
such a lack of response by the worldwide episcopate depends on inattention and 
ultimately ignorance about them. The most plausible hypothesis is that such principles 
are essentially shared by the RC episcopate. Hence the need for critically analysing 
them in light of what has been said in the previous chapter. 
The argument which follows will begin by addressing the nature of ecclesial 
authority (6.2). After having recalled in section 6.3 the few ethical norms for 
responsible cooperation outlined in chapter five, I will move to analyze the two 
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6.4. 
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interrelated dysfunctional centralizations which hinder the fulfilment of those norms in 
the current RC Church. Section 6.4 will be devoted to the centralization of competences 
occurring from the existence at many decisional levels in the church—parish, diocese, 
worldwide communion—of a single supreme authority whose competence is de iure all-
encompassing. The second centralization, examined in 6.5, concerns the disregard of the 
principle of subsidiarity (or principle of subsidiary function), occurring when a higher 
authority, instead of being limited to deciding and acting on those specific domains only 
which individuals and lower levels, following their inalienable responsibility, have 
deemed beyond their reach and have thus responsibly delegated, exercise an intrusive 
micro-management of the decisions and actions lying within the lower levels’ 
operational range. 
Sections 6.6 and 6.7 are closely linked. The former briefly sketches, on the basis 
of the thought of Bernard Lonergan, the influence of socio-political structures and 
cultural/religious tradition on the individual, and the necessity of constantly purifying 
the meanings and values informing them. The latter focuses on the consequent essential 
role free and public discussion has for, on the one hand, the very formation of a 
community of shared meanings and values and, on the other—by allowing the 
formation of an informed public opinion—for a greater efficiency in the related, 
ongoing needs to both foster the community’s progress and reverse its decline. Free and 
public discussion will emerge as the chief way—as far as strictly human means are 
concerned—of correcting and healing the unjust and unchristian elements which, due to 
human frailty and fallenness, inevitably attack to variable extents both socio-political 
structures and cultural and religious traditions. 
6.2 Human Consent and Divine Institution: The Nature of Ecclesial 
Authority 
With reference to the nature of authority in the church, the current RC default instinct is 
to oppose the ‘merely human’ authority and the ecclesial one, the former constituted by 
human consent while the latter by divine institution. Yet a different yet thoroughly 
traditional view holds that, in Nicholas of Cusa’s classic statement, 
every ecclesiastical or spiritual rulership was established by Christ 
through the mediation of human consent. For legitimate superiors are 
those established by the consent of their subjects. We are obliged to obey 
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them because of having given them our consent as established in authority 
by men from among men.7 
Not even the pope’s authority, he insisted, is unmediated by the consent of the 
church: the only possible alternative, he added, would be if there is ‘some miracle or 
sign that God wished someone to rule before he had obtained the consent of the faithful 
(in which case all Christians would be obliged to obey the divine command)’.8 
Differently put, God was ordinarily understood as acting through secondary causes—
specifically, the customary electoral procedures or, in Nicholas of Cusa’s more 
fundamental perspective, human consent. 
As touched on above, contrary to such a consensual view of ecclesial authority is 
the current official RC ecclesiology, essentially based on what is known historically as 
the divine-right theory of authority. Its foundational principle, often repeated by papalist 
theologians, is that all powers in the church come from Christ, either immediately (as it 
happened during his lifetime, e.g. when he choose Peter and the Apostles), or mediately, 
i.e. through the pope and the bishops as only successors of Peter and the Apostles to 
whom alone Christ had historically bestowed the self-mediating supernatural sacra 
potestas. The point has been made most concisely in a recent introduction to RC canon 
law: 
the power of jurisdiction has been bestowed by Christ to the Apostles; 
therefore, it is possessed primarily by the pope and the episcopal college 
with regard to the universal church, and by each of the diocesan bishops 
with regard to the particular church they preside. [...] 
The power of jurisdiction admits a vast delegation to secondary bodies; 
however the power of such bodies is always delegated and, therefore, 
dependent on and derived from the power of the pope or of the diocesan 
bishop. There are no phenomena of jurisdiction which are not 
reconducible to the above mentioned primary organs, insofar as 
jurisdiction proceeds from Christ, who transmitted it to the Apostles and 
only to them.9 
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Such a theory is behind several crucial contentious issues in current RC 
ecclesiology. For instance, as then Cardinal Ratzinger observed, it is the reason for the 
present denial that regional, national, and international synodal and conciliar bodies can 
exercise any proper and ordinary (as distinct from delegated) jurisdictional power, as 
well as for the concurrent affirmation that they can only exercise as much jurisdictional 
power as the pope delegates them.10 All ecclesial institutions of ecclesiastical (as distinct 
from divine) right—i.e. everything but the papacy and personal episcopacy—receive 
their jurisdictional power from delegation by the pope (or, in the case of diocesan 
bodies, from the local ordinary). In theory, the worldwide episcopal body together with 
the pope is also the wielder of supreme absolute power in the church. In practice, 
however, there are no canonically enshrined ordinary structures (as distinct from 
extraordinary institutions, such as ecumenical councils) for the worldwide episcopal 
body to act collegially—whether to govern or even only to delegate powers. 
Far from having been superseded by Vatican II, the old theory that all 
jurisdictional powers in the church derive ultimately from the pope has only been 
mitigated, not rejected, by that council’s endorsement of the theological doctrine that 
bishops derive their sacra potestas immediately from Christ. In effect, a crucial passage 
of the famous Nota explicativa praevia appended to Lumen gentium distinguishes the 
sacra potestas received through episcopal ordination, and the ‘canonical or juridical 
determination through the hierarchical authority [i.e. the pope or, in the Oriental 
Churches in communion with Rome, the patriarch]. This determination of power can 
consist in the granting of a particular office or in the allotment of subjects, and it is done 
according to the norms approved by the supreme authority.’11 Such a distinction means, 
concretely, that while bishops may receive their sacra potestas directly from Christ, 
they depend on the pope for the legitimate (as distinct from valid) exercise of such 
power, which includes the jurisdictional power. Such a view, which does not modify the 
substance of the traditional papalist position, appears to have been enshrined in the post-
Vatican II reform of canon law, if the conclusion of a recent study on the role of 
diocesan bishops in the current canon law is true that ‘the general determinations of the 
Code concerning the episcopate and the diocesan bishop, as well as the standard 
understanding of this ministry in the determinations of the Code, describe the diocesan 
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bishop as being juridically a functionary of the Pope’.12 In such a way, the pope 
maintains an indirect control over all jurisdictional powers in the church, including 
those of local, national, and supra-national synods and councils, which only exist by 
papal delegation. 
The first reason for rejecting the view that ecclesial authority comes from Christ 
through Peter, the Apostles, and their successors, to whom alone Christ had directly 
bestowed the self-mediating supernatural sacra potestas, is simply that such view is 
based on a mistaken exegesis without valid scriptural bases. 
The second reason is that the divine-right construal of church authority is based 
on a flawed understanding of the relationship between divine action and human 
cooperation. Indeed, that is the crucial issue lying at the very heart of the divergence 
between the divine-right and the consensual understandings of ecclesiastical authority, 
as it can be glanced in one the main arguments in favour of the former and against the 
latter. The NT, such argument goes, appears to describe church offices as a particular 
kind of charisms. But charisms have an exclusively pneumatical origin. Hence, the 
authority of the charismatics (including office-holders) comes directly from God and 
thus is in no way dependent on the community’s consent for—and that is the crucial 
point—that would entail an unacceptable ‘control’ over the Spirit, forcing the Spirit to 
bestow the required charism of leadership to the chosen person.13 
However, it has long been generally acknowledged that God ordinarily acts in a 
way which preserves the laws of creation, even when perfecting their proper nature and 
working: which, in the case of the establishment of ecclesial (as well as civil) authority, 
means that the divine action occurs through human beings’ freedom and concomitant 
responsibility of discerning and evaluating the best available candidate for office, even 
while assisting and perfecting them. The only alternative is to maintain that God 
ordinarily acts without any human cooperation, bypassing human freedom and 
responsibility: so that God would somehow impose (and potentially force) ecclesiastical 
authority on (and potentially over against) the freedom, intelligence, and thus 
responsibility God has endowed his human creatures with—something in effect touched 
on by Cajetan when forced to describe the church as a ‘servile’ society (4.4). There is 
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 As canonist Georg Bier concisely observed, it is ‘the pope [who] determines the extent of the 
diocesan bishop’s power of governance [Leitungsgewalt, or potestas regiminis].’ ‘Das Verhältnis 
zwischen Primat und Episkopat. Anknüpfungspunkt für einen ökumenischen Konsens über den 
Petrusdienst?’, in Wolfgang Bock (ed.), Gläubigkeit und Recht und Freiheit: Ökumenische Perspektiven 
des katholischen Kirchenrechts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 53–76 (59). 
13
 Thus Joseph Ratzinger, ‘Demokratisierung der Kirche?’, in Ratzinger and Hans Maier (eds.), 
Demokratie in der Kirche: Möglichkeiten, Grenzen, Gefahren (Limburg: Lahn-Verlag, 1970), 7–46 (26). 
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but one significant historical instance in which ‘ecclesial’ officials might be understood 
as having been established immediately by God: namely, Jesus’ selection of the original 
Twelve. But since Jesus’ ascension, the process of selecting ministers and leaders for 
the embryonic church has inevitably followed the pattern of divine-human cooperation 
outlined above: indeed, already Matthias was to be chosen by the entire community, 
although certainly under the Spirit’s assistance (see Acts 6). 
The same insights about the relationship between God’s action and human 
cooperation are also implicitly entailed by Cyprian’s understanding of the vox populi as 
the vox Dei in the context of the selection of bishops (see 2.2, no. 24). Cyprian’s 
conception also suggests, by the way, how foreign to the mind of the early church was 
the view regarding the common judgment and consent of the church as a control over 
the Spirit.14 The same insights were, again, to be expressed more explicitly in Nicholas 
of Cusa’s above mentioned assertion that, unless clear evidence exists of a 
miraculous—and thus by definition extraordinary—divine intervention, God is to be 
understood as ordinarily acting through the consent of Christians. This is not to deny 
that all authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, comes from God, as already Paul had 
stated. Rather, it agrees with a central affirmation of the Scholastics—and especially the 
Dominicans of the Salamanca School—that while God is indeed the causa prima of 
authority, it is human consent which is ordinarily its causa secunda.15 This has long 
been understood to be the case in the civil and ecclesial societies alike. The only 
difference should be sought, then, in the motivation for such consent: in the political 
sphere, that was identified with the fulfilment of temporal needs, while in the Christian 
community delegation to ecclesial officials was motivated by the fulfilment of Jesus’ 
mandate both to spread the Good News and to contribute in different ways to the 
coming of God’s kingdom on earth. Because such mandate can only be accepted in 
faith, the basis of the delegation to church officials is ultimately the supernatural assent 
of faith. But this only difference, as noted, was not seen as incompatible with the fact 
that the essential requirement of authority—the free, informed assent of intelligent and 
responsible individuals—remained analogous in both cases. While, then, it is 
theoretically legitimate to argue that God in appointing church authority routinely 
                                                 
14
 Cyprian explicitly wrote more than once his conviction that God, with whom the real decision in 
episcopal elections lies, speaks through the voice of the people (Epist. 43, 1; 55, 8; 59, 5; 68, 2). See also 
the analysis in Peter Norton, Episcopal Elections 250–600: Hierarchy and Popular Will in Late Antiquity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 12–3. 
15
 A point first made officially, to my knowledge, by Pope Leo XIII, ‘Immortale Dei: On the 
Christian Constitution of States’, (1st Nov 1885), §§3–4, quoted in 2.5, no. 91. 
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makes a miraculous exception and bypasses the requirements of freedom and 
responsibility of his creatures, still, because mainstream Christian theology regards the 
continuity between nature and grace to be the norm, the burden of proof lies with those 
wanting to uphold such an admittedly momentous exception to that rule. 
The reflection on political authority has been quicker to accept such insights than 
that on ecclesial authority, and so we see that what John Neville Figgis observed long 
ago with regard to the ‘desacralization’ of the former can nowadays fittingly describe 
what is happening with regard to the latter: 
the theocratic [...] conception of political right has gone from the educated 
world. Providence, doubtless, has to do with politics as with other human 
affairs, and all Theists must allow that political associations have some 
divine sanction. But most are now agreed to relegate the part of 
Providence to that of final cause. There has been a revolution in political 
thought, not dissimilar to the substitution of efficient for final causes as an 
account of natural phenomena. [I]nstitutions and all alleged rights must be 
able to show some practical utility if their existence is to be maintained.16 
More recently, Andrés Torres-Queiruga has argued that the very same reasons 
which recent magisterial teaching highlighted to ‘desacralise’ civil authority must be 
applied to the church.17 One of its most concise statements, whose ecclesiological 
transposition is easily made by simply substituting the word ‘church’ to the word 
‘State’, can be found in Pope John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem in terris: 
The fact that authority comes from God does not mean that men have no 
power to choose those who are to rule the State, or to decide upon the 
type of government they want, and determine the procedure and 
limitations of rulers in the exercise of their authority. Hence the above 
teaching [about the divine origins of authority] is consonant with any 
genuinely democratic form of government.18 
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 John Neville Figgis, Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, 16; also Francis Oakley, ‘In Praise 
of Prolepsis: Meaning, Significance, and the Medieval Contribution to Political Thought’, History of 
Political Thought 27, no. 3 (Autumn 2006), 407–22 (414–5). 
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 ‘Vatican II and Theology’, Concilium 4 (2005), 21–33 (31). 
18
 ‘Pacem in terris. Encyclical Letter on Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity and 
Liberty’ (11th April 1963), §52 (see also GS§74), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html. 
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If it is true, then, that ‘“Ius divinum” is the atomic bomb of the reactionary’,19 it is also 
true that it is increasingly evident to Christians in general and Catholics in particular 
that such a ‘nuclear’ deterrent to change is non-existent.20 
Further clarification from tradition can be had from one of the Scholastics’ central 
theological insights concerning divine-human cooperation, affirming that facienti quod 
in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam (God does not deny grace to the one who is doing 
within one’s power). Or, as Saint Ignatius de Loyola supposedly put it, ‘Pray as though 
everything depended on God, and work as though everything depended on you’.21 From 
this perspective, to understand an institutionalized procedure for evaluating and 
selecting candidates to church office as an unacceptable control over the Spirit and the 
mediation of grace is as mistaken as understanding a prayer of petition, or a genuine 
human effort to achieve something with God’s help, as doing the same. More 
specifically still, if requiring the people’s consent to candidates for church office (and 
specifically ordination) is understood as an absurd control over the Spirit, then so 
should be the requirement—common to Paul, the mainstream Christian tradition, and 
canon law—that the community evaluate the presence of certain ‘qualifications’ or 
dispositions in candidates to office/ordination. Again, it should also be noted that the 
same people who affirm that elections would bind the Spirit to the human will of the 
majority also ordinarily assert that the exercise of all other charisms is dependent on 
their being assessed by office-holders.22 This makes the authority of all other 
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 Piet F. Fransen, ‘Criticism of Some Basic Theological Notions in Matters of Church Authority’, in 
Leonard Swidler and Piet F. Fransen (eds.), Authority in the Church and the Schillebeeckx Case (New 
York: Crossroad, 1992), 48–74 (67). 
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 For complementary reflections on Christians’ freedom to devise the polity of their own faith 
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 Joseph de Guibert, SJ, The Jesuits: Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice, trans. William M. 
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Ministry and Life of Priests’, [7th December 1965], §§12, 2, 5, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decree_19651207_presbyterorum-ordinis_en.html; ‘Ad gentes. Decree on the Mission Activity of the 
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Future for the Laity? Law and History’, in Noel Timms and Kenneth Wilson (eds.), Governance and 
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charismatics dependent on institutional legitimation, and yet that is not ordinarily 
condemned as ‘control’ of the Spirit.23 In fact, the correct insight that charisms must be 
somehow assessed and legitimated provides the answer ad personam to the objection 
appealing to their divine origin: this latter does not exclude the human mediation in the 
sense of the responsibility of those on behalf of whom the charism has been given to 
evaluate both its prerequisites, if any, and its authenticity. 
The problem, then, becomes that of finding the best way for discerning the 
Spirit’s charisms—or, if one wants to contend that ordination bestows such charisms ex 
opere operato, for discerning the proper dispositions for receiving them. In any case, 
the way of discerning the right person has since the very beginning been a matter of 
working out the most appropriate human technique, in the conviction that the Spirit 
always works through human means. Such human means are the specific object of 
political philosophy, and so we see throughout history a close symbiosis between the 
latter and ecclesiology. 
Now, several scriptural passages and the earliest tradition witness that an electoral 
procedure was considered as the best means to discern charisms—including the charism 
of office—and consequently to appoint ecclesial office-holders. Besides the instances 
mentioned in 3.3, suffice here to recall the most unambiguous scriptural examples we 
have in this regard, viz. the selection of Matthias and the Seven (Acts 1.15–26 and 6.1–
6 respectively) by the local congregation.24 
So it is that, in virtue of its scriptural basis and apostolic origins, the election of 
church officials and more specifically bishops by the local church has been considered 
by many Fathers, and most famously by Cyprian with all the bishops of Northern 
Africa, and Leo I, to be nothing less than of divine institution. They accordingly 
regarded it as the only proper procedure, all others being illegitimate under ordinary 
                                                                                                                                               
Authority in the Roman Catholic Church. Beginning a Conversation (London: SPCK, 2000), 91–102 
(100). The post-Tridentine hierarchy has even arrogated to itself the selection of seminarians, setting in 
canon law strict guidelines for assessing the authenticity of what is elsewhere judged to be a divine 
personal calling originally independent of any ecclesial mediation. And the papacy of the last century and 
a half has proceeded to the current centralization of worldwide episcopal appointments. In other words, in 
the current organizational layout of the RC Church, the discernment of whether a certain individual 
possesses a God-given charism, which was once the prerogative of the whole church, has been 
exclusively restricted to the episcopal hierarchy and to the pope. 
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 Although contrast this with the argument condemning precisely institutional legitimation as 
‘control’ over the Spirit advanced in Emil Brunner, The Misunderstanding of the Church, trans. Harold 
Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), 81–2. 
24
 On the election of ἐpiίσκοpiοι see Hermann W. Beyer, ‘Ἐpiίσκοpiος’, in Gerhard Kittel (ed.), 
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI.: William 
B. Eerdmans, 1964), vol. II, 608–20 (616). 
  208 
circumstances25—a judgment which was to be forcefully endorsed in more recent times 
by Blessed Antonio Rosmini.26 
Precisely because the method to discern the best person available to fulfil a certain 
function—whether administrative or sacramental—has since the very beginning been a 
matter of working out the most appropriate human technique, we see that considerations 
in favour of the popular election of bishops have hardly ever been grounded exclusively 
on the properly theological sources just mentioned. Rather, they have also been 
endorsed by considerations which today would be called political, that is, stemming 
from insights into the organization of human community. This is particularly evident in 
the ecclesiological debates since the investiture struggle, when canonists and 
theologians soon realized that the practical quandary of deciding who (or which body) 
should appoint bishops could not be solved apart from the deeper issue regarding the 
locus of authority in the community and, specifically, from a judgment on the best 
procedures for information- gathering and assessing, and for responsible decision-
making. Political philosophy proved to be coherent with the early ecclesiological 
practice by further clarifying why and how an electoral procedure is the best way of 
carrying out the discernment of church officials. One of the most important reasons, 
developed at some length by political philosophers and ecclesiologists such as Rosmini, 
is simply that the discernment of the best person available to fulfil a certain office and 
function is best carried out through a free and public discussion of all the members 
concerned—where all data, insights, judgments of fact and judgment of value can 
emerge and be critically assessed—followed by an election.27 
But there are other reasons just as fundamental. To deny that the discernment of 
those members most apt to be church officials can be done by the local community and 
that accordingly it should be its own inalienable responsibility, means to deny the 
faithful the possibility of giving a responsible consent to the choice and appointment of 
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 For an historical survey see Joseph F. O’Callaghan, Electing our Bishops: How the Catholic 
Church should Choose Its Leaders (Lanham: Sheed & Ward, 2007), 7–118. 
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 For a thorough argument bringing together the scriptural, patristic, traditional, and political 
arguments in favour of episcopal elections see Rosmini, The Five Wounds of the Church, ed. and trans. 
Denis Cleary (Leominster: Fowler Wright Books, 1987 [1848]). 
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office-holders: and that means, in turn, to deny them the possibility of cooperating 
responsibly. It is therefore quite correct to underscore that the primary objection to any 
centralized system of appointment disregarding subsidiarity is moral—as Pope Pius XI 
did when he first formulated that principle28—rather than pragmatic or based on 
considerations of efficiency. 
Again, the community’s consent is required not only for the jurisdictional 
authority—which is natural and delegated by the community—but also for the 
sacramental authority—despite its supernatural character—because in both cases what 
the candidate to office/ordination will fulfil is a (jurisdictional/spiritual) service offered 
to free, intelligent and responsible individuals (a service which if imposed on unwilling 
subjects would be nothing but coercion), and as such it must rely on the consent of those 
to whom it is offered. 
Finally, such consent, as noted, takes the form of a reasonable and responsible 
delegation which may be expressed by means of an election or by other institutional 
procedures. However structured, such a procedure should respect subsidiarity, that is the 
inalienable responsibility of each level, from the individual upwards, to determine both 
what is within and what is beyond the possibilities of one’s competences and charisms. 
For the consent must not only be free, but also informed and thus responsible: and yet it 
cannot be such if the selection procedure is badly devised, and thus (1) does not 
sufficiently allow for information- gathering and assessing, i.e. the two necessary steps 
for an informed and thus responsible decision; (2) disregards subsidiarity by taking 
away the inalienable responsibility of those concerned to select for themselves as an 
authority the person(s) they deem most appropriate on the basis of their competence. 
The current system of episcopal appointments in the RC church does not envisage 
any public discussion and largely deprives the local church of its inalienable 
responsibility to select for itself an overseer. Ninety-nine percent of the faithful of a 
local church are routinely excluded in any significant way from the discernment 
process, and their inalienable responsibility to discern and choose for themselves an 
authority disregarded. This would not be the case if all church officials were authorised 
by the community which, by recognizing their God-given charisma or humanly 
developed skill/expertise, would also delimit their area of competence. Authority, 
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whether sacramental or jurisdictional, does not come automatically from intellectual and 
moral competence/divinely bestowed charism, much less from the office itself. Rather, 
it comes from the (attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible) consent given to 
the perceived (intellectual and moral) competence/charism of someone, and the 
consequent decision, if need be, to appoint/ordain him/her (compare 5.5). This is 
analogous to the distinction between the legitimacy and legitimation of authority: one 
must distinguish the legitimacy (i.e. authenticity) of the ‘empowerment from above’, of 
the divinely bestowed ‘sacramental power to mediate grace’—or, more scripturally, of 
those charisms supernatural in origins—per se, from the legitimation to exercise it, 
which requires discernment followed by consent. If even Christ did not force his divine 
authority on anybody, but rather subjected his teaching to the acceptance of all people 
of good will, how much more should any authority in the church—whether 
spiritual/sacramental or jurisdictional—do the same, whatever the claims about its 
divine origins, and thus legitimise its exercise by the consent of the faithful it is 
supposed to serve. 
The remarkable convergence of scripture, tradition, and reason outlined above 
demands that, for all intents and purposes, the discernment, selection and appointment 
of all church officials must occur democratically—the object of such discernment being 
the possession of the relevant competence(s) for the job, whether humanly acquired 
skills and/or divinely-bestowed charisms. In current Roman Catholicism that would 
mean the reintroduction of elections by the Christians concerned as the ordinary method 
of appointing bishops and other church officials as well, in particular parish priests.29 
6.3 Setting a Standard: The Ethical Norms for a Responsible 
Cooperation 
Granted that legitimate ecclesial authorities are established through responsible 
delegation—ordinarily under the form of an electoral procedure—it is necessary to 
examine whether the moral norms for such delegation and, more generally, for the 
individual’s subordination to an authority to be responsible are respected within 
contemporary RC ecclesiology. Let us recall them briefly. 
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The foundational principle is that it is the inalienable responsibility of each 
decisional level, from the individual upward, to determine the limits, extent, and domain 
of what falls within one’s operational range and is thus one’s responsibility, and what 
instead can only be decided and achieved by cooperation. Delegation occurs when a 
moral person (individual or collective) freely decides, on the basis of a responsible 
judgment, to accept as a directive for action the judgment or choice of someone else in 
order to achieve something lying beyond one’s reach, because of insufficient knowledge 
or means. Hence, a delegation is responsible only if it is motivated by a judgment on the 
greater accuracy of someone else’s capacity for evaluation and action in comparison 
with one’s own. Only and exclusively such responsible delegation creates legitimate 
authority (the adjectives here are crucial). Again, the motivation of responsible 
delegation is competence—the competence the delegant perceives in the potential 
delegate. Differently put, it is the subject’s judgment as to the opportunity to delegate 
that creates authority, and that judgment is based on an assessment of the competence of 
potential delegates. It is, accordingly, the delegants—from the individual upwards—
who have the inalienable responsibility of determining the limits, extent and domains of 
delegation and thus of the delegates’ authority.30 In this regard it should be recalled what 
can. 133 §1 affirms generally with regard to delegation: ‘A delegate who exceeds the 
limits of the mandate, with regard either to things or to persons, performs no act at all.’ 
But in addition to those requirements for delegation to be responsible—most of 
which are concisely embodied in the principle of subsidiarity or derive directly from 
it—highly specialised and differentiated societies where no one can be omnicompetent 
require further limiting conditions for delegation to be responsible. Either (1) the 
representative is given a specific mandate in virtue of specialised competence; or when, 
(2) within a generic mandate, (i) the one delegating is reasonably sure the representative 
will use criteria for factual and value judgments similar to those s/he would have used; 
(ii) the delegate is only given a coordinative or supervisory role, viz. one which does not 
involve making decisions on the substantive (often technical) issues at stake, but only 
overseeing the performance and selection of others (who might in turn be coordinators 
themselves), perhaps with some veto powers capable of demanding that certain 
procedures be repeated; (iii) the delegate is made legally bound to act in accordance 
with the technical reports worked out by the relevant specialised person(s) or 
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 Conversely, ‘whether a decision has authority depends on the person to whom the order is 
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Organizing (Reading PA: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 3. 
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commission(s), which have in turn been democratically assessed, selected and delegated 
to deal with issues in their field of competence. 
It is crucial to understand that the resulting authority of such ‘generic’ church 
officials must be purely coordinative or supervisory, analogously to what has been said 
of the authority of political representatives: by which I mean that it cannot entail at all 
making decisions of substance in the various specialised fields, although it may perhaps 
entail a veto power demanding that a certain decision-making procedure be carried out 
again where irregularities have occurred. 
We can now move to inquire whether the current organization of the Roman 
Catholic Church respects such steps for a responsible delegation to authority, which are 
also necessary ethical norms for cooperation to be moral. It is fairly evident that the 
answer must be negative, due to a twofold centralization which disregards each of the 
main points above. 
6.4 Centralization of Competences in the Roman Catholic Church 
The current ecclesiology of Roman Catholicism displays two dysfunctional 
centralizations resulting from the disregard of both norms for a responsible delegation. 
The first is a centralization of competences: the monarchical authority exercised by the 
hierarchy is conceived as including each and all domains of church life: it is 
omnicompetent. The second is the centralization resulting from the disregard of the 
normative limit subsidiarity imposes on authority, namely that of only acting on those 
issues which are judged by the lower level as beyond its range. 
At the level of theory, both centralizations are the consequence of the RC church’s 
continuing acceptance of the traditional argument in favour of monarchical government: 
namely, that for the unity—and ultimately very existence—of a society, the latter must 
be structured under a unique, indivisible, supreme authority (see 2.5 and 5.7).31 That 
such an authority must also encompass all domains of action follows necessarily from 
the above as a matter of logical deduction. 
Such an understanding of authority made more sense before the early modern 
time, when the organization of civil society (in its various forms of empire, kingdom, 
city-state, etc.), was understood as having a very limited agenda, essentially restricted to 
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defending the internal and the external peace.32 As I have argued earlier (5.7), such a 
conception has undergone a radical development in political philosophy, due both to the 
vast acceleration of the process of social differentiation and specialisation since the 
Industrial Revolution, and to the great expansion of the operational range of the modern 
state. 
As with the process of desacralisation of authority, so also with regard to its 
process of decentralisation ecclesiology—in its RC variety at least—appears to lag 
behind political philosophy. Many of Vatican II’s central ecclesiological tenets are still 
clearly based on the traditional reasoning concerning the necessity of a indivisible, 
omnicompetent and supreme authority for the unity and existence of a community: for 
instance, that ‘the Roman Pontiff, as the Successor of Peter, is the perpetual and visible 
source and foundation’ of the unity of the bishops; that, in turn, ‘The individual bishops 
[...] are the visible principle and foundation of unity in their particular churches’ (LG 
§23). More recent magisterial pronouncements are on the same line: 
the ordered hierarchical communion of all the Bishops, successors of the 
Apostles, with the Successor of Peter, [is] a guarantee of the unity of the 
faith and life of all Catholics. It is therefore indispensable, for the unity of 
the Church in individual nations, that every Bishop should be in 
communion with the other Bishops, and that all should be in visible and 
concrete communion with the Pope.33 
And again, ‘the profound unity which binds together the particular Churches [...] 
throughout the world, has its roots not only in the same faith and in a common Baptism, 
but above all in the Eucharist and in the episcopate.’34 Apparently, a common fund of 
shared experiences (and primarily the experience of the Spirit), meanings, values, and 
goals, is either insufficient or unnecessary in that regard: the unity and thus ultimately 
existence of a community (or collegial body) is understood as warranted both 
sufficiently and necessarily by a unique monarchical authority. 
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And so we reach the indivisibility principle of (jurisdictional) power in 
contemporary RC ecclesiology.35 That assumption is also, as Ladislas Örsy observed, 
the reason for the position that ‘non-ordained persons can only cooperate with the 
power of governance but not participate in it’, and that, conversely, the ordained cannot 
delegate jurisdictional power to laypeople.36 While controversial, such a stance is the 
one accepted and practiced by the current RC establishment.37 
As for the tenet concerning the omni-competence of such authority, it is, as noted, 
a necessary logical consequence of its being unique and indivisible. Perhaps more 
importantly, it is further entailed by that pervasive theological current which has been 
arguing since the Middle Ages that there is an indissoluble link between 
sacramental/spiritual and jurisdictional/administrative authority. According to this view, 
only and exclusively the clerical hierarchy of the ordained can exercise jurisdictional 
power within the church. This means that the hierarchy possesses an ultimate and 
exclusive responsibility both over all functions of authority itself (e.g. the legislative, 
executive, judicial) and over all aspects of church action (not only the primary and in 
itself enormous domain of evangelization—which includes informing individuals, as 
well as social, political, and cultural structures with the gospel—but also the other 
domains of financial administration, charitable work, theological research and teaching, 
preaching, catechetical formation, liturgical work, and so on). On this basis, the official 
post-Tridentine RC ecclesiology has advanced in both theory and practice a growing 
centralization of competences. 
Yet, analogously to what has already happened in political philosophy, 
ecclesiology too has been undergoing for some time now a process of progressive 
abandonment of the twin tenets concerning the unicity and omnicompetence of 
authority respectively. 
A first element which has contributed to disproving the necessity for a unique, 
indivisible, supreme, and so inevitably all-encompassing (papal) authority has been the 
already recalled unsuccessfulness and eventual rejection of papal claims of authority 
over the temporal domain. The acknowledgment that the temporal authorities are 
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independent and supreme in their own domain of competence was already suggested in 
the reflections by medieval theologians on the real secular authority of non-Christian, 
pagan kingdoms, and then explicitly and officially acknowledged by Roman 
Catholicism in many eighteenth and nineteenth centuries concordats between the papacy 
and European states, and eventually at Vatican II.38 The latter was to clarify the issue 
even further, by observing that the evangelization of the world, including of course its 
social and political domains, is the primary and distinctive responsibility of the laity, 
and not of the hierarchy (GS §43). That implies a division of competences and a 
recognition, if only in theory, of distinct authorities within the church, to the extent that 
the laity is acknowledged as being ordinarily autonomous and independent from the 
hierarchy in their own specific domain. 
Another element contributing to the abandonment of the construal of authority as 
necessarily unique and omnicompetent is the sharp decline of the traditional view that 
there is an indissoluble link between the sacramental and jurisdictional powers. Not that 
such a position had ever been uncontroversial: quite the contrary, it has been contending 
for centuries against the opposite stance according to which sacramental and 
jurisdictional authorities can be distinguished at the level of theory because they can and 
have been separated at the level of practice.39 In the post-Vatican II period, this debate 
has continued unabated;40 it seems, however, that despite the fact that the 1983 code of 
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Law denying that Vatican II taught ‘the sacramental origin of all jurisdictional power and thus the 
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Canon law (can. §12941) appears to support the intrinsic union of jurisdictional and 
sacramental powers, it is the contrary view which is supported by the most data, both 
scriptural and traditional. To the earliest church, the language and reality of that 
separate priestly class which will be known as ‘clergy’ and of the ‘sacred (mediatorial) 
power’ associated with it was unknown: it is a question there of a relatively late 
innovation, and one arguably contrary to the NT (see below).42 Furthermore, not even 
after the introduction of such a distinction between the two genera of Christians—laity 
and clergy—does the ecclesial tradition support the exclusion of the laity from the 
power of governance: quite the contrary in fact, given the innumerable and ever 
growing historical instances witnessing the exercise of jurisdictional authority within 
the church by laypeople, both men and women.43 
In addition to such historical facts, there is the philosophical argument coming 
from an understanding of the morality of cooperation and delegation. I have concluded 
earlier that a responsible delegation of authority to church officials, just like for civil 
officials, requires a discernment as to the competences and charisms of potential 
candidates by the people such a minister will serve, and is thus both based on their 
consent and limited to the domain in which they recognise the candidate as being 
competent/charismatic. Now, in light of the two facts that the determination of the 
possession of relevant competence/charism is a moral requirement for responsible 
delegation, and that jurisdictional and sacramental powers fulfil two quite different sets 
of functions requiring two quite different sets of specialised competences and skills, 
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ecclesial office holders and ordained persons should ordinarily be two different sets of 
people.44 
Moreover, even separated from the function of sacramental/spiritual guidance, the 
jurisdictional/administrative task must be fulfilled in innumerable specialised fields. For 
this reason, a specific authority of oversight or ἐpiισκοpiή to coordinate them would 
therefore be, if not absolutely necessary, highly desirable. But would such an authority 
have decision-making power to dictate policies in every area of church life? That would 
include financial administration; theological education/teaching/research; preaching, 
liturgy, and other pastoral activities; social and charitable work; the vast work entailed 
by divinely-mandated mission of total evangelization—i.e. informing with the gospels 
not only individuals, but also societies and cultures—with all the problems that raises, 
in the various fields from bioethics to economics. 
The glaring problem with such an understanding is, of course, that of competence: 
no single authority can possess the innumerable expertises necessary to govern all those 
fields of church life. By far the most common solution suggested by RC ecclesiologists 
since Vatican II has consisted not in denying the existence of a centralised hierarchy 
with exclusive and absolute prerogative for the exercise of jurisdictional and decision-
making power over all areas of church life, but rather in insisting that the laity be 
allowed to participate in the decisions of the episcopal hierarchy. The latter should be 
bound, morally and perhaps even canonically, to ‘consult’ the church—in its general 
public opinion, relevant experts, or both.45 (As purely consultative, that role of the non-
ordained would not be a real ‘participation’ or sharing in church governance, and would 
accordingly preserve the clerical hierarchy’s exclusive responsibility in that regard46). In 
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other words, much of the current ecclesiological discussion on the issue of church 
governance starts by implicitly presupposing the existence of a class of policy-makers 
(i.e. the bishops) with decision-making authority over all the many specialised areas of 
church life, and then attempts to work out how best to make them exploit the relevant 
specialised expertise and wisdom scattered in their Christian communities. The solution 
would be to insist and even require that they inform themselves through consultation. 
Yet to frame the issue as that of making sure that those who decide in a 
community first inform themselves is to state an unhelpful truism. For, to reiterate, the 
problem concerns competence: the preliminary question to be solved whenever the 
Christian community is confronted with a problem is to identify who, within the 
community, has the specialised competence to address it. The person or group thus 
identified will be acknowledged as being an authority over that issue or area of 
competence, and thus as having decision-making/governing power over it. 
The contribution of political philosophy to that issue can, once again, prove 
illuminating. In the civil community, it has been argued (5.8), the purpose of political 
authority is not that of micro-managing and carrying out the tasks distinctive of a 
community’s specialized structures of knowledge and evaluation: that would require an 
almost omnicompetent authority. Rather, it is primarily that of making decisions that 
determine the general direction of common action on the basis of the delegating 
community’s scale of values and priorities. But with regard to the various expertises 
necessary for making those decisions, the political authority must defer, as a matter of 
moral duty (which should be made legally compulsory), to the relevant specialised 
authorities. 
Exactly the same would apply to the authority of ἐpiισκοpiή in the Christian 
churches. Analogously to the political authority in civil society, ἐpiισκοpiή would have 
two main functions. One would be that of overseeing—as distinct from 
micromanaging—the performance of those which are recognized to be the community’s 
specialised authorities. The other would be that of deciding and guiding the common 
action of the community in agreement with the latter’s distinctive scale of values and 
goals. Such policy-making, of course, requires of ἐpiισκοpiή that it exploit the findings of 
the specialised authorities within the Christian community. The exploitation means that 
an authority of ἐpiισκοpiή (which cannot normally possess all the expertise needed to 
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plan and decide common policies) must defer to the relevant specialized authorities as a 
matter of moral duty, by means of the legal institutionalization of binding forms of 
collaboration (either by consultation or by delegation) with the Christian community’s 
specialised authorities—including its structures of knowledge and evaluation such as 
universities, think tanks, and so on. Their responses, reports, and even decisions should 
be required before the authority of ἐpiισκοpiή (I do not say ‘episcopal authority’, given 
the excessively centralised power that expression conveys in most mainstream Christian 
churches) could make a decision. This is not sufficiently stressed by the CIC currently 
in force, which simply affirms that ‘According to the knowledge, competence, and 
prestige which they possess, [all faithful] have the right and even at times the duty to 
manifest to the sacred pastors their opinion on matters which pertain to the good of the 
Church’ (can. 212 §3). There is a very subtle but nonetheless real difference between 
affirming that, in the contemporary highly complex and differentiated societies, 
specialized authorities should ‘convince’ whoever is delegated with the authority of 
planning and deciding common policies to consult or delegate to them those tasks 
requiring specialized competence, and saying that according to the way we come to 
know and decide, whoever exercises policy-making authority—in the Christian church, 
arguably the authority of ἐpiισκοpiή—has, just like anybody else, a moral duty of 
deferring to specialized authorities with regard to everything lying within their 
competence. 
The exploitation of expert or specialised authorities would not translate into an 
ecclesial technocracy, if the subsidiarity principle is preserved according to which it is 
the community who sets standards of expertise, and proceeds to recognize and delegate 
individual or groups with relevant specialised competences to deal with particular issues 
requiring such expertise. Expert authorities would enjoy autonomous and supreme 
decision-making power but only, of course, in that particular field in which are 
recognized and trusted as authorities by the delegants (see 5.6 and 5.8). In addition to 
this, as noted, an effort should always be made to translate technical problems in 
commonsense language, so that technical findings and proposals be made available for 
public discussion at large, thus implementing a synergy of public debate and expert 
decision-making. Finally, the danger of rule by experts is tempered by the fact that, 
while laypersons may not be able to directly assess the expert authorities, nonetheless 
the (admittedly necessary) use of expert knowledge and findings is always shaped by 
and subject to the shared values and priorities of the (majority of) the community. 
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An example of the difficulty, within the RC Church, of coordinating the supreme 
authority of ἐpiισκοpiή with the output of specialised authorities within that community 
occurred in the late sixties with regard to the issue of contraception. At that time, for the 
first time the papacy instituted an experts’ commission on the topic, with a view to 
expound the Christian approach to that issue and, by the same token, also offer some 
official guidelines to the Catholic faithful.47 The commission gathered Catholic experts 
in the various relevant fields (medicine, psychology, etc., as well as, of course, 
theology), made also sure to consult widely laypeople by means of questionnaire polls, 
and then, by majority vote, gave its official advice against the maintenance of an 
absolute ban on contraceptive methods. So far so good, for in the perspective of what 
has been said, a similar process—one involving a synergy of free public debate and 
expert/specialised knowledge—is the correct way of addressing complex problems, and 
should therefore be legally institutionalised so that its results would be binding on the 
decision-maker, lest the whole procedure is rendered pointless. 
However, this latter possibility is evidenced precisely by our Roman Catholic 
example where, in effect, the commission had the status of the erstwhile counsellors of 
the prince: it was the deliberating authority itself which would choose, at its complete 
discretion, when and whom to consult, and whether or not to accept their advice which, 
as purely consultative, was in no way binding.48 In that particular case, the result was 
that the advice of the commission was disregarded. 
A major problem in RC ecclesiology, then, is precisely its justification of an 
absolutist centralization of all powers into a hierarchy which is not legally bound to 
defer to the specialized competences as an unavoidable moral requirement. Even today, 
the acknowledgment of the role of specific authorities is often impeded by the old 
prejudice, dominant for so many centuries, that authority is essentially non-divisible, 
and thus unique, supreme, omnicompetent and not subject to any control. 
The hierarchy’s refusal to accept that deferring to such specialized competences is 
a moral requirement which they cannot bypass finds its only theological justification—
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complementing the discredited philosophical one on the unicity of authority—from their 
belief in being endowed with a certain ‘carisma veritatis’ (charism of truth), which 
would obviate the hard work of coming to know in favour of direct inspiration from 
God. Yet direct inspiration from God of the hierarchy has been explicitly rejected by 
both Vatican councils,49 and however the carisma veritatis is interpreted, it is well 
understood that it can only be some sort of assistance in the fulfilment of the via 
humana, the human way of coming to know and deciding, perfecting rather than 
superseding it.50 
Now, our understanding of the via humana has increased remarkably during the 
last two centuries on the wake of the development of critical historical studies, 
hermeneutics, and the human sciences more in general. Specifically, with regard to 
theology, the via humana requires undergoing the very same methodical steps—
research (archaeological, philological, literary, etc.); exegesis/interpretation; historical 
reconstruction; critical assessment of opposed interpretations/historical 
reconstructions—which Lonergan detailed as necessary before a correct understanding 
of doctrines can be attained and, if need be, an official, dogmatic formulation 
expressed.51 Lonergan dubbed such steps ‘functional specialties’, to highlight that they 
are ordinarily carried out by different authorities—the archaeologist, philologist, 
exegete, historian, and so on—each of which is supreme and autonomous in its sphere, 
even while collaborating with the others. Now, it is evident that as the exegete cannot 
ignore but indeed must defer to new archaeological or philological findings by the 
relevant experts, so must the historian do with regard to the exegete, and the systematic 
theologian with regard to the findings of all the previous specialties. Analogously, any 
teacher in the church—including bishops and popes—cannot ignore but indeed must 
defer to the results of the different expert authorities in the several specialised fields 
constituting a comprehensive theological method. Differently put, to the extent that the 
magisterium does not enjoy constant private revelations but must, just like all common 
mortals, follow the methodical order of the functional specialties in retrieving the 
revelatory meaning in scripture, tradition, and reason, to that extent it depends on the 
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experts dedicated to such enterprise—primarily, but by no means exclusively, exegetes, 
historians of Christianity, and systematic theologians.52 
Richard McCormick is among the contemporary RC theologians who has insisted 
the most that the specialised research and findings of the theologian ‘is a necessary pre-
requisite for the proper (contemporary and persuasive) expression of the faith by 
hierarchical leaders’, and so in that sense the theologian ‘educates the hierarchical 
magisterium’.53 However, and the point is crucial, this affirmation should be extended to 
all Christian experts in all the sundry areas of church life and mission: liturgy and 
charitable work; ecumenism and interreligious dialogue; bioethics and social justice. 
Rather than an absolute (papal) monarchy, then, the Christian polity might more 
helpfully be conceived as encompassing a network of autonomous yet mutually 
dependent specialised authorities, each recognized as competent in only one area among 
the innumerable ones comprising the vast mission of informing with the gospel not only 
the infinite variety of human beings in their own historical and socio-cultural context, 
but also the very socio-cultural structures which exert so much influence on their 
physical and spiritual development, both as human beings and as Christians. 
Finally, the understanding of a pluralism of parallel, autonomous yet cooperating 
authorities—and the consequent rejection of the necessity of a unique, supreme, and all-
encompassing authority—appears to agree with the scriptural evidence. For nowhere 
does the latter envisage, and much less does it mandate, a class exercising a monopoly 
of jurisdictional authority in the community. Indeed, as James D. G. Dunn observed, 
‘[T]he idea of mono-ministry or ministerial autocracy—that is, of all the most important 
gifts concentrated on one man (even an apostle) or in a select group—is one which Paul 
dismissed with some ridicule’54 in 1 Cor. 12, esp. vv. 29–30. It cannot be sufficiently 
stressed how Paul’s ecclesiological principle that nobody can possess all competences 
or charisms—something which implicitly discards the possibility of delegating authority 
over all areas to any one person or group alone—is foundational to any social ethics 
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concerned with the morality of cooperation. Its centrality is highlighted precisely by the 
fact that it is one of the only two explicitly political principles unambiguously advanced 
in the entire NT—the other being that concerning the exercise of ecclesial authority as 
service rather than dominion (treated in section 6.5 below). 
That principle must also be complemented by two further NT insights. The first is 
the rejection of any separate sacerdotal class as necessary to mediate between the divine 
and Christians or indeed human beings more in general.55 This is most clear in Hebrews 
(esp. 4.14 and 8.1) and 1 Peter 2.9; in addition, nowhere in Paul’s letter is such a class 
either mentioned or envisioned as necessary—indeed if anything it appears to be 
excluded by his ecclesiology. In the current RC theology, a central raison d’être of the 
‘ordained’, making their existence as a separate priestly class of Christians necessary, is 
that they are the only ones to be divinely empowered to preside over the most important 
sacrament, viz. the Eucharist. But such exclusivism is at odds with the earliest scriptural 
and traditional testimony, according to which a variety of people are reported to have 
presided over the common Eucharistic meals: most importantly, prophets, teachers, and 
house-church patrons.56 And because there is unambiguous scriptural as well as 
traditional57 evidence that all such roles have been fulfilled by women, it is almost 
certain that women who were apostles (Junia in Rom. 16.7, according to the majority of 
exegetes), prophets (Acts 21.9; 1 Cor. 11.5), teachers (Acts 18.26; see 1 Tim. 2.12), or 
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house-church patrons,58 would have not only taught but also presided at Eucharistic 
meals.59 In short if, for simplicity’s sake, we anachronistically apply to the early church 
the language of sacramental and jurisdictional powers developed much later, it can be 
said that throughout a few post-apostolic generations at least, all Christians, women 
included, could be delegated authority to fulfil specific functions of both an 
administrative and a sacramental nature—including those which were later to be 
ordinarily reserved to a special class or ordo of Christians, the clergy: preaching, 
teaching, baptising, and even Eucharistic presidency60—on behalf of the community and 
for the sake of its evangelising mission.61 
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The second significant element which can be gleaned from the pages of the NT is 
that in the early church, often enough, the chief reason for appointing someone as an 
authority in his/her own field was the possession of the relevant competence(s) (and I 
include here both humanly achieved and divinely bestowed skills/charisms).62 This 
remains true, even though the consensual acknowledgment that a person had 
authority—and so, often enough, his/her consequent appointment to office—was also 
dependent on the socially accepted (hence consensual) criteria such as the importance of 
honour, patronage, and the patriarchal organization of the household.63 Within the 
limits, then, of the already accepted patterns of cooperation and authority, it was often 
the community which would authoritatively discern and select suitable people to carry 
out administrative or spiritual tasks on its behalf (3.3). In this way the potential pool of 
possessors of such human skills or infused charisms was not arbitrarily and a priori 
limited to a separate caste of those who had been enabled through ordination to 
accomplish certain functions. 
It is within this general understanding that the question concerning the separation 
of sacramental and jurisdictional powers must be addressed, and that its historical 
development can be better appreciated. No necessary link existed between competence 
in financial and other administrative matters and competence in liturgical, pastoral, 
theological/doctrinal, and spiritual/mystical matters. This is also adumbrated by the 
expression the Twelve use in Acts 6.2 (i.e. ‘οὐκ ἀρεστόν ἐστιν’, that is, ‘It is not fitting’, 
‘commendable’, or ‘reasonable’), which appears to be a declaration of incompetence to 
serve at the tables by those charged with the unrelated task of proclaiming the Good 
News. The episode suggests that, as the Twelve, so too apostles, teachers, preachers and 
more generally all ministers in the church were not thereby also granted authority over 
issues beyond the specialised function detailed by their very title.64 
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Together with the foundational Pauline principle of 1 Cor. 12.29–30, this means 
that, because it is extraordinary that a Christian be uniquely competent not only in 
spirituality but also in all areas of church life (from financial administration to policy-
planning, resource-allocation, and liturgical worship), those who have spiritual 
authority—the ‘ordained’, in the present understanding of church ministry as being 
primarily a cultic-oriented ‘priesthood’—should not ordinarily also have administrative 
authority. 
Such an interpretation of those scriptural data appears the only alternative to the 
current official opinion in Roman Catholicism that the power of government of the 
hierarchy includes all the domains of the ecclesial life. For, to reiterate, it is impossible 
for any single person to be sufficiently qualified to wield absolute, unaccountable 
policy-planning and decision-making authority over all areas, and even more impossible 
to be able to fulfil demanding spiritual and sacramental duties as well. As Vatican II felt 
compelled to state, pastors ‘know that they were not ordained by Christ to take upon 
themselves alone the entire salvific mission of the Church toward the world. On the 
contrary they understand that it is their noble duty to shepherd the faithful and to 
recognize their ministries and charisms, so that all according to their proper roles may 
cooperate in this common undertaking with one mind.’65 
To sum up: authorities in the Christian community, just like in the human 
community, are such in the specialized domain only in which they are recognized as 
being competent. There can, of course, be ecclesial officials exercising a general, 
political authority of ἐpiισκοpiή: however, rather than being all-encompassing, such 
authority should only extend to the domain of the subsidiary coordination for unity, 
while deferring to the specialized authorities in their areas of expertise. 
6.5 Micromanagement and the Disregard of Subsidiarity in the Roman 
Catholic Church 
We come here to the second centralization plaguing contemporary RC ecclesiology. 
Defined negatively and explanatorily, it is the one resulting from the disregard of 
subsidiarity, and defined positively and descriptively, it is known as micro-
management. 
We see such a dysfunctional disregard of subsidiarity in several elements of the 
current constitution of the RC Church. A central one is the centralized appointment of 
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bishops worldwide by the pope—a procedure which took place gradually only since the 
mid-nineteenth century. Another vast field where micro-management is most evident 
concerns liturgical translations, customs and more generally local evangelization and 
the inculturation of the gospel. Those as well as analogous areas of micro-management 
in the RC Church depend on and are justified by the crucial definition of the powers of 
bishops as stated by can. 381 §1 of the 1983 CIC: ‘A diocesan bishop in the diocese 
entrusted to him has all ordinary, proper, and immediate power which is required for the 
exercise of his pastoral function except for cases which the law or a decree of the 
Supreme Pontiff reserves to the supreme authority or to another ecclesiastical 
authority’ (my emphasis).66 
According to the understandings of delegation, subsidiarity, and the division of 
competences offered earlier, it is always the inalienable responsibility of each decisional 
level from the individual upward, to determine the extent and limits of what is one’s 
responsibility to decide and act, and what is instead better delegated to the higher 
authority—not the other way around. According to subsidiarity, the authority of office 
holders must be understood as a subsidiary ‘coordination’ which, rather than entailing 
some sort of intrusive micro-management of the decisions and actions lying within the 
operational range of the individuals or the lower levels (negative prescription), is to be 
understood as limited to those decisions and actions only which individuals and lower 
levels have deemed beyond their reach and for which they require accordingly the help 
and cooperation of the wider community (positive prescription). 
Now, both the negative and the positive aspects of the understanding of authority 
resonate with some important NT data we have on the subject. The NT passages on 
ecclesial ‘authority’ ordinarily quoted by ecclesiologists (esp. Mt 20.24–7, 23.8–12; Mk 
10.42–44; Lk 22.26; Jn 13.1–17; 1 Peter 5.3, and 2 Cor. 1.24) repeatedly distinguish 
between two conflicting understandings of authority: a negative one, ‘to lord it over’, 
against which the NT repeatedly warns, and a prescriptive one, ‘διακονία’ or service. 
The former understanding appears to exclude the possibility for authority to micro-
manage (‘lord it over’) in violation of the principle of subsidiarity. On the other hand, 
the positive ‘service’ authority provides is made more explicit by Paul as that of 
‘equipping the saints’ or perhaps, as a possible alternative translation goes, as ‘bringing 
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the saints to maturity’ (Eph 4.12):67 whatever the interpretation, it is plausible to infer 
that Paul understands the function of authority as supplying what enables lower levels to 
perform at best (which is precisely the most relevant meaning of the Greek καταρτισµός, 
from the verb καταρτίζω: ‘make whole or perfect’, also used to refer to moral and 
spiritual maturation68), that which can be further specified in light of the analysis so far 
as the function of deciding and coordinating the implementation of only what 
individuals and lower levels have deemed beyond their reach and for which they 
accordingly require the help and cooperation of the wider community. This seems to 
accord with the NT usage of ἐpiίσκοpiος as ‘a man charged with the duty of seeing that 
things to be done by others are done rightly, any curator, guardian or superintendent’.69 
More generally, as it has been noted, 
the goal of the ‘apostolic ministry’ is ‘the responsible community’ and 
also the ‘organization of the community’ (see 1 Cor. 14). The Pauline 
ideal of the Christian community does not consist in making believers 
dependent on the ecclesiastical office, but in assisting them towards their 
own responsibility and independence as self-accountable Christians (see 1 
Cor. 3:1-4).70 
Arguably, resistance in the RC Church to the application of subsidiarity and to the 
reform of its absolutist polity largely derives from the fear that to do so would 
contradict the dogmatically defined immediate, universal and ordinary jurisdiction of 
the pope. Yet such fear is mistaken, at least to the extent that they would not abolish 
such jurisdiction, but simply restrict it to exceptional cases. Again, subsidiarity remains 
the only solution to the unresolved issue of the two overlapping jurisdictions of the local 
bishop and the pope respectively.71 The acknowledgment of the importance of 
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subsidiarity, and its consequent implementation in the RC Church, would eliminate 
centralism, while the recognition of the unfeasibility of an omnicompetent authority 
would eliminate the main source of clericalism. 
To the extent that the current structural outline of the RC Church does not respect 
those norms for the individual’s cooperation in the common action of a community to 
be responsible, it is ‘gravely immoral’ by the very standard of the principle of 
subsidiarity. To the same extent, moreover, also for the individual Catholic to cooperate 
in the common action of their local church—whether by contributing time, skill or 
money—is irresponsible and thus potentially immoral. 
Consider for example the morality of donating money, which is a form of 
cooperation in the common action of the group, for money funds collaborative projects. 
Following the scriptural witness in Acts, as well as the above mentioned philosophical 
insights into the morality of cooperation, in the Christian church temporal goods belong 
to the whole community, and so does their administration. In the current RC Church, 
with regard to the financial administration, canon law apparently allows self-
determination: it affirms that dioceses and each parish within a diocese own their own 
lands, buildings and money, and have a fair amount of autonomy in financial 
administration—the diocese in particular having virtually no external or regulatory 
oversight of its financial statements.72 
Yet the affirmation that the local church own its own assets risks becoming void 
to the extent that, according to the canon law currently in force, the bishop is the only 
person ultimately and exclusively responsible for the financial administration of those 
assets. Additional circumstances make the irresponsibility and thus potential immorality 
of cooperating financially with one’s RC parish and diocese under the current legal 
ordering particularly evident: namely, that the bishop is not canonically required to be 
an expert in financial administration, cannot be expected to be able to elaborate single-
handedly the future policies and courses of action to be taken in concert by the local 
church and, last but not least, is not even legally bound to take into account the analysis 
of the only expert financial body canon law prescribes at the diocesan level—namely 
the finance council (can. 492)—unless for an amount of money exceeding a certain 
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limit, which varies from national church to national church (in the U.S., it is $1 million 
for dioceses with more than 500,000 Catholics, and $500,000 for smaller dioceses, see 
can. 1295). In addition, there are not legal provisions to make such financial decisions 
open and transparent, a lack which already Blessed Antonio Rosmini forcefully 
denounced more than a century and a half ago.73 The problem is compounded by the 
bishop’s virtual lack of accountability for how he administers the assets of his church. 
Conversely, the donors—and more generally the whole community, to which, it is 
crucial to remember, ecclesial assets belong—have legally no say on how the money is 
to be spent. This means that their money may be used for purposes or projects which 
they deem (and may well objectively be) inappropriate, mistaken, or even immoral, 
without them having the possibility of doing anything about it.74 And the possibilities of 
that happening are far from remote for, as noted, the system does not provide legal 
norms binding the only decision-maker (i.e. the bishop) to be an expert on policy-
making and economic administration, nor does it provide any legal warranties that both 
binds him to consult the competent person(s), and makes him accountable in case of 
misdeeds.75 Such a ‘blind’ cooperation, with no voice in the discernment for the best 
course of action possible, no warranty that everything will be done to find it, nor that 
the values and priorities of those cooperating into the common action are shared by the 
decision-maker, is irresponsible and potentially immoral. 
                                                 
73
 See The Five Wounds of the Church, chapter five. For the current state of affairs with regard to 
financial checks and balances, West and Zech, ‘Internal Financial Controls in the U.S. Catholic Church’, 
135–6. 85% of the 78 chief financial officers responding to the Zech-West survey acknowledged that 
embezzlement occurred in their dioceses over the past five years. 
74
 It is hardly the case to recall here the scandalous way in which RC bishops used church goods to 
cover for abusive priests, not only in the US but also, notably, in the UK and Ireland. 
75
 Statistical studies show that Catholics on average donate significantly less to their church than 
most Protestant denominations: see e.g. Dean R. Hoge et al., Money Matters: Personal Giving in 
American Churches (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996): the average Catholic Household 
was reported at $819 in the early 1990s, the lowest of the five Christian denominations studied, i.e. 
Lutherans ($1,196), Presbyterians ($1,635), Baptists ($2,479), and members of the Assemblies of God 
($2,985). Is that because Catholics are greedier or less generous than other Christians? Or is it because 
they perceive the dangers of donating under the current arrangement? Indeed, church members 
responding to the study did indicate that if churches wanted them to give more, the churches should be 
prepared to give them a say in how the money was spent. Catholics, the lowest givers, expressed the 
greatest dissatisfaction with being left out of financial decisions. More than two-thirds of Protestant 
respondents said members had enough influence in how church money was spent; only 48 percent of 
Catholics said they had enough influence. 78% of Catholics surveyed said lay people and clergy should 
handle financial matters jointly. Only 9% wanted to leave finances to priests only. In fact, it has further 
been statistically observed that Catholics’ contribution is positively affected, among other things, 
precisely by the extent of the community’s (i.e. the donors’) decision-making power with regard to how 
the donations are to be used, and by the extent to which an active majority of parishioners are involved: 
see on this Peter Zaleski and Charles Zech, ‘Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant 
Religious Giving’, Review of Religious Research 36 (December, 1994), 158-67. 
  231 
6.6 Social Sin and the Necessity of Criticism towards Tradition 
By highlighting the relationship of individuals with their cultural tradition of common 
meanings and values, the outline of a political philosophy based on Lonergan’s 
intentionality analysis presented in chapter five also sheds light on the meaning of the 
concept of social and structural sin, much debated especially since the development of 
liberation theology. It is true, of course, that there cannot be sin unless with reference to 
a morally conscious individual subject, and to his/her choices. Still, the subject’s 
choices can be motivated either by his/her own immanently generated knowledge, or by 
what s/he believes. Now, the vast majority of the latter comes from the shared fund of 
meanings and values constituting his/her cultural inheritance: about 98% of what we 
know, we believe, so that the cultural tradition from which we imbibe meanings and 
values makes us far more than we make it. Consequently, most of our choices and 
judgments are based on beliefs coming from our cultural heritage rather than on 
immanently generated knowledge.76 Accordingly, responsibility is fully personal only 
and exclusively for those choices or the part of those choices which are fully attributable 
to the individual subject; while it is a shared (co-)responsibility for those judgments and 
choices not directly generated by the subject. As a consequence, while the responsibility 
of the individual vis-à-vis the factual as well as evaluative errors of the community does 
exist, it is always a very small percentage of the overall, communal co-responsibility for 
it. 
The cumulative results of social inattention, oversight, unreasonableness and 
irresponsibility constitute what Lonergan calls the ‘social surd’, namely the historical 
and social results of the sustained inauthenticity stemming from inattention, oversight, 
unreasonableness, and irresponsibility.77 The individuals’ responsibility with regard to it 
presupposes the possibility of escaping at least partially from the factual as well as 
evaluative mistakes contained in one’s socio-cultural tradition. Inasmuch as the 
common fund of knowledge and evaluations is the result of the experiences, 
understandings, judgments of fact and of value of several generations, individuals can 
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carry out the critique of their socio-cultural tradition only in minimal percentages. In 
effect, while it would of course be nonsensical to say that individuals can escape 
entirely from the influence of their tradition, still it is possible that, on particular 
occasions, they may perceive the effects of the distortions the social surd produces. 
And, as Lonergan illustrated, because the correction of a single error can open the way 
to a systematic tracking of the web of factual as well as evaluative mistakes preceding 
it, the independent contributions of particular individuals can be the starting point for 
the critical contribution of others.78 
Such collaborative cultural critique will not be a linear or obstacles-free process, 
so much so that, according to Lonergan, the overcoming of the social surd is simply 
impossible if one were to consider only the intrinsic capacities of human beings. In 
order to rise above the biases derived from individual and group egoism, it is necessary 
to have a further contribution, which Lonergan outlines as the integration of human 
capacities.79 The healing of the social surd will be, in any case, always and inevitably be 
a very partial and precarious achievement until the piαρουσία, or second coming of 
Christ. Yet such healing, even if inescapably partial, is the overall goal to which the 
church must contribute in the history of humanity. 
Finally, and most significantly for present purposes, the critical assessment of 
tradition necessary for the healing of the social surd largely depends, as far as human 
means are concerned, on the existence of the freedoms of information, thought, 
communication, and public debate. 
Such is, in extremely summarized form, the vision elaborated by Lonergan, in 
harmony with his philosophical and theological system. Lonergan argued that the 
problem of evil, viz. human beings’ fundamental moral impotence or ‘basic sin’—
understood as their incapacity of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible 
consistently and for a sustained period, and which is the cause of the social surd and 
would quickly bring to the end of humanity—is not something which can be addressed 
by our natural capacities: rather, it requires a supernatural solution. This solution he 
envisaged precisely as a supernatural integration of the human capacities which 
strengthens but does not destroy or supersede them.80 Lonergan’s perspective is a 
development of the Thomist conception of the continuity between nature and the 
supernatural. It is relevant for our present purposes in two ways: first, by clearly 
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envisaging the socio-cultural dimension of sin and the need for divine redemption at 
that level too, it confirms that the church’s role in God’s universal salvific plan must 
include a distinct and arguably irreplaceable contribution to the communal striving for 
the constantly needed redemptive recovery of the social surd. Second, it highlights both 
the need for critically assessing a community’s tradition in order to heal its social surd 
and, most to the point, the fact that such critical assessment depends, as far as human 
means are concerned, on the existence of the freedoms of information, thought, 
communication, and public debate. 
6.7 The Role of Free and Public Discussion in the Church 
The ecclesial community too must provide for the diffusion and development of its own 
fund of knowledge and values. Only thus will it be able to live up to the times and 
contribute to the overcoming of the social surd. This is because, on the one hand, this 
overcoming presupposes the conversion of the individual, but on the other, it is itself the 
presupposition for the preparation, purification, and completion of the individual 
conversion itself.81 
If this is so, there is a clear need to nourish the critical assessment and 
development of the common fund of knowledge and evaluations of a community, and to 
foster its critical appropriation by its members. To this goal, modern societies have 
developed a certain number of institutions concerning education and mass 
communication. Those institutions are geared towards assuring the freedoms of 
conscience, research, and communication, which are the fundamental conditions for the 
development of culture just mentioned. We find again here a third dimension of the 
analogy between human and ecclesial authority (cf. section 6.2 above): in both, the 
conditions for the decision to delegate are the same, viz. that there be sufficient 
information for such decision to be informed and thus responsible. Thus, just as the 
more the state wants to realize the democratic ideal of responsible delegation, the more 
it must invest in promoting the diffusion of knowledge, so too in the case of the church: 
the adhesion of the people of God is the more responsible the more it is informed and 
critical. 
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The impossibility of public criticism is the death-sentence of any society: for just 
as self-critique is an absolutely necessary premise for individual conversion—
conversion always stems from the realization of the sinfulness of one’s own current 
ways—so public debate and critique is an absolutely necessary premise for social and 
cultural conversion, and this applies within the church as well.82 Free and public 
discussion is a necessary feature for the very continuation—and indeed the very 
establishment83—of any community in the technical meaning of the word detailed 
above, as a group characterised by common experiences, insights, judgments of fact, 
and values. It is, in effect, the only means whereby the common fund can be exploited. 
Besides bringing to the surface all the available knowledge and wisdom of the 
community, it also filters biased, ideological counter-positions, so that it is necessary for 
an informed assessment and selection of potential authorities and thus for a responsible 
delegation. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The present chapter was motivated by the twofold concern for assessing both the extent 
to which the current RC polity opposes the above mentioned insights concerning the 
moral norms for the individual’s responsible cooperation in a common action (including 
by means of subordination to authority), and whether it is really possible to affirm—as 
official Roman Catholic ecclesiology is, if not unique, certainly idiosyncratic among the 
Christian churches in doing—that those insights are invalid within the church because 
incompatible with scriptural and/or traditional data on the church. 
The findings reported above suggest both that current official RC ecclesiology 
does in fact contradict in important respects some foundational (democratic) principles 
of political freedom and responsibility, and that such principles appear to resonate rather 
than being incompatible with scripture and tradition. Among the common elements, I 
have mentioned the importance that officials be appointed by popular election, or other 
procedure, as long as it is suitable for expressing the necessary consent of the 
community to those in authority. Again, I have insisted that the understanding of 
authority defined by the principle of the subsidiary function seems to be if not explicitly 
warranted at least in agreement with scripture. Indeed, it specifies the twofold NT 
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 See John R. Quinn, ‘Reform and Criticism in the Church’, in The Reform of the Papacy: The 
Costly Call to Christian Unity (New York: Crossroad, 1999), 36–75. 
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 ‘Through communication there is constituted community, and, conversely, community constitutes 
and perfects itself through communication.’ Lonergan, Method, 363. 
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description of authority—positively as ‘service’ and negatively as ‘not lording it 
over’—by envisaging the very raison d’être of authority as that of helping the lower 
decisional level (from the individual upwards) attain what it would otherwise have to 
forsake—hence its diaconal element—and by the same token limits such authority by 
forbidding micro-management—hence its ‘not lording it over’ element. Finally, I have 
commented on the importance of free and public discussion for the very formation as 
well as maintenance and development of a community. Free and public debate, of 
course, is implied by the NT term piαρρησία—itself a fundamental concept of Greek 
political thought84—which was a central element of the common life of the early church. 
In effect, the common house-meetings and assemblies (ἐκκλησίαι) at the basis of the 
Christian fellowship (κοινωνία) were undoubtedly events in which discussion—for 
mutual edification, growth in understanding of the Good News, discernment of the 
common good and decision-making for common action—was a primary and indeed 
essential purpose.85 Today, such public debates should be promoted also on all available 
ecclesial mass-media. 
The guidelines offered above aim to overcome both the centralization of 
competences—and thereby both allow the responsible selection by all those concerned 
of church officials on the basis of their competence, and legally binding the 
coordinating authority to defer to the relevant specialized authorities whenever needed 
as a matter of moral duty—and the centralization resulting from not recognizing that 
every authority has only a subsidiary function with regard its lower level and, 
accordingly, should not act in any of those matters that the lower level deems, on the 
basis of its own personal judgment, to lay within its capacity and thus responsibility. 
Until the Roman Catholic ecclesial polity has redressed both centralizations—and the 
changes required, as might be appreciated, are momentous—it can be foreseen that the 
current situation of indifference, disengagement, and alienation affecting a majority of 
those baptized Catholics is not likely to improve.86 
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7 CONCLUSION 
This work has been prompted by the much debated question of whether the Christian 
community can be structured democratically. The organization of the Christian polity, it 
was anticipated, can have a remarkable import for both the intellectual and the moral 
quality of Christian action and cooperation in the world, and that justifies the amount of 
research and discussions gone into addressing it. 
The potential for developing this work is both dependent on and limited by its 
methodology, for the latter is based on two precise assumptions which are not 
universally shared. The first, expounded in chapter four, is an insight basic to and 
distinctive of mainstream Christian (as distinguished from e.g. Islamic) theology. In this 
view, divine assistance—whatever its precise nature—always preserves all the 
cognitional and moral operations making up human beings’ distinctive way of coming 
to know (intelligently) and deciding (responsibly). 
The second assumption is that any theory studying the individual’s cooperation in 
the action of a group always assumes, explicitly or implicitly, a view of whether and 
how (i.e. by what cognitional and moral operations) we come to know and decide. 
When coupled with the first more properly theological assumption, the resulting insight 
affirms that an understanding of human intentionality detailing whether and how 
humans come to know (intelligently) and decide (responsibly) is basic to, and always 
undergirds, not only philosophical but also theological reflections about the individual’s 
political cooperation in the action of his or her group, regardless of whether the latter is 
a primarily religious or a primarily civil community. 
That this has been historically the case is witnessed by the remarkable influence 
different views of human intellectual and moral capacities and operations (e.g. the 
Augustinian/Platonic and the Thomist/Aristotelian) have had on the past ecclesiologies 
and political philosophies they undergirded—whether papalist or conciliarist, royalist or 
constitutionalist, Catholic or Protestant. 
The method underlying this work has been, accordingly, that of clarifying, 
comparing, and evaluating political as well as ecclesiological insights and practices 
against whether and to what extent they stem from and abide by the cognitional and 
moral criteria for our coming to know to be attentive, intelligent, and reasonable, and 
for our deciding to be responsible. Its results have been, on the one hand, the essential 
reaffirmation of the insights entailed by the principles of subsidiarity and self-
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determination and, on the other hand, a heuristic understanding of democracy as the 
rationalization and responsibilisation of delegation and of the relationship of authority. 
Both subsidiarity and the understanding of legitimate authority as based on 
attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible and free decision to delegate should not be 
regarded simply as a recent insight which has perhaps over-hastily been considered as 
the foundation of contemporary Western democratic political philosophy. Rather, they 
express the eventual widespread acceptance of the ancient perception that human beings 
are rational, responsible, and thus free, and that accordingly obedience to authority—
any authority, whether that of the gods or of the rulers—must ultimately rest on free 
consent. 
Of course, historically such a fact of human nature has been ignored much more 
often than not, variously due to group prejudices about ethnicity, gender and sexual 
orientation, religion, or social class/caste. Throughout history, people have denied and 
still deny other people their intelligence, responsibility, and thus freedom—including of 
course their political freedom—for a variety of reasons. For instance, because they 
worshipped the wrong gods (‘infidels’); had been conquered or were born of the 
‘wrong’ parents (‘slaves’, by conquest or by birth); were born of the ‘wrong’ sex 
(female) or sexual orientation (homosexuals); were born of the ‘wrong’ race: all those 
terms, from ‘infidel’ to ‘female’, carried—and often still carry—the implication of 
negative, inferior, sub-normal cognitive and moral capacities. 
Yet, the universal awareness of the responsible and thus free nature of human 
beings kept resurfacing, time and again, with the nagging insistence of facts, which are 
sacred. Its very slow, struggling recognition has only recently began to attain dominant, 
if still precarious, status in the cultural mindset of the people living in the Western 
democracies, but that in itself, from an historical perspective, is to be counted as a 
momentous achievement of political philosophy and human civilization more generally. 
An analogous discourse can be made about subsidiarity—understood in the sense 
presented earlier (4.4)—which well summarises the intentional requirements for 
cooperation to be responsible. Precisely with regard to that principle we find a notable 
convergence between political philosophy, Christian ecclesiology, and—I would 
suggest—some important non-Christian thought on political as well as religious 
communities. Let us proceed in that order. 
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Robert Dahl has hailed subsidiarity, under the name of ‘presumption of personal 
autonomy’,1 as the foundational principle of democratic political philosophy. Its essence 
is already clearly present in Aristotle’s Politics.2 The most famous endorsement of 
subsidiarity has been by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, which 
sanctioned it as the normative principle for regulating the division of competencies and 
responsibilities between the various decisional levels within the EU (thus further 
underlying that it is the only principle truly necessary and foundational for any polity, 
and thus the only principle with potential transcultural value). However it is called, the 
principle of subsidiarity—which is but a clarification of the principle of self-
determination—continues to be regarded across many of the currently dominant and 
most widespread cultures as expressing a universal anthropological insight with obvious 
political consequences. Particularly noteworthy is also the fact that subsidiarity has been 
regarded as one of the handful of interrelated foundational principles which should 
undergird any revision of international law and any future development of a ‘global 
law’.3 
Subsidiarity has had an analogous fundamental role in the history of ecclesiology. 
As in political philosophy, its earlier implicit role was first officially acknowledged only 
relatively recently, when Pope Pius XII twice stressed its foundational importance in the 
church. More recently, in 1998 the Virginia Report of the Inter-Anglican Theological 
and Doctrinal Commission endorsed its application as a principle which should inform 
the government of the worldwide Anglican Communion.4 Likewise, the constitution of 
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the Lutheran World Federation, drafted in 1990, clearly embodies the principle of 
subsidiarity even while it does not explicitly mention it.5 In their recent ecclesiological 
dialogue with the U.S. Roman Catholic Church, the U.S. United Methodists 
acknowledged that they ‘highly value the application of the “principle of subsidiarity” 
within their communities, whereby functions, services, and decisions that are 
appropriate to individuals or smaller groups are actually carried out by them. It is unjust 
and harmful to koinonia for higher authorities or larger communities to deprive people 
of their rightful responsibilities’.6 The polity of other Christian churches—Reformed, 
Presbyterian, Baptist, and Free Churches—are already largely consistent with 
subsidiarity: but they too might still find that principle useful for the ongoing 
assessment of both their current practices and their future developments. 
Lastly, there are some intriguing instances of the presence of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the political thought of non-Christian traditions. For instance, with regard 
to Islam, Muslim scholars Zafar Iqbal and Mervyn K. Lewis observed: 
The Holy Qur’an mandated the pre-Islamic concept of shura, that is 
governance by mutual consultation and consensus, as a central aspect of 
an Islamic system of government as epitomized by the actual practice of 
the Prophet and the four rightly-guided Caliphs. Shura involved the use of 
elections or consultations to select representatives to discuss, debate and 
formulate public policy on the umma’s behalf. Using this example, each 
specific community or fraternity should decide, via shura, what structure 
of governance is appropriate for it. In effect, what must be decided is the 
process of establishing mutual consultation on political decisions, and the 
role of ahl al-hal wa al-àqd, the persons eligible to participate in the 
process of shura (Tag el-Din, 2006).7 
The affirmation that it is up to each specific community to determine what political 
pattern is appropriate for it, as well as the scope and extent of delegation, is essentially 
an affirmation of subsidiarity (see 5.4 and 5.13, no. 138). 
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In light of those assumptions, it is easy to see how this work could be developed. 
For the latter is but a specific and limited application of the general method of 
clarifying, comparing and evaluating philosophical or theological insights on the 
political life in general—and specifically on the requirements for cooperation in a 
community—against both a critical understanding of how (i.e. by which intentional 
operations) we come to know and decide, and against the resulting view of the human 
being stemming from it—i.e. the view, today widespread, of the human subject as 
intelligent, responsible, free and self-determining (if always socially and culturally 
conditioned). Politically, it entails—as chapter five has attempted to show—an 
understanding of democracy as the rationalization and responsibilisation of delegation 
and of the relationship of authority, based on the principle of subsidiarity or self-
determination. 
From this perspective, a way to carry that project forward would be, as just noted, 
that of clarifying, comparing and evaluating philosophical or theological insights of 
other cultural or religious traditions concerning the political life in general—and 
specifically on the requirements for cooperation in a community—against whether and 
to what extent they stem from a view of human intentionality in general, and of its 
cognitive and moral requirements for cooperation/obedience to be responsible in 
particular, analogous to the distinctively Christian and Western one assumed here: 
namely, that the human subject retains his/her intelligence, responsibility, and freedom 
of self-determination even if continually assisted by God, and that the main criterion for 
evaluating any polity, whether primarily civil or primarily religious, is the extent to 
which it stems from, reflects, and enables the exercise of intelligence and responsibility 
in the relationship of authority, and so primarily in delegating. 
A reliable way of knowing if such an understanding of democracy common in the 
West has indeed a future is by evaluating its presence in, or at least compatibility with, 
the political insights contained in the many cultural and religious traditions of the world. 
While a lot has already been done in this regard, with many specific studies analysing 
the democratic content of the Islamic, Hinduist, Buddhist, or Confucian traditions—to 
mention but a few—much more still needs to be done. 
A more immediate way of expanding the project advanced here is to study further 
what ecclesiological insights and practices should be preserved, developed, or revised 
for the Christian church to become an exemplary model of democracy in the sense 
developed in this work: namely, a community stemming from, reflecting, and nurturing 
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the exercise of intelligence and responsibility in the relationship of authority. Such a 
goal, as de Gruchy among others insisted, is central to the mission of the church: 
If political democracy means the way in which justice is structured on the 
presupposition of equity and for the sake of freedom, then it reflects by 
analogy what should be even more true within the life of the Christian 
ekklesia. If genuine democracy should enable human fulfilment and 
flourishing, how much more should the life of the church enable its 
members to discover an even deeper fulfilment and freedom in Christ? If 
democracy is about political participation in which difference is respected 
and which contributes to the well-being of the whole, how much more 
should the church as the koinonia of the ‘people of God’ embody and 
express true human sociality, reflecting the restored image of the triune 
God? This being so, ‘the most authentic support that the church can give 
to a democratic order of society remains that of an effective and 
increasingly profound praxis of communion within itself’.8 
Indeed, Barth’s words remain as actual today as they were first written that ‘the decisive 
contribution which the Christian community can make to the upbuilding and 
maintenance of the civil consists in the witness which it has to give it and to all human 
societies in the form of the order of its own upbuilding and constitution.’9 
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